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28 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Latvian SSR Exfiltration Proposal

1. Situation. Two Agency trained REDSOX agents are currently operating in the Latvian SSR. They have accomplished their missions successfully, and their tours of duty were completed in the fall of 1954. They are, however, incapable of effecting an exfiltration utilizing only their own resources.

2. Problem. In order that the ultimate success of this operation, which began in 1951, may be insured, and in order that our developed assets in the Latvian SSR may be preserved, a means must be devised whereby these two agents can successfully exfiltrate.

3. Recommendations. After exhaustive analysis of the problem, it appears that an exfiltration by air staged from Gotland is the only method available which would insure to the greatest possible degree the success of this undertaking. It is therefore recommended that the previously submitted AECOB (Latvian SSR) Exfiltration Plan providing for such an overflight be approved.

4. Attached herewith for your background information is a brief summary of the current status of our Latvian agent assets.

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Chief, SR Division

[] CONCUR: []
Chief, AMD A Chief, FI

[] CONCUR: []
for Chief, CI COP

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

CONCUR: — BUT NOT RPT NOT UNTIL AFTER
SUMMIT MEETING IS CONCLUDED
WHICH I ASSUME IS INTENDED
BECAUSE OF PARA 2 OF
MEMO OF 29 JUNE.
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29 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations
VIA : Chief, FI
SUBJECT : Latvian Exfiltration Operation

1. Recent developments in the Latvian exfiltration operation point up the necessity for an early policy decision on whether or not we should attempt the exfiltration. A synopsis of the background and the present situation in the case is reproduced below in support of the memorandum for the Director recommending approval of the overflight.

2. Permission has been received from the Chief of Swedish Intelligence to stage the overflight from Gotland, both on the inbound and the outbound legs. Weather, terrain and conditions of darkness will be favorable beginning 11 August 1955 until mid-October 1955. An early decision is needed to allow us to take timely advantage of these favorable conditions.

3. An extremely minute and thorough analysis of the agents' traffic and all other aspects of this case was conducted by the Chief, CI Staff. His findings corroborated our own conclusion, to wit, that there was absolutely no evidence of any RIS control apparent, nor was there any sign of any of the patterns usually encountered in RIS controlled cases. A continuing review of all traffic received to date reveals a consistent positive indication of freedom from control, as well as a complete absence of any indications of RIS control. (See Tab A for favorable recommendation of CI Staff.)

4. Following is the background and present status of the case:

a. CAMUSO/2 is a Latvian who was recruited by this Agency in Sweden in 1951. He was brought to Germany for approximately one year of training and was dispatched by air in August 1952 to the Latvian SSR. As regards the other two agents with whom CAMUSO/2 was dispatched, one missed the DZ and failed to effect a rendezvous. The first message from him indicated he had been captured. The other agent maintained contact with CAMUSO/2 according to plan; however, the two were ambushed by troops on the morning subsequent to dispatch and during the ensuing skirmish, CAMUSO/2's companion was killed. CAMUSO/2 managed to escape and

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was able to reach one of his support points in Riga safely. In the process, however, he was forced to abandon a good deal of operational equipment and almost all of his operational currency. In spite of such an inauspicious beginning and although he was forced to operate under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions, CAMUSO/2 continued to carry out his assignment and did in fact complete it successfully. In the course of his activities he recruited and trained two internal resident agents, developed two cut-outs for receipt of communications, and arranged for two separate safehouse facilities. Although his tour of duty was scheduled to be completed in August 1954, it was decided that it would be wiser to withdraw him in advance of that date inasmuch as his mission had been accomplished and he lacked funds for further operational activity. It soon became apparent, however, that he had no possibility of exfiltrating by utilizing his own resources alone, and it was therefore incumbent upon us to furnish the assistance required.

b. Accordingly, it was decided to dispatch CAMBARO/2 in order that he could provide the necessary briefing and assistance to effect CAMUSO/2's exfiltration. CAMBARO/2 is a former Latvian Army officer and police official who was recruited by this Agency in Sweden in 1951. He is an extremely powerful man physically and at the same time highly competent mentally. Due to his exceptional qualifications he had been utilized as an indigenous instructor of REDSOX agents and had participated to a considerable degree in the training of CAMUSO/2. He was put through a final, short but intensive, period of training in the US in the early part of 1954. He was thoroughly briefed and documented for the best exfiltration route available to us. Elaborate meeting arrangements were devised in order to enable the two agents to make contact without one endangering the other in case of compromise.

