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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DDP/PG/CA

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

8 March 65

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. SOD/C-GB

RC

2. *NO/GM*

J

3. *C/DR OA*
C/DR

15/3

W

EFF

File -

2-3: Pls assure that OA is kept informed, since OA is currently involved somewhat with DEPOT.

7. *DC/GB*

4-7: For inclusion in NUDEPOT project folder.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

8 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Domestic Operations Division
Chief, Special Operations Division
Chief, War Plans Staff
Chief, DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project WUDEPOT - Current and Future Status.
Meeting, Monday, 15 March 1965, 2:30 P. M.,
Room 3-C-28.

REFERENCES:

- A. ADD/P memorandum to above addressees, dated 24 February 1965, subject: "Project WUDEPOT - Current and Future Status".
- B. DDP/PG/CA Memorandum for the Record dated 3 March 1965, subject: "Project WUDEPOT, Meeting Monday, 1 March 1965, 2:30 P. M., Room 3-C-28."

1. Subject meeting has been scheduled to conclude the discussion initiated 1 March 1965 (Reference B, attached).

2. It is the intent that the agenda will therefore be confined to the basic WUDEPOT facility and overhead.

3. In order to facilitate the discussion, it is requested that the revision of the DO recommendation of 1 March 1965 be prepared as soon as possible, and that DDP/PG/CA be provided copies for distribution to addressees in advance of subject meeting.

[]
Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment:
Reference B - Memo for
Record, 3 March 1965

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3 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project WUDEPOT
Meeting, Monday, 1 March 1965, 2:30 P.M.
Room 3-C-28

REFERENCE: ADD/P Memorandum to DO, SOD, WPS and PG,
dated 24 February 1965 (DD/P-5-0913), Subject
"Project WUDEPOT, Current and Future Status".

ATTENDING: ADD/P Mr. Karamessines
SOD

WPS.

DO

PG

1. The meeting conformed generally with the agenda.
2. War Plans Staff. Status report of the probable acceptable

limits of future responsibilities of the Clandestine Services for JCS (hot war)

PM contingency requirements.

- a. This matter continues to be a subject for further negotiation,
contingent upon considerations currently confronting the Department
of Defense:

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(1) Conclusion of EUCOM discussions scheduled toward the end of March 1965.

(2) The possibility that budgetary and other pressures may precipitate a decision to withdraw the 10th Special Forces from Europe.

b. Progress to date in the discussions with the Department of Defense may be noted as follows:

(1) There is agreement to challenge the concepts of JCS requirements which have provided the basis for C.S. operational projects in the past.

(2) A "talking paper" has been prepared and a specific Defense designee assigned as a focal point for further discussion.

c. The War Plans Staff is of the opinion that:

(1) CIA is not obligated to continue WUDEPOT solely upon the basis of JCS requirements.

(2) The JCS will continue to require internal assets as a preference.

(3) Withdrawal of the 10th Special Forces from Europe would invalidate requirements predicated upon C.S. assets held externally to the target areas.

SECRET

SECRET

3. SOD

Estimate of the probable scope and nature of requirements for qualified PM-type contract personnel to cope with C.S. contingencies.

a. This is not a matter to be tabulated in simple black and white, nor does it lend itself to pat solutions through advance planning. At the moment, it is on an ascending scale, which may soon require an increase in the numerical ceiling (80) which has been placed upon IUJEWEL.

b. The genesis of the problem occurred during the period of years when attrition reduced the on-duty roster of qualified PM staff employees so that, as of the moment, there are on duty a minimum of senior staff officers, very few junior officers (recently recruited), and none who are qualified for the in-between area.

c. The IUJEWEL project (U.S. nationals) has been designed to provide an active reserve of contract specialists qualified for assignments which cannot be serviced by personnel currently within the present staff system.

d. The problem is vulnerable to further aggravation through the policy fluctuations of the Department of State with respect to the use or limitations on the use of U.S. nationals in target areas.

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The use of foreign nationals can also be similarly inhibited. While there are reservoirs of qualified foreign mercenaries available, current Department of State policy precludes the use of South Africans or Belgians in the Congo at the moment (to illustrate the policy problem).

e. It was observed that there is no solution in a stockpile of people since:

(1) There are limitations on how long they can be held as reservists without deterioration because of age, increased dependents or other personal considerations mitigating against a willingness to accept hazardous duty in remote areas.

