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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/DO	EXTENSION	NO.
	DATE 12 March	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans	12 MAR 1965	31 MAR 1965	[]	<p>for your file</p> <p>Jue, F, 10 f</p> <p>AW</p> 
2. C/SO D	5 APR 1965		[]	
3. C/GB/SOP				
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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2007

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DD/P. 5-1190.

12 MAR 1965

DO 65-72

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Considerations of the Contingency Problem

1. This memorandum is intended to raise certain questions concerning the ability of the Agency to supply agent assets to meet current and future contingency requirements.

2. Present Requirements:

a. Africa Division has a current requirement for 26 WUDEPOT-trained agents for service [] []. The Division anticipates that before the Congo situation is stabilized they will probably need at least an equal additional number. Furthermore, [] [] Deputy Chief, Africa Division, has stated that he anticipates a further need for 10 PM-trained agents to meet possible future contingencies in Africa. While his preference is for non-American agents, he recognizes the difficulty in recruiting and holding this type asset. He appreciates, however, the utility of assets who, while being American, actually possess a foreign background including language, legend, etc. [] [] foresees and is exploring the current use of WUDEPOT agents in at least three other situations: (1) to serve as a bodyguard to an important Greek agent currently working in the Congo; (2) to develop a border police or para-police capability in Zambia and perhaps other countries, and (3) to use various WUDEPOT assets to develop a safe haven and training base in Kenya. [] [] emphasized, in the present political atmosphere in Africa, American agents whose nationality as Americans is obvious are unsuitable and unaccepted for the types of clandestine operations described above.

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He felt that WUDEPOT agents, although American citizens, could be used since by appearance they are not obviously American and can be documented as non-American. The State Department policy prohibiting the use of Americans in situations in which they may be exposed to capture would not prohibit the use of WUDEPOT type agents in the types of operations enumerated above.

b. NE Division has a firm requirement for the continuation of its ARLEAP program which is an integral part of the WUDEPOT project. All of these agents have been recruited and trained through the WUDEPOT mechanism. There are currently 12 of the ARLEAP agents held in reserve in the United States. NE Division wishes to bring its assets to a level of 16; anticipates that it will experience an annual attrition of 4 of its agents; wishes to retrain ARLEAP reserve agents annually in a two-week course to improve their capability and maintain their effectiveness in the event of a call-up and, finally, wishes to give new and replacement recruits the initial 18-week WUDEPOT training.

c. FE Division (which heretofore had not been aware of the existence of WUDEPOT) has stated that they have no specific requirements which per se would justify the continuation of WUDEPOT. If, however, the project were to be continued, FE feels it would in all probability place upon the project a requirement to acquire for its future use a specified number of individuals. The specifications would generally be for agents with some language ability in one of the Southeast Asian languages, Chinese or French; training in PM, commo, tradecraft, organizational techniques and intelligence collection, and with the ability to live and work in primitive circumstances in less developed areas of the Far East. FE has also requested DO/DOB to review its files for existing WUDEPOT agents who might fit the criteria set forth above.

d. Although the WH Division does not anticipate the use of American agents in contingency situations in Latin America, it is

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investigating the use of the WUDEPOT project to recruit singleton agents who could be documented and appear as non-Americans for FI and perhaps other purposes in the WH area. Parenthetically, it might be noted that WH has made greater use of WUDEPOT agents than any other Division, having successfully used 21 during the 1960-61 Cuban crisis. One of these agents is still being used by WH 4 years later.

e. EE and SR Divisions: Neither of these Divisions foresees a need for agents to meet cold-war contingency situations in their areas of responsibilities. Until the question of the JCS requirements is resolved, however, it is recognized that the OKWHIPPER and WUDEPOT agents must be retained and retrained to maintain their state of readiness. Reportedly, the JCS may well cancel its requirements for SR but retain a number of revised requirements for Eastern Europe. These revised EE requirements, if accepted by the Agency, will necessitate our maintaining a capability to meet them.

f. The Special Operations Division has stated that it can foresee the need for non-American agent assets who might be recruited, trained and held in the United States pending the development of a contingency situation. While SOD representatives assured this Division that they were preparing a request for the recruitment of up to twenty of this type asset, they later indicated that they would suspend the requirement until after the resolution of the WUDEPOT problem.