c. CAMBARO/2 was dispatched by air to the Latvian SSR in May 1954. Whether due to insufficient altitude or faulty timing by CAMBARO/2 it can not now be determined, but whatever the cause, the agent was unable to disengage his jump container and hit the ground with the 100 pound-plus pack still strapped to his body. As a result, he seriously injured his knee and dislocated one ankle; he was, however, still capable of some movement and was able to leave the area and proceed according to his briefing. Contact between the two agents was successfully established seven

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days after CAMBARO/2's dispatch, both agents reporting on it independently. He spent the summer assessing and reorganizing CAMUSO/2's assets and despite his instructions to the contrary, also recruited and trained two additional resident agents and developed and briefed three support point/safehouse facilities.

d. As soon as the conditions of darkness and terrain were appropriate, the two agents set out on their exfiltration attempt after first sending an advance scout to reconnoitre the route. They were able to reach Murmansk without difficulty; however, here they encountered extremely stringent security controls due to the route's compromise by the capture of the two Estonian agents that summer. The agents attempted to implement their alternate plan and cross the Tuloma River 40 kilometers south of Murmansk. However, in traveling at night over the rocky terrain, CAMBARO/2 dislocated his previously injured ankle and no further progress was possible. The severity of his injury may be judged by the fact that whereas the two agents reached the 40 kilometer point in two nights, they required seven nights in order to return after the accident. They were able to return safely to Riga by rail, a distance of some 1200 miles, and requested further instructions from us.

5. Realizing that the two agents between them held the key to the identities of our entire assets in Latvia and that therefore an urgent necessity existed for extricating them from their extremely precarious positions, an exhaustive study was made of all possible avenues of escape that could conceivably be used as a means of exfiltration. On the basis of this study, it was concluded that the best method available by far would be to fly the agents out by plane. A possible alternate solution would be to exfiltrate them by sea; however, this would require developing maritime assets which we do not now possess.

6. Accordingly, CAMBARO/2 was instructed to select an appropriate LZ and to train two of his recruits for utilization as a reception party. He located and reported an ideal LZ to us and was in a complete state of readiness for the exfiltration as of mid-February 1955.

7. A Staff study of the proposed exfiltration by Air Maritime Division indicated that although it was possible to mount the operation from other locations, only by staging it from Gotland would there be a maximum degree of success insured. The operation was tentatively scheduled for implementation in March 1955; however, due to our inability to secure refueling rights on Gotland, it was delayed until

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sufficient darkness no longer existed, and it was thus not possible to mount the operation.

8. We have also been informed by Frankfurt Air Section that the pilot who has been in training for this operation will have reached the proper level of proficiency by 1 August 1955.

9. It is requested, therefore, that in view of the short time remaining, immediate steps be taken to secure final approval for this operation. Although the proposed action is in the nature of a calculated risk, careful consideration has been given to the balance of possible gains versus losses (see Tab B, Balance Sheet of Gains and Losses), and it is felt that the probable gain would considerably outweigh the possible loss.

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Chief, SR Division

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5 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: Latvian SSR Exfiltration Proposal

1. This Staff is concurring in the recommendations of the memorandum dated 28 June 1955, from Chief, SR to the DCI, in the above-captioned matter. This concurrence is conditional as follows:

a. The CI Staff can see no objection to the operation from a counter-intelligence standpoint.

b. It is the type of operation that is appealing not only from the positive good to be accomplished but also from the standpoint of obligation to the agents.

2. You are aware of the previous memorandum which I submitted relative to overflights around the time of the Summit conference. Of course, no one at this point knows what the outcome of this conference will be.

3. It is the recommendation of this Staff that you tentatively approve the project in order that SR can go ahead with its planning subject to ~~an SR review~~ review after the Summit conference, at which time additional recommendations may or may not be made to the DCI.