(2) Regardless of how qualified a reservist may be at the time the "whistle goes off", there remains the inhibitions on use imposed by the prevailing policy determinations applicable to the target area at that particular moment.

f. In summary, we have been fortunate to have implemented the IUJEWEL concept during a period of demand in excess of resources. It is anticipated that IUJEWEL will continue an ascending trend until a more favorable balance of qualified PM staff personnel can be developed. At that time, IUJEWEL will enter a descending trend and, when the gap has been filled, probably IUJEWEL will phase out.

g. Project IUBEE (foreign national contract personnel) has proven to be more limited in actual practice. Two IUBEE personnel are performing well. A third (Italian) was terminated amicably by mutual agreement. Two other candidates (Southeast Asians) were picked up by Department of Defense at greater compensation than IUBEE could afford. The recruitment of foreign nationals who have been associated with an indigenous service always runs some risk of foreign penetration. It was determined that the proposed use of certain otherwise qualified Malaysians involved unacceptable association with the "Crown". To a large degree, it appears necessary to dangle the "carrot" of ultimate U.S. citizenship to successfully recruit personnel for IUBEE. This project will probably continue in "low key", pending acquisition of quality personnel.

h. IUMUG is an agent-support project to provide cover for a singleton agent in the field of maritime labor and should be deleted from this discussion.

i. IUZESTFUL is an Air Branch air support training and qualification mechanism, rather than a source of personnel recruitment. It also falls outside of this discussion.

SECRET

4. SOD

Summary commentary on the probable value of foreign (area division) operations as a source of personnel for unilateral recruitment as a ready reserve of qualified contract personnel for C.S. PM-type contingencies.

- a. Those projects (liaison) based upon bipartite or tripartite agreements are by and large predicated upon people who are presumed to have stayability in these areas. They are not people we would want to recruit as mercenaries. If we want people from these areas for third country operations, it would be necessary to deal directly with the indigenous service for nominees, with due respect for the risk of penetration, as noted above.
- b. NE Division's ARLEAP (area-wide external PM types trained under WUDEPOT) may provide some personnel (as discussed below under WUDEPOT).
- c. STCENTIGRADE (ChiNats) has been a source for boat crews and aircraft pilots.
- d. MONOTYPE (Thailand) also has potential as a source of personnel for use in other areas.
- e. A general observation was made that each of the area-type projects must be judged upon some other basis and able to stand on

SECRET

its own, separate and apart from the problem of contract recruitment of PM personnel for contingency requirements.

f. Oversimplified, and within the limitations of quicksand in the policy areas, our need is for two types of personnel qualified technically, ethnically and lingually --

- (1) Supervisory, who can run an operation.
- (2) The "do-ers", to get the job done.

5. 10

Commentary in depth (exclusive of the Stand-by roster of contract agents) on the current facilities, personnel and capabilities of the basic WUDEPOT complex (including direct overhead not formally included in the approved project) to outline the potential of the facilities in the absence of any JCS-type requirements.

a. It is first to be noted that SOD, by memorandum dated 23 February 1965 (SOD-5-185), assumes the following posture:

- (1) Examination, evaluation and contingency retention of the existing roster of WUDEPOT-trained reservists is a separate matter upon which work is progressing satisfactorily to either convert these individuals to a more useful status or phase out their contracts.

(2) The basic WUDEPOT facility and overhead is another matter which has ceased to be of value in its present form, since more effective means have been developed to satisfy SOD's currently pressing requirements.

b. DO presented at the meeting a Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 March 1965, subject "Future Direction of DOB and Project WUDEPOT." The concept outlined therein contemplated:

(1) Reduction of the annual level of cost to approximately \$400,000.

(2) Reduction in the number of personnel from the prior total of 48 to a revised total of 28.

(3) Transfer of custody of two safehouses to appropriate support elements.

(4) Retention of facilities at Fort Meade and Camp Pickett.

(5) Reduction in total vehicles from 21 to 13 and return of the Helio aircraft to SOD.

(6) An objective of 50 qualified contract agents in stand-by status under hand-holding contracts at \$200 each per annum, to conform with currently revised criteria for contingency-type of active duty upon demand.

SECRET

c. The ADD/P, after the benefit of considerable round-table discussion, pointed out that:

(1) The case for continuation of WUDEPOT, even in this revised form, remains weak.

(2) It would still involve unacceptable levels of staffing and annual cost, particularly when weighed against the climate of circumstances already discussed above, inhibiting the operational use of these individuals for C.S. contingencies.

(3) Having accepted the SOD position that it is idle to try to stockpile people, perpetuation of WUDEPOT along these lines remains in conflict with the SOD position.

(4) In the event that an acceptable concept can be developed for WUDEPOT, there are overriding considerations in placing all requirements for training in OTR.

(5) Any real estate to be retained for training purposes should also be placed under OTR custody. The same principle applies to personnel to be employed exclusively for a training mission.

d. Chief, DO, requested an opportunity for the DO Division to complete some additional homework and to revise their recommendations.

