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30 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Approval of Overflight of Latvia

1. In connection with subject request, it is deemed advisable that certain facts be called to your attention:

- a. This Agency has been unable to furnish any material support whatsoever to its agent in Latvia since May 1954 at which time a second agent was dispatched in order to carry in operational funds.
- b. Both these agents have long since exhausted their funds and have been without money for almost a year.
- c. Due to several false alerts and three abortive attempts at air exfiltration, both agents are convinced that we have no intention of sending an aircraft into Latvia and consider this phase of the operation to be notional.
- d. The first agent has stated that he would monitor our broadcasts only until the end of June and if nothing concrete were forthcoming would thereupon quit.
- e. The second agent has indicated a determination not to await an inevitable end but to make every effort to escape the country this summer.

2. A review of the agents' traffic and an analysis of the situation leads us to the considered conclusion that:

- a. Words alone will not suffice to hold the agents in place, respondent to our control, pending the time an air exfiltration can be carried out this fall.
- b. Unless our good faith is proven by a dramatic and concrete event such as an overflight forthwith, the first agent will in fact quit, and the second will attempt an independent escape.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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- c. The first agent's resignation will result only in the Agency losing the services of a qualified internal agent.
  - d. It is felt likely that the second agent will be unable to exfiltrate utilizing only his own resources and his attempts to do so will result in capture.
  - e. This agent's capture will inevitably result in the compromise and capture of our first agent and approximately 12 other sub-agents.
  - f. When the potential number of witting or unwitting contacts of these 12 sub-agents is considered, it becomes apparent that the Soviets would be in an excellent position to hold mass public trials with appropriate propaganda exploitation. It is suggested that such a "flap" would have far more serious repercussions than would the shooting down of an airplane.
3. The net result of the foregoing probabilities would be:
- a. The loss of the entire assets of this Agency in Latvia.
  - b. The creation of such an atmosphere of disillusionment that future REDSOX recruitment both within and without Latvia will be ~~most difficult~~ *most difficult.*
4. The problem that we are faced with now is to resupply by air this spring or not at all, since our agents will not last until fall nor do they intend to wait. It is therefore recommended that you reconsider your decision and grant approval for an overflight for the purpose of resupply by air for this spring.
5. Attached as appendix A and B for your background information, are the last messages received from our agents.

Attachment  
As stated above

[ ]  
Chief, SR Division

CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_  
DD/P

The recommendation in paragraph 4  
is approved.

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Director of Central  
Intelligence

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