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Acting Chief, CI

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24 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Balance Sheet of Gains and Losses

1. Pursuant to your request of the 19th, we are submitting herewith what we believe to be a fair Balance Sheet of Possible Gains and Losses Which Might Accrue in Connection with the Proposed Project AECOB Exfiltration Mission #1.

2. Our review of all of these considerations leads us to believe that although considerable loss may be expected to accrue to the AIS should the mission fail, particularly in the event of ambush in the target area, the gains from the mission's successful accomplishment would be so significant as to materially outweigh the risks involved in its undertaking.

[]
Chief, SR Division

1 Enclosure

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BALANCE SHEET OF GAINS AND LOSSES

**Expected to Accrue to AIS in Connection with the
Proposed Project AECOB Exfiltration Mission #1**

Part A -- Gain in Event Mission Accomplished

Part B -- Loss in Event Mission Cancelled

Part C -- Loss in Event Mission Ambushed

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A. GAIN IN EVENT MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

1. Partial or total fulfillment, at this time, of requirements concerning Latvia and other Northwest USSR areas as the result of the availability of agents* for debriefing by Agency specialists. These requirements are as follows:

a. Positive intelligence and information on the following:

- (1) General defense situation, including OB;
- (2) General political situation;
- (3) General economic situation;
- (4) General sociological situation.

COMMENT: This data is expected to contribute to Agency's estimate of the situation in the target area.

b. Operational intelligence and information on the following:

- (1) Detailed conditions in the area affecting operational possibilities, including conditions of legal and illegal residence and travel;
- (2) Current documentation situation;
- (3) Adequacy of Agency-provided documents tested in operational situations;
- (4) Adequacy of Agency-agent training tested in operational situations.
- (5) Adequacy of Agency-provided equipment tested in operational situations.

COMMENT: This data is expected to enhance the possibilities of successful accomplishment of future similar clandestine missions.

c. Information on feasibilities of establishing and employing covert assets for:

- (1) Evasion and escape of SAC air crews;

*The two agents involved have been resident in USSR for 2½ years and 1 year respectively, and as recently as October 1954 have journeyed to the Murmansk and Northwest border areas becoming familiar with travel and border controls therein.

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- (2) Tactical intelligence, guidance and reception of airborne forces;
- (3) Sabotage and other unconventional warfare tactics for deterring enemy progress;
- (4) Guerrilla warfare.

COMMENT: This data is expected to improve Agency's estimates of capabilities for hot war plans of special interest to Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Improved opportunity for continued fulfillment of requirements, concerning Latvia and other Northwest USSR areas, for positive and operational intelligence in the cold war, and tactical intelligence and unconventional warfare tasks in the hot war, by:
 - a. Elimination of unnecessary hazards to security and operations of legal resident agents from continued presence of the two principal agents who are vulnerable to (1) apprehension because of their insecure, illegal, status, and (2) "souring" from despair of AIS' ever rescuing them from a situation of questionable tenability.
 - b. Infiltration of operational funds for legal resident agents.
 - c. Infiltration of reserve operational equipment for resident agents.
 - d. Infiltration of special operational equipment, a sequence camera with capability of taking pictures at two-minute intervals of 45 days duration for installation on the scene of a high priority target.
3. Experience in mounting personnel pick-up operations in denied areas. Since exfiltration is one of the Agency's biggest problems unsolved to date, this experience would be a long step forward operationally, greatly contributing to the Agency's future successes in such missions.

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B. LOSS IN EVENT MISSION CANCELLED

1. Partial or total unfulfillment, at this time, of requirements concerning Latvia and other Northwest USSR areas as the result of non-availability of agents for debriefing. These requirements are as follows:

- a. Positive intelligence and information as indicated in Part A, paragraph 1 a.

COMMENT: As the result, no contribution will be made from these sources to Agency estimates of the situation in the target area at this time.

- b. Operational intelligence and information as indicated in Part A, paragraph 1 b.

COMMENT: As the result, information which may be expected to enhance the possibilities of successful accomplishment of future similar clandestine missions will not be made available to us at this time.

- c. Information on feasibilities of establishing and employing covert assets as indicated in Part A, paragraph 1 c.

COMMENT: As the result, data which is expected to improve Agency estimates of capabilities for hot war plans of special interest to Joint Chiefs of Staff will not be made available to us at this time.

