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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

15 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT: Comments on 12 March 1965
Considerations of the Contingency
Problem form C/DODS to ADDP

1. It appears to me that DODS (in panic) has ignored operational realism in attempting to sell WUDEPOT assets to the Area Divisions. Subjectively, what has annoyed me from the very beginning of this attempt to peddle bodies, has been DODS probing into the field of covert PM contingency requirements. This is our responsibility and we are now (and have been) busily engaged in attempting to develop realistically third country covert PM personnel assets in consonance with requirements.

2. Pertaining to DODS/AF Div discussions, I cannot envisage SOD approving an arrangement by WUDEPOT with an Area Division whereby WUDEPOT agents would go to the field and set up a para-police unit. We, SOD, might use one or two agents on a selective basis. C/AF/5 [] has admitted having "rushed in" too quickly in the planned use of WUDEPOT personnel []. The reasons for his reservations are - an absence of language capability, no area background, and security factors attending use of teams of white personnel who are obviously Americans running around the sensitive tribal areas.

3. The NE Division's contingency requirement requires a level of 16 agents (4 over the present 12 agents). This appears to be a requirement which could be handled more economically by OTR, rather than maintaining a WUDEPOT mechanism.

4. I fully endorse DC/SOD comment re FE and WH interest in WUDEPOT. These two divisions would welcome a cost free agent acquisition mechanic, as would any division chief. This is an expensive alternative for keeping WUDEPOT.

5. Re para 2F, Ground Branch has held a number of meetings with DODS re use of WUDEPOT personnel. Further, at the request of the ADDP, we initially arranged for WH

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and AF discuss with DODS the use of WUDEPOT agents. GB's interest in WUDEPOT agents has been limited due to their U.S. citizenship status, language deficiency and past cover arrangements, i.e., Department of Defense. If U.S. personnel are to be used, we could do much better with JEWEL personnel or if needed in quantity "dipping" U.S. Military - Special Forces, Ranger and Seal personnel. There is precedence in the Agency for this action, i.e., QKNOONTIDE (U.S. Army, Navy, 7 Marine Chopper Pilots in Laos).

6. Re para 4b - IUJEWEL. The last sentence in this para is open to challenge. During past discussions with AF/Div relative to IUJEWEL staffing in African PM projects, it was understood if a para-police unit was set up in Zambia, Tanzania or elsewhere, if feasible, these units would be staffed by IUJEWEL personnel. Witness: Tanzania (2) officers, Zambia (1) officer and limited use of IUJEWEL in sensitive situations, i.e., Stanleyville (Rip and Art) and Bruce Learned, presently in the Bunia area.

7. Procedurally, it seems DODS has sidetracked the basic requirement to thoroughly assess Depot Personnel to determine their suitability, availability, and training necessary to properly qualify them for covert contingency use. To date, GB has reviewed the paper work (training reports, personal profiles, and present employment status) on some 100 personnel. [] of GB, who worked with WUDEPOT personnel for three years, believes about 25-30 could be considered for SOD contingency use. I would question if we want this many U.S. personnel when we can get better technicians from Defense or politically more acceptable personnel on a covert basis abroad. A few of the better qualified WUDEPOT agents, communicators, etc., might be retained for contingency use.

8. As DC/SOD has noted, OTR could handle WUDEPOT training much more economically even if a training site in addition to ISO were necessary. Camp Pickett, for example, costs nothing to retain. This or a similar facility could be acquired for both SOD and WUDEPOT type contingency training (ARLEAP, etc.).

I underline and endorse DC/SOD comment re bringing pressure to bear on OTR to set up such a facility. We, SOD, need such a facility now and will have periodic and continuing use for it.

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In conclusion, we, SOD, and one or two other area divisions might have at most a total of four to six contingency training requirements each year. These would average from \$12-20,000 for expenses. WUDEPOTs programming to handle this requirement with a permanent staff and facilities would cost considerably more according to their estimates.

[]
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

SOD/GB/[]:ef
(15 March 1965)

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