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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2-07

Renewal - FY 1961

**SECRET**

PO-4127

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project AEDEPOT (Renewal) FY 61

SR - Headquarters

1. The attached project, originating in SR Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 July 1960 through 30 June 1961. The project provides for a trained cadre of agents who could be used during a period of reinforced alert or during actual hostilities against the Soviet Union in accordance with the Clandestine Services War Preparation.

2. Authority is requested to obligate \$84,000 from the DD/P-SR Division budget in fiscal year 1961, subject to the availability of funds. This estimate includes: \$59,000 for the salaries of 24 agents during two 4-month training programs, and 44 agents during a two-week reserve training program; \$9,000 for travel of 68 trainees; \$10,000 for holding administrative costs; \$3,000 for the possible resettlement of six agents amounting to a one-month salary of \$500 each; \$1,000 for W/T training equipment for graduates of the two basic courses; and \$1,500 for the costs involved in the use of military and Agency aircraft.

3. The attached request for renewal summarizes the concept and management of the project, and presents a detailed breakdown of the funds requested. The project was originally approved in 1956 under the name AEREADY and was designed to recruit, train, and hold agent assets in the U.S. who would be ready for dispatch to designated SR target areas in the event of imminent or actual hostilities. Two classes of twelve agents each will be given basic training programs of four month duration under military cover during the renewal period. Forty-four agents will be given a two-week "reservist" refresher program in June 1961.

4. All appropriate Special Staff elements recommend renewal of this project. CI Staff comments that it believes that our hot-war cadre assets of this type should be considered sensitive and targets for Soviet CE penetration. It notes that AEDEPOT trained assets who have close relatives in the Soviet Bloc represent a potential vulnerability because of susceptibility to pressure. Attached is a memorandum prepared by CI Staff on AEDEPOT/2, which highlights some

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aspects of the problem. CI recommends that during the renewal period SR Division review the operation security vulnerabilities of AEDEPOT personnel including the frequency and type of correspondence with residents of the Soviet Bloc. It also recommends that the true identities of other AEDEPOT personnel known to each trainee and reservist should be made a matter of record and reported to CI Staff. It is recommended that each agent should agree not to travel into denied areas without the prior approval of this Agency.

5. I recommend renewal of Project AEDEPOT as presented, with particular attention to the comments and recommendations of CI Staff noted in paragraph 4 above.

[ ]  
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: [ ] COP-DD/P [ ] 1960  
Date

Attachment:  
Project Outline AEDEPOT

Staff Coordination:  
For FI Staff -s,  
For CI Staff -s,  
For CCD -s/  
For FI/PLANS -s,  
  
For CA Staff -s  
For FI/TRNG -s, [ ]

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM AEDEPOT

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

AREA DIVISION SR

\_\_\_\_\_

STATION Domestic Operations Base

ROOM NO. 1052 J

EXTENSION 8331

DATE 7 April 1960

The attached project outline is presented for renewal.

CONCURRENCES:

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

12 JUL 1960

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

\_\_\_\_\_   
Chief, SR/DOB

\_\_\_\_\_   
SR/COP

\_\_\_\_\_   
Chief, SR Division

12 JUL 1960

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE OF APPROVAL

## PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM AEDEPOT

### PART I

#### 1. AREA OF OPERATIONS

- a. Domestic

#### 2. PURPOSE

- a. The AEDEPOT Program is a part of the CIA unconventional warfare activities being undertaken by SR/DOB specifically to prepare timely support for the military forces in anticipation of open hostilities against the Soviet Union.

#### 3. BACKGROUND

- a. The project was initiated in 1956 as Project AEReady, registered Top Secret #147212 and assigned the file number 74-132-20. Its first amendment dated 3 December 1956 authorized assignment of three enlisted men in support.

- b. The project was renewed for FY 58 on 13 January 1957 and amendment #2 authorized the purchase of three U. S. Army vehicles on 24 October 1957.

