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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
C/WPS				DATE 22 DEC 1964
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.			[ ]	<p>Please keep me informed of any further action on this -</p> <p>[ ]</p> <p>3-7: contact [ ] and make sure we are kept apprised of this matter [ ]</p>
DC/SOD - 2C20			[ ]	
2.			[ ]	
C/SOD			[ ]	
3.			[ ]	
C/GB/SOD			[ ]	
4.			[ ]	
DC/GB			[ ]	
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7.				
C/Dr-				
8.	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 25X2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007			
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DD, P *4-6884*

22 DEC 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans**

**SUBJECT: Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of JCS  
Wartime UW Requirements**

- REFERENCES:**
- A. SR Memo, 25 August 1964, Same Subject
  - B. EE Comments on Ref A, 10 September 1964,  
Same Subject
  - C. SOD Comments on Ref A, 28 September 1964,  
Same Subject
  - D. WPS Memo, 17 September 1964, Same Subject

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 6.

2. Background: In 1956 the CIA initiated a program of recruiting, training and holding external assets for the denied areas of the USSR and Eastern Europe against which JCS UW requirements for hot war were accepted. These UW requirements are for pre-selected target areas in which Special Forces teams will be employed to support local indigenous dissident forces. Their main requirements at the time of employment are to have some foreknowledge of the dissident elements in the target area and to have secure means of making contact with them. The criteria established by JCS for CIA peacetime preparation for wartime UW operations envisions that CIA assets will furnish UW intelligence information and act as the contact link between the Special Forces and local dissident elements.

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a. By Reference A, C/SR suggests that the external assets do not have the capabilities to meet the JCS criteria for wartime UW operations. Although the asset teams are well trained and the program well conducted the assets are not capable of effecting wartime contact with dissident elements in the USSR M, in fact, such elements be present. Also, with the passing of time the assets have progressively lost their familiarity with persons and operating conditions within the projected target areas. Thus the external assets have the same requirements for making contact with dissident elements as do the Special Forces teams.

b. Based on the above, C/SR recommends that the Agency withdraw its previous acceptances of UW requirements for the USSR; and notify the JCS that CIA is confident that its wartime intelligence collection activities will provide the needed UW information on dissident elements if such elements emerge. At the same time C/SR suggests that CIA/JCS jointly re-examine the validity of the concepts upon which UW planning is based and the criteria established for preparation of UW requirements for acceptance by CIA.

c. By Reference B, C/EE concurs with C/SR and recommends that the scope of the Agency's actions with respect to the JCS requirements also embrace the denied areas of Eastern Europe.

d. By Reference C, C/SOD concurs with C/SR and agrees that the scope of the Agency's actions with respect to the JCS requirements should be increased to include the satellite nations as proposed by C/EE.

e. By Reference D, C/WPS concurs with the above memoranda and agrees that we should notify the JCS that we can no longer accept requirements against external assets. He suggests, however, that a firm Agency position on validity of UW concepts be established prior to either withdrawing previous acceptances to the requirements or discussing the subject with the JCS.

3. In recent informal discussions with the JCS action officers we learned that they too are beginning to question the validity of current UW concepts in the CINCEUR area of responsibility. The JCS have always taken the position

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that the use of external assets to fulfill CINCEUR's wartime UW requirements is a poor substitute for internal assets. Apparently the action officers will welcome an Agency suggestion to jointly re-examine the entire matter of UW concepts for Europe and bring up-to-date the criteria upon which the structure of UW requirements and capabilities are determined.

4. Based on the above, it is concluded that: there is common agreement within the CS regarding the capabilities of the external assets, the need for CIA/JCS to jointly re-examine the concepts and criteria upon which UW planning is based, and that CIA should take action with regard to USCINCEUR's UW requirements previously accepted against the external held assets. After further coordination with the interested Area Divisions it was agreed that any action to change previous acceptances of CINCEUR's UW requirements should be taken subsequent to discussions with the JCS.

5. It is proposed that CIA/JCS jointly re-examine the concepts and criteria upon which UW planning is based prior to taking any action with regard to CINCEUR's UW requirements previously accepted against externally held assets.

6. It is recommended that you approve the conclusions and the proposal contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, and forward the attached memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  
Chief, War Plans Staff ✓

Attachment:  
As Stated

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The recommendation in paragraph 6 is approved:

29 DEC 1964

Deputy Director for Plans

WPS/GLO,   cah (22 Dec 1964)

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DD/P 6485

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**ATTENTION:** Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency  
and Special Activities

**SUBJECT:** Unconventional Warfare (UW) Planning

1. This Agency has recently completed a thorough re-examination of its capabilities to fulfill USCINCEUR's wartime UW requirements. This re-examination was thought necessary because more than two years have elapsed since we have received a revised UW annex updating CINCEUR's UW requirements to support OPLAN EC-102.

2. As a result of our review we believe there are a number of very practical reasons for CIA and the JCS to re-examine jointly and bring up to date the entire matter of concepts and criteria upon which the structure of UW requirements and capabilities is determined.

3. We believe a joint re-examination of such matters as location and development in wartime of identifiable anti-regime elements with a UW potential, functions and positioning of assets, pre-selection of specific UW requirements and timing for employment of UW Forces, will identify areas where planning has not kept pace with technological advances and changing world conditions.

4. If you concur that it is desirable jointly to re-examine the matter of concepts and criteria upon which the structure of UW requirements is determined, I have designated  telephone extension 8036 as my point of contact for further arrangements.

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

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