SECRET

e. The ADD/P agreed to defer action upon the condition that:

(1) Another meeting is to be convened within ten days.

(2) The revised proposal is to be a bare-bones, hand-holding concept.

not done

(3) Any training contemplated is to be predicated upon the use of existing training facilities of the Agency (OTR).

(4) The total future requirement for personnel and funds to be identified under the hand-holding concept must be drastically less than the levels proposed above.

[]
DDP/PG/CA

Distribution:

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C/SOD, DC/SOD, SOD/C-GB

C/DO, DO/EX

C/WPS, WPS, []]

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SECRET

26 Feb. 65

1. SARGASSO - Norway - \$70,000
(CIA share only)

Tripartite - staybehind
Some 90-odd compartment Agent teams

Main contingency utility is in good liaison relationship (Cite recent Maritime mercenaries)

-
2. TINHORN - Sweden - \$1,000

Tripartite - staybehind

Doubtful unilateral contingency except through good offices of liaison

3. NERVUE - Denmark - \$12,000

Tripartite - staybehind

do. TINHORN

-
4. NICLIPPER - Belgium - \$7,400

Tripartite staybehind

do. above

-
5. OKRIDGE - Luxembourg - (No Funds)

Originally designed for providing support to liaison for maintaining a staybehind capability. No funds now being expended. No significant contingency assets.

SECRET

SECRET

6. SYRUP-SYNTOSIS - Netherlands - (No Funds)

Formerly a Tripartite staybehind

Not carried in FY 65 Program

7. DEWBAR - Italy - \$90,000

Bipartite - Staybehind -
plus
Sardinia Training Base

Project began 1958; by mid-1963, 656 persons were considered operational, and 338 were "under recruitment or being trained"; and a considerable caching program was under way.

SOD has used in limited way under IUBEE

Further exploitation would appear to be feasible.

8. SMETRIC - U.K. - \$5,000

CIA support of MI-6 for MI-6 training of European Tripartite staybehind agents.

No apparent unilateral contingency utility.

9. GRGROOND - Austria - \$6,000

Unilateral maintenance of ten multipurpose - W/T agents for wartime staybehind

Not for contingencies

SECRET

SECRET

10. CAELI - Germany - \$5,000
(3,400)

Unilateral maintenance of six agent - W/T operators
for staybehind in West Germany

Not for contingencies

11. CACINNABAR - Germany - \$7,500
(4,000)

Unilateral maintenance of two singleton multipurpose
agents in Berlin for CIA staybehind

Not for contingencies

12. CAHAZY - Germany - \$33,000
(18,000)

Unilateral maintenance of 11 multipurpose agents
in West Germany for use in East Germany in crisis
situation

Projected for termination in FY '65

13. OKSCRAMBLE - Germany - \$25,000
(\$7,800)

Unilateral maintenance of agents in Germany targeted
against Rumania, Bulgaria, & Albania

Terminated during FY '65

14. THUNDERBIRD - Greece - \$70,000
(65,000)

Bilateral - Support of Greek Raiding Forces - plus
support of G.R.F. program to maintain civilian stay-
behind agent nets.

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SECRET

THUNDERBIRD Continued

Project presently under policy review.

Potential source of contingency assets.

15. THUNDINE - Greece - \$6,000
(Nil)

Unilateral staybehind in Greece largely in duplication of THUNDERBIRD

Terminated during FY '65

16. EXWOOD - Turkey - \$24,000
(Plus JUSMAT funds)
(Renewal for \$20,000)

Bilateral - for CIA/JCS
staybehind in Turkey

Under policy review largely because of Cyprus

Potential source of contingency assets.

17. ROBEVY - Iran - \$7,000

Unilateral - to maintain a contingency W/T capability among Iranian tribes, and in Tehran area.

Primarily for FI staybehind capability in Iran.

Not for outside contingencies

18. ACLEVER - Pakistan - \$13,500

Bilateral through liaison with Pak. Army. Maintains one W/T agent team in Karachi.

No PM utility

No Cold War utility

SECRET

19. ARLEAP - Middle East - \$19,030

Unilateral - under WUDEPOT. Maintains 16 agents in U.S. for contingency use in Middle East.

Designed expressly for Cold War.

20. STCENTIGRADE - Taiwan - \$59,700
cut back from \$245,200

Support of CHINAT PM effort against China mainland.

Cut back reflects reorientation from PM to FI

Use in Cold War is a policy problem - not an assets problem.

21. MONOTYPE - Thailand - \$915,700

Support of PARU

Already committed in Cold War.

22. Other OPS in VietNam, Laos, Tibet, Cuba, and Congo.

(Assets presently committed)