- c. The project was renewed for FY 59 and its cryptonym was changed to AEDEPOT and its classification was downgraded to SECRET.

#### 4. REFERENCES

- a. DD/P memo dated 22 December 1955 "Clandestine Services War Preparation."

- b. "CIA Criteria for Determination of Wartime Military Requirements for Clandestine Operations" (TS #109734).

- c. SR/DOB Project AEACRE for FY 61.

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5. OBJECTIVES

In view of the infeasibility (from both an operational and security viewpoint) of developing stand-by agents within the USSR to be held in a state of readiness for wartime use, Project AEDEPOT has been established to recruit, train, and hold externally, selected personnel for wartime infiltration to designated targets in the USSR. In wartime or in local emergency these cadres would serve as all-purpose agents or action personnel with communications who could collect positive and operational intelligence; spot and assess for possible recruitment other personnel in the area; and establish contact with local resistance potential or provide reception, safe-haven, or communications facilities and services as required.

6. TARGETS

While agents have been trained under AEDEPOT to service JCS wartime requirements in a variety of fields (including the basic field of positive and operational intelligence collection), the only detailed official JCS requirements for which AEDEPOT-trained agents have been considered are JCS U/W requirements. Originally, 63 U/W targets in the USSR levied on SR Division in accordance with memo dated 18 September 1958 from C/PP to CSR, subject: "Revised U/W Requirements" (with 5 attachments) were accepted. Subsequently, USCINCEUR's 49 U/W targets submitted originally among the 63 JCS targets have been consolidated by USCINCEUR and resubmitted in 1960 as 27 area targets. These have been accepted subject to future priorities established by appropriate authority.

7. TASKS

Each target is assumed to be an area of approximately 25 miles in radius around the designated coordinates. Each target area could be normally satisfactorily covered by a team of three agents, i. e., a leader to protect the U. S. Government interests, a former national of the target area who would establish contact with resistance potential and a competent W/T radio operator to provide communications. However, one fully developed agent alone may be qualified to perform all the functions in certain target areas. The mission for each team or solo agent will be:

- (1) To be prepared for immediate commitment;

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- (2) To report operational intelligence;
- (3) To refrain from overt and direct acts of sabotage and raids which may unduly expose its members (or himself if solo) to capture;
- (4) To organize, support, and advise indigenous friendlies in U/W through their leaders;
- (5) To provide in certain categories and some instances such support and turnover of responsibilities to Special Forces as directed by proper authority;
- (6) To assist in the development of an E&E capability;
- (7) To perform any mission directed by proper authority.
- (8) To perform current missions of an operational nature;
- (9) To assist and support other operating divisions in their hot-war programs.

#### 8. PERSONNEL

a. Agent candidates selected for this training are predominately Soviet Bloc nationals, who are now naturalized U. S. citizens or who intend to apply for citizenship. Each agent candidate is assigned a pseudonym to be used in his relationship with the U. S. Government (for contracting); an alias to be used in his relationship with his associates while in training; and, unbeknown to him, he is assigned a cryptonym (AEDEPOT--numerical order) upon his successful completion of the 16 week basic training course.

b. Recruitment of agent candidates is performed by any secure means available and is based on all four of the following factors:

- (1) potential ability to perform tasks involved;
- (2) motivation;
- (3) unquestionable loyalty;
- (4) voluntary acceptance.

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## 9. OPERATIONAL and/or SECURITY CLEARANCE

a. Due to the security aspects of this program, POA's are issued by Headquarters prior to contacting prospective agent candidates for assessment and recruitment. Initial recruiting and assessment phases are usually performed under the cover of U. S. Government officials seeking translators and/or consultants because of their specific area knowledge or language background.

b. All Agency personnel deal with the agents under alias.

c. The training activities are under the cover of the U. S. Army Materiel Testing Unit (8723).

