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D R A F T

*Schwartz*

1 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Request for Policy Determination Re Acquisition, Training and Holding of Wartime and Contingency Assets by DO/DOB

REFERENCES : A. WPS Memo, <sup>22 December</sup> ~~17 September~~ 1964, to Deputy Director for Plans, Reconsiderations of CIA's Acceptance of JCS Wartime UW Requirements

B. DO Memo, 2 December 1964, to Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Interim Plans for Project WUDEPOT Activity

C. DD/P Memo, 29 December 1964, to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unconventional Warfare (UW) Planning

*Wherry Ref.*

1. This memorandum contains a request in paragraph 10 for a policy decision on the acquisition, training, and holding of wartime and contingency assets by DO/DOB.

2. Currently DO/DOB, operating under Project WUDEPOT as approved 12 August 1964, is chartered to recruit, train, and hold external assets for several divisions against JCS and AGENCY wartime UW needs and for operating divisions against developing contingency needs.

3. Reference A clearly indicates the Agency position re JCS wartime requirements. Chief, SR and Chief, EE have agreed that the Agency should withdraw its acceptance of JCS

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wartime UW requirements. As seen in Reference C, the Deputy Director for Plans has approached the JCS with the suggestion that a review be made to determine how "technological advances and changing world conditions" may have altered the concept of employment of externally held UW assets to satisfy hot-war requirements.

4. Based on the statements of the various divisions contained in Reference A as well as in direct discussions with the divisions which have sponsored wartime UW assets, DO Division has informed the ADD/P in Reference B that DO/DOB has discontinued further recruitment and re-training of wartime UW assets for SR and EE.

5. The WUDEPOT Project outline clearly states that the pool of trained assets it is now holding may and should be considered for contingency use by all operating divisions. However, it must be noted that no requirements have been levied upon DO/DOB for the use of these assets or for the selection, recruitment, training and holding of other contingency assets that might better meet the needs of the operating divisions.

6. In a number of meetings held during the period September to December 1964, which included from time to time the ADD/P and representatives of SOD, WH, NE, WPS, AF, and DO the subject of contingency assets were considered in some depth. There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the discussions:

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- a. Several divisions recognize the value of externally held contingency assets, but they are not certain until an emergency occurs that they will have a positive use for such assets in a particular place.
- b. Several divisions, in areas under their jurisdiction, have such widely varying languages, peoples, geography, etc. that they are reluctant to place requirements for the acquisition of any asset until they know where they will be needed.
- c. In some cases, operating personnel are so fully occupied with the tasks at hand that they are unable to plan for the possible use of contingency assets for some future emergency.
- d. Currently, while there are no requirements for contingency assets of a long-range nature levied upon SOD or DO, Africa is almost daily being faced with the need for such assets. AF is finding it exceedingly difficult and in most cases impossible to satisfy these needs.
- e. SOD has been assigned responsibility to prepare, in conjunction with the area divisions, a staff study to identify the Agency's foreseeable contingency asset requirements and to recommend the most effective and secure method to acquire, train

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and hold such assets prior to the development of an emergency requiring their deployment.

7. There are many factors that make the operating divisions reluctant to develop requirements for contingency assets. Some of these should be identified and answered:

a. Financial - The perennial question of spending money that may never show a profit comes to the fore immediately. However, contingency assets should be looked upon as insurance, which the Agency must have to meet its cold-war obligations but hopes never to have to use.

b. Operational Employment - Contingency uses vary so widely that almost any type of trained person might be employed anywhere in the world under certain circumstances. Certainly if indigenous peoples are to be led, trained, supported, etc. it is essential that the required language be available and that the racial or ethnic background of the assets will not offend the people we are trying to work with. However, if the assets are to be used as a strike team, demolitions team, maritime patrol, aerial-supported guerrillas, out-right mercenaries, etc. it may make little difference what color their skin is or what language they speak.

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c. Lacking available contingency assets the Agency will almost certainly be unable to react properly and promptly to situations that develop unexpectedly. If assets are hastily acquired against an immediate need, one can almost inevitably expect - poor and hasty selection; fast and misunderstood recruitment; hasty and bob-tailed training, often by unqualified personnel; hasty dispatch into operations with the concomitant spectres of light or contradictory cover; improper documentation; inept handling; poor operational and area briefings; inadequate clothing and equipment, and ultimate failure and security flaps.

d. Documentation and plausible denial of United States involvement - considerable confusion exists as to the suitability of using U.S. agents in cold-war contingency situations. The answer to this question necessarily involves another i.e. are only foreign agents suitable to conceal U.S. involvement? In considering these questions DO Division believes the following factors must be appropriately weighed:

- (1) Feasibility of re-documenting American agents in some other nationality. DO feels this is not only feasible, but

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believes that appropriate procedures can be worked out with TSD and other appropriate CIA elements to provide adequate insurance and other casualty benefits for U.S. agent participants.

(2) Past experience with externally-held foreign agents has raised serious questions regarding their dependability or availability in crisis situations.

WUDEPOT assets, on the other hand, have proven extraordinarily responsive to situations completely different from those for which they were originally recruited.

(3) Availability of foreign agents - The problems inherent in recruiting, training and holding foreign contingency assets in sufficient number to meet our contingency

requirements may prove insurmountable.

8. *et. Suitable cover, regardless of documentation or nationality.*  
DO/DOB has on its rolls trained American agent

assets who have been acquired against JCS wartime UW commitments. These agents have undergone extensive training in a wide range of para-military and intelligence subjects. Many of them have had advanced training which has included parachuting, demolitions and sabotage, and radio communications. In line with the thinking of EE and NE the training

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of basic groups and advanced classes during 1964 was directed toward contingency employment.

DO/DOB is currently contacting these agents to determine their willingness to be employed in a contingency situation in an area other than that for which they were originally recruited. Of the 113 agents presently on the rolls, 84 have been presented with the contingency pitch and 56 of them have indicated their willingness without reservation; 7 have had certain reservations; and 18 have refused to change their commitment. Twelve NE agents have not been approached regarding their willingness to serve outside the NE area. This review of current assets will be completed by March 1965.

It is important to note that 26 of these agents were called upon to support the Cuban operation in 1960. 21 of them took part in the various phases of the operation. In January 1962 a group of 15 out of 17 agents who were contacted volunteered for special training preparatory to proposed employment in Poland. In November 1962, 15 EE assets were called up for the Berlin contingency. They were informed that they were going to be dispatched into an operation distinct from that for which they were originally recruited, yet all 15 volunteered and reported for final training and deployment.

9. DO Division has the facilities for selecting, recruiting, training, and holding wartime and contingency assets. Pending a final resolution of requirements for wartime assets

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between the Agency and JCS, DO has suspended activity related to the satisfaction of JCS requirements. DO has not received contingency requirements from any operating division nor has it received the staff study on contingency needs requested by the ADD/P. Therefore, DO is unable to proceed toward the re-training of existing assets or the acquisition of additional assets to meet the contingency needs that are being experienced from time to time by the operating divisions and in the case of Africa almost on a daily basis.

10. It is requested that the DD/P establish a policy on the acquisition, training, and holding of contingency assets for the guidance of DO Division in the future utilization of WUDEPOT personnel and facilities. DO is prepared to lend the services of a qualified officer to work with whom ever may be directed to solve the policy question posed herein.

*Recommendation  
(P)*

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