3. The preceding paragraph represents the only firm estimates we have been able to obtain to date for contingency type agents. As has been previously acknowledged, however, it has been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to forecast accurately contingency needs. At the 1 March 1965 meeting chaired by the ADDP, [] Deputy Chief, SOD, forecast that the Agency's requirements in contingency situations are expected to increase considerably for the next several years. It is also noteworthy that divisions which had no role

SECRET

in the development of WUDEPOT nor participation in the selection of its current assets have begun to show a positive interest in the employment of these assets in their operations.

4. Available Assets: At the above-mentioned meeting the shortage of PM-qualified staff officers and agents to meet the expected increase in contingency requirements was reviewed by [] [] Several salient points made by [] [] should be noted here:

a. Staff Personnel - [] [] clearly pointed out the existence of a "staff gap" in the area of PM-qualified staff officers within the Clandestine Services. It was his contention that the experienced PM officers are generally over age and above the grade which would make them available for general overseas service at this time. While a serious effort is being made to groom a body of JOTs for PM operations, [] [] anticipates that it may take as long as five years to close this "staff gap".

b. IUJEWEL - This project presently authorizes the recruitment of a total of 80 Class A contract agents who are specialists in various phases of the PM field. [] [] stated that this project was principally designed to fill the existing "staff gap". Although these are contract agents, individuals in this project are treated as staff, receive staff training, are fully witting of Agency doctrine, personnel, operations, etc., and some hold staff positions. They are Americans who, for the most part, could not reasonably be documented otherwise. Their employment in a contingency operation is subject to the same policy restrictions as the WUDEPOT-trained agents. They could not be used in the type of special operation described by [] [] in Africa because of the non-acceptability of Americans in key roles throughout the African continent.

c. IUBEE - This project, designed to recruit senior foreign PM-experienced nationals has succeeded to date in acquiring only

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two agents. (Incidentally, [] is loud in his praise of the work being done by one of these in the Congo and expects that the second will be equally effective.) The CS has long endeavored to recruit, train and hold foreign nationals for contingency use. On the basis of our experience over the years, it is extremely doubtful whether we will be able to acquire this type agent in anything like the numbers needed to satisfy our cold-war requirements.

d. Foreign Stay-Behind Operations - [] concluded that none of these stay-behind operations was suitable to provide the type of contingency agent required by the Agency.

5. It seems clear from the foregoing that there is a present need for contingency assets which will be considerably increased in the months and years to come. Further, it is painfully evident that the CS has inadequate capability in all the projects and operations reviewed by [] to supply agent personnel for even current, let alone future, contingency needs. As I have repeatedly said, DO Division has no parental or bureaucratic interest in holding on to WUDEPOT. We are perfectly amenable to transferring the project to another Division; to reduce or alter the nature of WUDEPOT; or to work with other CS components in its management if this will serve the Agency's interest. Furthermore, I am willing to liquidate the project, release the agent assets, reassign the project and training officers and give up the physical facilities of the project if this is deemed necessary or desirable. In the overall interest of the CS, however, I feel obliged to raise the fundamental question as to what alternate means is available to the CS to satisfy our expanding contingency requirements. A corollary to this question involves the question of cost and effectiveness of these alternate means.

6. SOD and the Inspector General have recommended that the training of externally-held assets be transferred to OTR. OTR has stated unequivocally that they cannot accomplish the retraining of

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the ARLEAP or WUDEPOT agents in their present facilities or without augmenting their training staff in excess of the proposed training staff of WUDEPOT. ISOLATION, OTR insists, is not available for training this type of agent; therefore, additional facilities will be required if OTR is to assume this responsibility. OTR states that they are currently undermanned in PM-qualified officers. Even the transfer of the WUDEPOT training staff will not permit them to take on the minimum amount of training needed to meet the requirements of the ARLEAP program alone. *Additional training facilities, whether they be at Fort Meade, Camp Pickett or elsewhere, will necessarily entail additional support personnel to provide security and logistical support for those additional facilities.

7. If it is true that an alternate mechanism is not available to the CS to meet its anticipated contingency needs at considerable savings in personnel and money, I seriously question why we should abandon or decimate the WUDEPOT mechanism which not only has proven its effectiveness in meeting our undertakings at the behest of the JCS, but which can, at a greatly reduced cost and with less than one-half of its presently assigned personnel, do the job facing the Clandestine Services in the future.

