

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

D/BPAM

EXTENSION

5477

NO.

DATE

19 February 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

ADD/P

23 FEB 1965

31 Mar
1/23/65

2.

C/SOD

1

APR 1965

3.

D/C 300

1

APR 1965

4.

SOD/GB

1/1/65

5.

Herewith for your information is a copy of a paper done for me on Domestic Operations Base (DOB) by I had felt there might be an opportunity for some savings here, particularly in personnel, and I still do. However, Don informs me you are actively concerned in resolving the complicated issues involved and that some time will be needed to work them out. Therefore, I'll retire to the sidelines and wish you luck.

6.

has seen an unfinished draft of Don's paper. You may wish to send this copy to In view of Don's observation in para 12, how about

7.

8.

9.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 2520
HAZ W AR CR IMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

2-3
You may wish to circulate this + send on to Gen Br. If behavior is to run it for phase it out w/o the problems noted

SECRET

05 FEB 1965

SUBJECT: Domestic Operations Base (DOB)


Background

1. In the early 1950's "cold war" thinking was largely conditioned by the experience of World War II. There was much preoccupation with preparations for hot war when it was feared the Red Army might quickly overrun most of Europe. In such event it was envisioned that there would be substantial dissidence inside most of the overrun countries. Under NSC 10/2 (June 1948) and NSC 5412/2 (December 1955) CIA had certain responsibilities to support the military in wartime and various directives evolved relating to the peacetime preparation of such support. These were very general. CIA was to organize resistance, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, E & E, etc. The early requirements lists from the JCS, while specific, were unrealistic and concerned mostly individual demolition targets. Subsequently the U.S. Army Special Forces were organized and the individual target concept was replaced by another based on specific locations or "U/W Areas" from which the Special Forces teams would operate. The JCS wanted CIA to provide advance knowledge about dissidence in each area and the means for linking up Special Forces with the dissidents. This implied sleeper agents to be activated in time of war. CIA declined to accept the requirements in this form but agreed to develop agents who would be externally held and who could be pre-positioned in the areas to receive the Special Forces teams. This is still the basic concept for fulfilling the JCS wartime requirements in the Denied Areas. In the non-Denied Areas CIA's response to JCS requirements generally took the form of tripartite (with MI-6) and bi-partite arrangements with security services and/or the military aimed toward developing stay-behind nets. The following discussion is concerned only with the Denied Areas problem in Europe and the concept of externally held agents which was developed to meet JCS wartime requirements.

Domestic Operations Base (DOB)

2. The JCS designated specific "U/W Areas" each of which was basically an area of 25-mile radius on given coordinates. In the 1962 planning cycle the number of such areas in the CINCEUR area had reached 101 of which 56 were in Denied Areas. The basic plan called for a three-man team to drop into the area on the outbreak of war and prepare to receive the Special Forces teams. The responsibility to develop and maintain these reception teams fall to SR Division's Domestic Operations Base (DOB) which was SR's "field base" for REDSOX operations.

SECRET



SECRET

In short order the servicing of the JCS requirements came to dominate the activities of DOB to the virtual exclusion of activity oriented toward CIA unilateral needs. Later, some broadening of the concept took place especially in connection with the Berlin crises when EE Division needed standby capabilities which DOB was able to provide from its pool of trainees who had been recruited originally for USSR operations. This led to the training of agents by DOB for EE Division and subsequently RE Division and SAS requirements were also met. Thus, there has been some small diversion and diversification of DOB assets toward serving the unilateral cold-war needs of CIA.

3. In recognition of the common concern character of DOB's activities the responsibility for DOB was turned over to Domestic Operations Division in February 1964. DOB is now a DOD project budgeted at \$180,000 for 1965 with a T/O of 41 agency personnel plus some TDY commo as well as contracted personnel. At the beginning of FY 1965 DOB had a stockpile of 109 trainees and there were plans to train about 30 more agents during the year and to give a refresher course to 40 old grads. DOB offices are located at Alexandria, Virginia and the main training site is at Fort Meade, Maryland. The agents are scattered about the United States. DOB maintains contact with them, pays them \$200 each per year and mobilizes some of them to participate in war games exercises with the military from time to time.

Validity of JCS Requirements

4. Increasingly during the past year or two the validity of the basic concept behind the JCS wartime requirements has been called into question. CIA's growing cold war responsibilities around the globe have led to a re-appraisal of the present day threat to which the continued development and maintenance of an externally held agent cadre directed toward the USSR and European theaters alone seems to have little relevance. The DD/P now takes the position that these requirements are based on an out-dated concept because (a) substantial dissidence no longer exists and (b) the threat of general war has receded. Moreover, the nature of the threat has changed in the past decade and we are now concerned mostly with little wars in backward areas. A survey by DD/P SOD of all Agency operations directed toward JCS hot war requirements (including non-Denied Areas) served to reinforce the DD/P's position and two main developments have ensued. A letter has gone forward in December 1964 to the JCS suggesting that a review of the requirements is in order. Consideration is being given within the Agency to ways in which DOB assets can be converted to serve CIA unilateral needs and the effect that reorientation of DOB's future activities toward CIA's cold war requirements would have on existing Agency activities related to counter insurgency training.

