

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

*c/do*

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

*c/sod*

*[Handwritten initials]*

*1 to 2*

2.

*Ch GND Br*

*For Review & such  
comment & for recommen-  
dation as you consider  
appropriate*

*[Handwritten box]*

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

*DEPOT*

*Detroit  
R 1576*

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

22 OCT 1964

DO 64-349

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Future of Agent Recruitment by DO/DOB

REFERENCES : a. C/SR Memorandum dated 25 August 1964 to ADDP, Subject: Recommendation for Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of JCS Requirements for the USSR.

b. Extract of EE Division Memorandum dated 6 May 1964 to Chief, DO Division, Subject: (Agent) Requirements for DO/DOB.

1. Copies of reference (a) and the various comments thereon submitted by EE, SOD and WPS were not available to DOB until 9 October. These documents obviously have direct bearing upon the future agent recruitment program of DO/DOB and have an immediate impact on the outstanding, recently re-affirmed, requirements levied by EE Division on DOB for recruitment of Albanians, Bulgarians and Rumanians to satisfy JCS requirements which have been accepted by CIA.

2. As you are aware, DO/DOB is re-directing its recruitment efforts and re-assessing the capabilities of its reserve corps to meet cold war contingency situations which might involve covert CIA action. Notwithstanding this re-direction, until the basic policy considerations raised in reference (a) and the various endorsements thereto are resolved, DO/DOB, unless directed otherwise, has no alternative but to proceed with its efforts to satisfy EE's requirements for the Southeast European area.

3. At this late date, we would like to comment on several of the points raised in reference (a) and the comments submitted by other CS components thereon. Some of these papers refer to the fact that the WUDEPOT externally held agents are not sufficiently current with local conditions in the areas for which they were recruited. With the greater freedom of travel afforded by present policies of the Soviet Bloc governments, we believe that SR and EE, in conjunction with DO/DOB, should consider the feasibility of dispatching some of our external agents to their "target countries" as tourists. SOD in

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

its earlier "Review of Projects which Respond to JCS Requirements or Stay-Behind", dated 17 February 1964 made this same recommendation with regard to NE agents trained by WUDEPOT. Under present circumstances, the logic of SOD's recommendations with regard to the NE area might very well apply to certain of the European Satellites and, indeed, to the USSR itself or at least to certain Republics such as the former Baltic countries which were absorbed into the USSR. If this idea has any merit, we feel that such missions should be purely for familiarisation purposes and that no clandestine assignment should be connected therewith.

4. Certain of the papers relating to reference (a) allude to internal agents and the possibility of their utilization in response to certain JCS requirements. While we have no specific knowledge of the number or locations of these agents, it does occur to us that consideration should be given to their possible use as contacts for externally held WUDEPOT personnel in hot or limited war situations. Such use would obviously have an effect on our decisions regarding the future of the WUDEPOT program even on the basis of its initial concept, i. e., to meet JCS needs.

5. Some comment was made with regard to reference (a) as to the feasibility of CIA's relinquishing to JCS responsibility for recruiting externally held assets for hot war use in the event CIA concluded that this was no longer feasible or within its capabilities. We would strongly oppose such a recommendation because it inevitably would lead to a conflict between such a DOD effort and the re-directed recruitment for DO/DOB.

[ ] [ ]  
[ ] [ ]  
Chief, DO Division

Attachments: As stated

TPS:k (16 October 1964)

2 - Addressee

1 - C/SOD ✓

1 - C/WPS

1 - C/EE

1 - C/SR

1 - C/DO/DOB

1 - Chrono

SECRET