8. The attached documents provide additional information relative to the future status of WUDEPOT:

Attachment A - WUDEPOT training program for the remainder of FY 65

Attachment B - Condition I program for WUDEPOT

Attachment C - Condition II program for WUDEPOT

Attachment D - Condition III program for WUDEPOT

6

* The ARLEAP program requires recruitment of new and replacement agents who must be given the 18-week WUDEPOT training program. Additionally, call-up training involves field and town problems requiring tutorial handling of individual agents.

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**Attachment E - Personnel, Facilities, Equipment and
Cost Estimates for Attachments A, B,
C and D**

9. Unless and until some alternate, less expensive means is available to satisfy foreseeable CS contingency requirements, I recommend that the WUDEPOT project be continued at the level of activity set forth in Attachment D.



Chief, D Φ Division

Attachments

cc: DDP/PG
C/WPS
C/SOD
D/OTR

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ATTACHMENT "A"

REMAINDER OF FY 65

The present requirements for training which have been levied upon WUDEPOT for the remainder of FY 65 include:

- a. **ARLEAP** - One two week advanced training course 13 - 16 June 1965 for 12 agent assets. This program includes a comprehensive town problem for one week and a PM field exercise for one week.
- b. **AF Division** - AF and SOD have alerted DO/DOB to prepare for the recall of 30 WUDEPOT agents to be trained for six weeks for a special operation.

The above training will require the full facilities of the present training staff, support staff, and project staff (less the recruitment section) for the remainder of FY 65.

A total of 23 personnel, which might be reduced to 18 by moving WUDEPOT personnel from Alexandria to the DO Division main office (in effect releasing 5 military guards), will be required for the remainder of FY 65. Excess personnel will be made available for reassignment.

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ATTACHMENT "B"

CONDITION ONE - FY 66

This condition assumes Base activity will be suspended. The current body of trained agent assets would be maintained until a final decision is made re Agency responsibility for JCS requirements.

In this level of activity one Case Officer with the support of a clerk typist could maintain contact with the assets, arrange for their pay, prepare blind broadcasts, correspond with them in S/W, and assign and rate home training assignments.

There would be no personnel or facilities to handle the call-up or training of these assets either for maintenance or for operational use. It is believed that the reservoir of agents will begin to evaporate and that their level of training and technical skill will diminish if they are not brought in regularly.

ARLEAP advanced training and continuing recruitment to reach a level of 16 agents and to provide for normal attrition will have to be assigned elsewhere.

There will be no facility for the call-up and retraining of additional assets to meet the continuing needs of AF for replacements or for the enlargement of their operations.

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ATTACHMENT "C"

CONDITION TWO - FY 66

This condition envisages the limitation of WUDEPOT activity to the maintenance of the current pool of assets to meet the JCS requirements until such time as this Agency is relieved of the JCS commitment.

In this situation a review and evaluation of the current assets for possible cold war use would be completed.

The ARLEAP assets would receive two weeks advanced training and the OKWHIPPER and WUDEPOT assets would receive two weeks advanced training necessary to further qualify them for contingency employment.

During FY 66 twenty-six additional assets will be selected and trained to replace the initial AF levy or to expand the AF operation. This training would continue for six weeks.

The blind broadcast program, the secret writing correspondence, and the home training assignments should be continued to maintain the motivation and level of training of the assets.

The distinctive difference between this condition and condition three would be the halting of spotting, recruitment, and training of new assets for the more accurate satisfaction of area division contingency needs.

Condition Two Training - FY 66

- 1 - 2 week advanced training program for 12 ARLEAP agents.
- 1 - 2 week advanced training program for 30 WUDEPOT and OKWHIPPER agents.
- 1 - 6 week special training program for 26 WUDEPOT assets for employment with AF.

SECRET

-2-

ATTACHMENT "C"

The funds, personnel, equipment and facilities needed for this level of activity are listed in Attachment "E" in comparison with other levels of present and proposed activity.

Although the foregoing forecasts only ten weeks of full time training, it should be noted that considerable time and effort has to be devoted to the arrangements for call-ups, the preparations for training, and other associated administrative functions. Furthermore, predicated upon the assumption that replacements for WUDEPOT agents involved in the Congo operation will not all be trained together, it is most likely that several additional 6 week courses might have to be scheduled.

It should be noted that at this reduced level of activity there can be no provision made for the recruitment or training of new agent personnel either to bring ARLEAP to the level of 16 or to meet the annual attrition of four agents predicted by NE Division.