Present Status

5. This brings us to where we are today. Discussions have yet to get underway with the JCS and extensive preparation and preliminary steps seem to

SECRET

be required in advance of any high level resolution of the problem. The DOB training program for 1965 has virtually ground to a halt. One class of five has been trained and the second class is not likely to be held at all. The DD/P considers that the JCS hot war requirements can largely be satisfied by effective maintenance of the cadre of agents already in existence. Meanwhile, DOB is taking inventory of the agents on hand to determine how many have the qualifications and would be disposed to serve in areas other than their native lands. (The DOB trainees are US citizens originating in one of the Denied Areas countries who were recruited for service in their former homelands in time of war). Of those contacted so far, approximately two-thirds have responded affirmatively and without qualification to the prospect of their being used in areas other than the one for which they were recruited and in situations short of hot war. These are agents with aptitudes and training including W/T who are of potential usefulness to CIA now and in the future in the various insurgency situations which the Agency is called upon to deal with. Language capabilities of this group are being surveyed and perhaps some language training will result. Similarly, up-dating of W/T capabilities with new commo gear is in prospect.

6. It is apparent from the above that DOB activities are at a low ebb. Obligations through December '64 totaled \$59,000 out of \$180,000 budgeted. DOB is in the unfortunate status of having had its charter withdrawn (albeit informally) and not yet replaced. Efforts to reorient the program toward Agency objectives must take place within the larger framework of the Agency's total paramilitary effort. DOB's unilateral efforts to drum up requirements from the area divisions have met with little success.

Comment on Problems Involved

7. The ramifications and problems involved are numerous. It should be noted that externally held agents do not in truth meet with the JCS requirements which are for agents inside the denied area. Since we regard the recruitment of sleepers in place as not feasible we have sold the JCS on the idea of "pre-positioning" externally held agents which have been trained and held in readiness for the purpose of linking up the Special Forces with the dissident elements. But since our agents are external they, too, have the same requirement as the Special Forces; i.e., some knowledge of the dissidents and the means to contact them. Furthermore, SR Division feels that our agents would be spotted as strangers in the area and would be taken for provocateurs by any dissident factions they might encounter. Thus they lack the basic capability to perform their primary mission which is to contact the dissidents.

8. The whole question of dissidence in the Denied Areas is an open one. NIE 10-58 (Anti Communist Resistance Potential, etc.) is out of date. The JCS has asked for a revision which is now pending. This request grew out of their need to justify the Special Forces. It has ended up somewhere in DD/I as a study on vulnerabilities of the Soviet population but seems to be stymied for lack of information.

SECRET

SECRET

9. It is understood that we are reluctant simply to drop the so-called hot war requirements back in the laps of the JCS. As recently as 1962 General Carter reaffirmed CIA acceptance of them (for servicing through external agents and staybehind arrangements). But we don't really believe in them and have declined to place sleeper agents in Denied Areas as JCS originally wanted because this kind of effort has to be reserved for intelligence targets of current interest. There is little enough success to point to and nothing is left over for sleepers. We seem to fear that should we reject the JCS requirements outright, however, this would lead the military to try to satisfy them themselves. This raises all kinds of spectres we don't like and in the event the military were successful in recruiting in Denied Areas they would be led right into the clandestine collection business. Once they had an agent behind the curtain who could communicate, the temptation to use him could not be resisted.

10. What we would like would be recognition by the JCS that their requirements are out of date. Instead of committing bodies (externally held agents) to pin-pointed areas on the map, we would like requirements in terms of intelligence information needs on more general areas specifying such items as mood and temper of the people, guerrilla capabilities, potential dissident leaders, etc. We want realistic planning which takes into account CIA's true capabilities in their full range.

Conclusion


11. We are fairly confident that in due course, hopefully before the end of the fiscal year, the JCS requirements will either be withdrawn or drastically modified. The real problem now is what to do with DOB. The DD/P area division requirements have not been forthcoming in sufficient volume to justify the project. The most hopeful development is the very recent joint requirement of Africa Division and SOD which has led to a survey now going on of old DOB agents for use in the Congo on a specific project. If the survey turns up the necessary twenty men there will be a flurry of activity which may keep DOB busy the remainder of the fiscal year. Success with the [] project could lead to additional spotting, recruiting and training for joint SOD/AF projects. If not, it will be difficult indeed to justify renewal of WUDEPOT.

12. It appears to this observer that DOB could be more efficiently integrated into the CIA paramilitary program if it were managed by SOD instead of DOD. At present each issue that arises involves negotiation among DOD, SOD, and the area division concerned. SOD has the responsibility for the PM program and should control all operational aspects which are not clearly the function of the area divisions. DOD need not be involved. Integration with SOD would permit SOD to sort out the relationships with its other training projects, especially IJEWEL (American citizens) and IUBEE (foreigners). Some of the real estate might continue to be useful to SOD although the separation of the offices from the training site makes for an inefficient operation now. DOB has a cadre of

SECRET

experienced training officers who are used to working together on paramilitary subject matter. It has spotting and recruiting facilities particularly for American citizens. Problems such as DOB's military cover and orientation toward US citizens only which at present are stumbling blocks to working with SOD could be resolved more easily under SOD management.

13. The current IG survey of DOD will take cognizance of the DOB problem. It is recommended that EPAM await the IG recommendations with regard to DOB and follow up as appropriate during the forthcoming 1966 program hearings. It should also be noted that ADD/P has a watchful eye on DOB and has stimulated several actions which have been noted above looking toward the eventual resolution of the internal and external issues involved. In conclusion the writer wishes to observe that DOB seems to be a well run activity which has been carrying out its assigned mission in good fashion.



Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- ✓ 1 - []
- 1 - C/PAS
- 1 - Reading

SECRET