2. Impaired opportunity for continued fulfillment of requirements, concerning Latvia and other Northwest USSR areas, for positive and operational intelligence in the cold war, and tactical intelligence and unconventional warfare tasks in the hot war, by:

- a. Non-elimination of unnecessary hazards to security and operations of legal resident agents from continued presence of the two principal agents who are vulnerable to (1) apprehension because of their insecure illegal, status, and (2) "souring" from despair of AIS' ever rescuing them from a situation of questionable tenability.
- b. Non-infiltration of operational funds for legal resident agents.
- c. Non-infiltration of reserve operational equipment for resident agents.
- d. Non-infiltration of special operational equipment, a sequence camera with capability of taking pictures at two-minute

intervals of 45 days duration for installation on the scene of a high priority target.

3. Denial of opportunity for gaining experience in mounting personnel pick-up operations in denied areas at this time.

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C. LOSS IN EVENT MISSION AMBUSHED*

1. Capture of operational aircraft, affording Soviets tangible evidence of AIS violation of Soviet borders.
2. Capture of additional operational equipment, affording Soviets more tangible evidence of AIS illegal operations against the interests of the Soviet state.
3. Capture of flight crew with consequent Soviet acquisition of information on operational matters of which the agent pilots are witting as the result of their personal participation in a number of flight operations** or shop talk with other agent pilots who have participated in similar flights. Specifically the nature of information of which the flight crew may be expected to be witting is the following:
 - a. Most, and possibly all, of the air operations conducted against target areas from staging sites in Germany and Greece.
 - b. Most, and possibly all, of air training and staging areas employed by the Agency in the European theater.
 - c. An indeterminate number of Agency, Air Force and non-US personnel, including indigenous air crews, who have become known to them as the result of training and staging flights and similar operations in Germany and, possibly, in Greece. It may be expected that US personnel, in all categories, would be known to them by names other than true ones.
4. It may be expected that the Soviets will take advantage of the event by unleashing a propaganda barrage on world-wide basis, the aim of which most likely would be to:
 - a. Damage the prestige of the US among friendly and neutral peoples and nations of the world.
 - b. Damage the prestige of the present US administration in the minds of unsophisticated elements of the US electorate.
 - c. Dry up the remaining pools of agent personnel for AIS.

*Presumption is ambush took place as result of RIS control over agents.

**Of pilots currently being considered, one has been associated with Agency for one year, has not flown operational missions before; the other is not yet selected.

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- d. Damage the US bargaining position in negotiations for release of US airmen held in custody by the Peiping Government of China.

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SUBJECT: Latest S/W Message (No.17) from Latvian Principal Agent.

The following message, written 23 June 1955 in the Latvian SSR, was received at Headquarters on 11 July 1955. This message contains six positive signals indicating freedom from control:

"Received your message No. 37. Since the beginning of June I have been living in the country with Janis (the safehouse keeper near the LZ). For the purpose of possible document checks - which have not been made in this area for the last 8 years - I am regarded as his relative who has come from Riga for a few days to visit. When going to Riga, I shall stay with Erika (the safehouse keeper whom he recruited in 1954). I shall bury the remaining 4 copies of S/W instructions in the near future and will notify you of the location in my next message.

In my last message * I wrote that I would wait for the fulfillment of your promise this spring, even though it was getting late, but apparently I waited in vain. Now the time has gone by and I must draw the conclusion that you probably make that kind of promise merely in order to pacify your agents. Also your other promise regarding a re-supply of money seems to be only a promise, otherwise I should have received it by now.

What is one to do next? You do not say anything about that in your messages and only warn me to lay low and refrain from any compromising act. Am I to understand this in such a way that I should do nothing on my part, but should only wait for your instructions? I urge you again to please send me a reply as speedily as possible, since the summer is short, and let me know if I have good reason to hope that we shall be able to leave here in the fall. Mere promises "to do everything possible" do not satisfy me any more. The second exfiltration alternative which I mentioned in my last message* is no longer valid from my present point of view.

The report of Khrushchev's trip to Latvia has been confirmed. He was in Riga from 14 to 16 June.

/Signature/ 23/VI.1955

* Refers to Message No. 16 which has not been received.