## 10. CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION

a. During the recruiting phase the candidates maintain contact with an SR/DOB/SA&E case officer in alias through a Washington, D. C. accommodation address and an unlisted sterile telephone number.

b. During the training phase the trainees communicate with their next-of-kin through an accommodation address in nearby Maryland.

c. During the holding phase the graduates communicate with the project officer through a Washington, D. C., post office box and a sterile telephone number. They are instructed not to maintain contact with each other after graduation regarding association with the program.

## 11. CONTROL AND MOTIVATION

a. Each candidate is evaluated to determine at least one good reason why he would want to participate in this program. Individuals whose families have been persecuted by communist rulers or who display a particular desire for revenge, or immigrants who are particularly appreciative of the benefits they have received in this country, are generally adequately motivated to perform clandestine duties against the Soviet Union and for the U. S. Individuals who appear to be soldiers-of-fortune or of a mercenary nature may still be acceptable candidates when it is determined that they are genuinely sincere in being willing to perform their duties under the terms of the contract. During the assessment their loyalty is determined by every means available and their participation is on a strictly voluntary basis.



b. Each candidate who is accepted is required to sign a secrecy agreement and a contract which defines his obligations for the specified period and explains his remuneration and benefits authorized. An additional contract is again signed in pseudonym by the successful graduates to continue the mutual relationship as reservists.

## 12. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT

a. Facilities, equipment and messing is provided at U. S. Army installations under PASCO-57.

b. Additional supplies and support are provided by SR/DOB/Logistics under Station Support funds.

c. OTR furnishes instructor personnel, training material and such facilities that are adaptable to the program.

d. Services and technical equipment are provided by the Office of Communications on a continuing basis. Other Agency offices contribute on an on-call basis.

## 13. COORDINATION

a. This project originated in Headquarters and is being implemented by the Domestic Operations Base solely within the areas of interest of the SR Division.

b. Since its inception, this project's activities have been coordinated with other offices on a need-to-know basis in acquiring necessary support, and liaison has been maintained in areas of mutual interest.

## 14. TIMETABLE

a. To date, forty-four agents have been given the basic phase of training and are under contract as reservists to take annual two-week refresher courses and to be available for commitment when called during a period of alert.

b. For FY 61 Class VII is expected to commence on 31 July 1960 with 12 trainees, graduating 19 November 1960. Class VIII, with 12 trainees will begin on 29 January 1961 and end on 20 May 1961. Refresher training for 56 graduates of Classes I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII is scheduled for the period 11-24 June 1961.

PART II

15. ESTIMATED COST

a. It is requested that funds in the amount of \$84,000 be allocated to continue Project AEDEPOT for FY 61.

b. It is estimated that agent costs will include:

1. Salaries of Agents

Twenty-four agents @ \$500.00 monthly average for a period of four months	\$48,000.00
Forty-four agents (Classes 1-2-3-4-5-6) average \$250.00 for two week reserve training	11,000.00
Total Salaries	<u>\$59,000.00</u>

2. Travel

Twenty-four agents @ \$125.00 per round trip	3,000.00
Forty-four agents (Classes 1-2-3-4-5-6) round trip travel for two week reservist duty @ \$125 per	5,500.00
Emergency travel	1,000.00
Total Travel	<u>9,500.00</u>

3. Holding Admin Costs

Forty-four agents (Classes 1 - VI) @ \$50.00 per quarter - full year	8,800.00
Twelve agents (Class VII) @ \$50.00 per quarter - half year	1,200.00
Total Holding	<u>10,000.00</u>

4. Resettlement

Six agents - One Month Salary	3,000.00
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(Note: It is unlikely that this number will need such compensation but it is provided for against such exigency)

5. Commo Equipment

Twenty-four Instructographs for graduates @ \$41.23 each Approx. 1,000.00

6. Miscellaneous

Military and/or Agency aircraft @ \$100.00 per hour for 15 hours	<u>1,500.00</u>
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All Costs Total \$84,000.00