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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Project WUDEPOT

FROM: C/GB/DR	EXTENSION 7348	NO.
		DATE 28 October 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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1.	C/SOD/GB				<p>For signature.</p> <p><i>used</i></p> <p><i>Not</i></p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3020 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007</p>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SOD

SUBJECT: Project WUDEPOT

1. In a meeting with ADD/P on 2 September 1964, attended by representatives from DO, WPS, and [] and myself from SOD/GB, Mr. Karamessines requested that all participants give further thought to project WUDEPOT and be prepared to meet again in his office in the near future to discuss what can best be done with this project.

2. The tentative views on this subject now prevailing in SOD/GB are as stated in Attachment. In order to have a firm SOD position before the next meeting with ADD/P, we would appreciate discussing this with you at your convenience.

[]
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

Attachment:

Memo C/GB/DR to C/SOD/GB,
Subject: Project WUDEPOT

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28 OCT 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SOD/GB

SUBJECT: Project WUDEPOT

- REFERENCES:
- a. SOD Memorandum to ADD/P, 17 February 1964, Subject: Review of Projects Which Respond to JCS Requirements for Staybehind
 - b. SR Memorandum to ADD/P, 25 August 1964, Subject: Recommendation for Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of JCS Requirements for the USSR, and comments thereto by EE, WPS, and SOD
 - c. DO/DOB Memorandum for Record, 31 August 1964, Subject: Review of Project WUDEPOT Assets and Requirements for Recruiting and Training

1. Project WUDEPOT was initiated in 1956 specifically to prepare for UW support of the military in anticipation of open hostilities against the USSR, and this has been its principal purpose since that time. It is now the consensus, however, that it is unrealistic to rely on WUDEPOT assets to serve this purpose--see Refs. a. and b. Therefore, the problem arises as to whether the WUDEPOT mechanism and the assets generated by it can profitably be put to any use in current Cold War operations.

2. According to DO/DOB, there now are 115 trained agents held in reserve on a retainer basis under the WUDEPOT program, and of this total DO/DOB estimates that perhaps 50 per cent might respond to a call for Cold War contingency service in places other than their respective ethnic areas--see Ref. c. Leaving out those agents recruited specifically for the Middle East (ARLEAP), this means that perhaps 50 of the agents now retained by WUDEPOT might respond to a call for general Cold War service, whereas about 50 others would respond only for UW service in the USSR or the Satellites of Eastern Europe.

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3. As regards this latter group, if they will respond only for UW service in the USSR and Satellites, and if as stated above it is now considered unrealistic to rely on them for this purpose, it must be concluded that they have little remaining utility unless the Area Divisions can find some special use for them. The problem, therefore, comes down to a consideration of the other 50 who possibly can be used.

4. Under the present WUDEPOT program these agents are considered reservists who are subject to call for employment with U. S. Army Special Forces Teams behind enemy lines during wartime. Their training and orientation have been directed toward this end rather than toward Cold War clandestine or covert operations. If they are to be retained for contingency use individually in clandestine or covert Cold War operations, some other basic requirements necessarily must be satisfied.

a. In the first place, it goes without saying that they must be personally qualified and adequately trained for individual service in a covert or clandestine role. To meet this requirement, some reorientation and retraining would be necessary.

b. They should have some area knowledge of a likely target area. Critical target areas presently are in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Most of these agents are oriented toward Eastern Europe or the USSR. Nominally, therefore, this requirement is not met, although this does not necessarily mean that ethnic Europeans or Russians would not be operationally useful in present target areas.

c. They should have a language capability commensurate with the probable target area. Aside from English, the greatest need at present is for French or Spanish. Of the agents under consideration, DO/DOB indicates that only eight have some knowledge (untested) of French or Spanish.

d. More importantly, if these agents are to be employed operationally in a clandestine role, they must have either an enduring cover within the target area, or alternately there must be a clandestine apparatus within the target area to receive them and maintain them black. Evidently none of these agents presently have any cover in any target area,

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nor are they well-trained in the meaning and use of cover; and to use them black under pre-established clandestine nets would require special arrangements in individual cases.

e. On the positive side, all of these agents already have received training which in general is equivalent to that of our IUJEWEL personnel who have had no Agency training other than the Basic PM Course. Presumably, therefore, they could readily be integrated into the IUJEWEL program to serve in a PM role under light official cover where this is adequate, and where more sophisticated training is not required. Presumably, also, some few of these individuals who have the language capability might well be given the necessary additional covert training and documented to serve as non-Americans where this is called for.

5. As regards the future of the WUDEPOT project, it should be borne in mind that while the practice of holding ready reserves in the ZI is excellent for serving a military purpose, it is not very satisfactory for serving the needs of covert action during the Cold War. Within the field of foreign intelligence and related CA activities, the only satisfactory comparable practice is that of maintaining sleepers within a target area. Under the best of all practicable arrangements, men rooted and held in reserve in this country cannot easily develop a covert operational viability in a foreign area; they cannot easily maintain a language capability suitable for contingency operations in a target area; and they cannot satisfactorily develop contacts and durable cover in a target area. Sleeper agents can do all these things and be ready for immediate activation in an operational role when called upon. If these WUDEPOT reservists were in a sleeper role, there would be no problem; or if they could be uprooted and resettled in a sleeper role in selected target areas, there would be no problem--but it is unlikely now that this could be done on any practicable scale. Therefore, in the future, it seems undesirable that there be any further recruitment of reservists.

6. In addition to the 50 or more WUDEPOT agent reservists under consideration, there also is the WUDEPOT Base mechanism that administers the project. This includes the staff which does the spotting, screening, recruiting, and administering of records; it includes an effective

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training staff; and it includes the WUDEPOT physical training facilities. This in itself constitutes a valuable asset in the PM field, and it would be administratively wasteful to disband this asset if it can be kept intact and usefully employed in current operations. In view of the recurring crash requirements for domestic PM training programs involving contract personnel, and the increasing demand for PM training officers to serve on foreign operational assignments, perhaps at least a part of this WUDEPOT Base mechanism can be used to help meet some of these requirements. Again, this suggests possible integration with IUJEWEL or other related projects.

7. While the above review does not arrive at any very firm recommendations, it does lead to some tentative conclusions or suggestions on which an SOD position possibly can be based.

a. It seems to be clear enough now that there is no future role for WUDEPOT as it has been oriented and conducted in the past.

b. As regards the agent reservists now retained by the project, it would appear that perhaps a number could be absorbed for some use by the Area Divisions for whom they were recruited. WUDEPOT is the creation of SR, EE, and NE, and until they are released these agents still belong to these Area Divisions.

c. I should think that agents who cannot be absorbed by the Area Divisions, and who will not respond for general Cold War service should be terminated.

d. Agents not absorbed by the Area Divisions, who will respond for general service, could be integrated into IUJEWEL or be retained as a reserve for IUJEWEL. In the latter case, however, in view of what has been said about reservists, this should be looked upon as an expedient not to be perpetuated.

e. The WUDEPOT Base assets, at least in part, might also be integrated into IUJEWEL. Or the present WUDEPOT-IUJEWEL-IUZESTFUL projects might be consolidated to recruit, train, and administer all PM contract personnel. At present there is some overlap or duplication in these three projects, and

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there might be some advantage and economy in consolidation. There might be some advantage, also, in centralizing all contract training outside of ISOLATION.

[C/GB/DR]

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