The Office of Training has made a preliminary forecast of their requirements to meet Condition Two. They ask for the following:

1. Meade Facilities
2. All vehicles owned
3. All safehouse facilities
4. Present administrative staff to handle managerial aspects of program
5. Entire Training Staff
6. Pickett franchise
7. Budget to cover all of above |

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ATTACHMENT "D"

CONDITION THREE - FY 66

This condition envisages the on going program of WUDEPOT in the maintenance of the current agents until the problem of the JCS requirements is resolved. Additionally, fifteen new agents will be recruited and trained for world-wide contingency use by all area divisions.

The selection of these new agents would be based upon criteria such as language, race, national origin, etc., which would increase their utility in the CS as opposed to the more limited characteristics of the current assets. These new agents would be the beginning of a pool of contingency trained and maintained assets available upon short notice for operational employment.

Condition Three would require the spotting, recruiting and training of new assets. It is proposed that this activity be conducted on a much reduced scale from that approved for FY 65. Attachment "E" contains a comparison of costs, personnel, equipment, and facilities.

The pool of 110 current assets will be re-evaluated and those found suitable will be retrained and redirected toward cold war contingencies, while being held against JCS requirements. Those found wanting will be dropped.

Condition Three Training

- 1 - 18 week basic course for 15 new agents (including 4 ARLEAP replacements)
- 1 - 2 week advanced training program for 12 ARLEAP agents
- 1 - 2 week advanced training program for 30 WUDEPOT and OKWHIPPER agents
- 1 - 6 week special training program for 26 WUDEPOT agents for employment with AF

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-2-

ATTACHMENT "D"

Blind broadcast program for qualified radio operators

S/W correspondence program for all agents

Home training assignments for all agents

The Office of Training has made a preliminary forecast of their requirements to meet Condition Three. They are as follows:

All the funds, personnel, sites and equipment presently being used for a period of one year to permit an analysis and comprehensive report of the problem and the best manner of handling it.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT "E"

This attachment includes a breakdown and comparison of personnel, facilities, equipment and costs of the present base with what is needed to meet operating levels recommended in Attachments B, C and D.

Personnel

	<u>Present</u>	<u>Cond. I</u>	<u>Cond. II</u>	<u>Cond. III</u>
Staff	24	2	10	15
Military	15	0	5	6
Medical	2	0	0	0
Contract	7	0	0	0
TOTAL	48	2	15	21

Facilities

Washington	DOB/HQ	0	0	0
	2 S/H	0	0	0
	2 S/Off	0	0	0
	1 S/Apt	0	0	1
Ft. Meade	4 Bks.	0	4	4
	2 1-story bldg.	0	2	2
Pickett	3 Bks.	0	3	3
	1 Quonset	0	1	1

Equipment

Vehicles	21	0	8	11
Aircraft	1	0	0	0
Household furn.	2 S/H	0	0	0
	1 S/Apt	0	0	0

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ATTACHMENT "E" (continued)

<u>Finance</u>	<u>Feb-June'65</u>	<u>Cond. I</u>	<u>Cond. II</u>	<u>Cond. III</u>
<u>WUDEPOT</u>	<u>Revised</u>			
Agent salaries.	9,100.00	0	20,000.00	68,000.00
Quarterly Pmts.	10,000.00	16,000.00	10,000.00	10,000.00
F I C A	350.00	0	725.00	2,500.00
Agent Travel	2,000.00	0	6,500.00	12,000.00
Retirement	0	0	0	0
Contract salaries	0	0	0	0
Total Project	21,450.00	16,000.00	37,225.00	92,500.00
<u>Overhead</u>				
Staff salaries	87,500.00	15,000.00	160,000.00	200,000.00
Vehicle Maint.	1,000.00	0	1,200.00	1,700.00
Telephone	1,600.00	100.00	750.00	750.00
Postal Svc.	300.00	750.00	750.00	750.00
Staff Travel	9,000.00	0	15,000.00	20,000.00
Equip. Repairs	200.00	0	400.00	400.00
F & C-Meade	4,000.00	0	5,000.00	12,000.00
F & C-Safehouse	0	0	0	0
F P A	3,000.00	0	7,000.00	8,000.00
Safehouse & Off Rent	0	0	0	1,200.00
Misc. Exp.	1,000.00	0	4,000.00	5,000.00
Requisitions	500.00	0	7,000.00	7,000.00
TOTAL	108,100.00	15,850.00	201,100.00	256,800.00
Combined Total	129,550.00	31,850.00	238,325.00	349,300.00

318,000
47,000

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