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11 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Approval of Operational Plan
for Project AECOB Exfiltration No. 1

1. It is requested that approval be granted for the implementation of the Operational Plan for Project AECOB Exfiltration No. 1, attached herewith.

2. Subject plan proposes that a sterilized L-20 Beaver, piloted by agent personnel, penetrate the Latvian SSR, land at a locally selected LZ with a reception committee present, pick up two REDSOX agents and return to base.

3. The operation is deemed most desirable. Its successful implementation will result in the exfiltration of two REDSOX agents, whose mission has been completed, and facilitate the security of several legally residing agents recruited by them in place. (Cf Attachment A, paragraph 4)

4. A review and analysis of all traffic received from both REDSOX agents to date reveals no evidence of RIS control over them. (Cf Attachment B)

5. In order to be in a position of readiness in anticipation of the approval of this plan, arrangements are being made for Air Maritime Division to check-out an agent air crew in special techniques required for the operation.

6. An examination of the possible flight plans which may be employed, (Cf Attachment A, Annex 3), makes it apparent that the probabilities for success of this operation would be enhanced if refueling rights could be secured at Gotland, as first choice, or at Bornholm, as second choice. Approval is requested also, therefore, for the opening of negotiations with

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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
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the appropriate foreign authorities, in coordination with Western Europe Division, in order to secure these rights


Chief, SR Division

Attachments

- A. Operational Plan for Project AECOB Exfiltration No. 1 including annexes:
 - Annex I - Landing Zone
 - Annex II - Resupply Container
 - Annex III - Special Problems
- B. Memorandum to SR/COP from Chief, SR/2, dated 10 February 1955
Subject: Control of AECOB Agents
- C. Memorandum for Chief, Soviet Russia Division, dated 27 January 1955
Subject: Latvian Exfiltration

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OPERATIONAL PLAN
FOR
PROJECT AECOB
EXFILTRATION NO. 1

1. PURPOSE

- a. To exfiltrate two Agency trained and dispatched REDSOX agents from Latvian SSR.
- b. To infiltrate operational supplies and currency into Latvian SSR for future operational need of established legal resident agents.

2. BACKGROUND

- a. CAMUSO/2 was infiltrated into the Latvian SSR by means of an air dispatch in August 1952. His mission was to recruit legal residents, train them in clandestine techniques, and eventually develop them into independent principal agent types with the assignment of intelligence reporting. Upon the expiration of his two year tour of duty he was to attempt an overland exfiltration utilizing his own resources. To date, CAMUSO/2 has succeeded in recruiting AECOB/1, a principal agent, and AECOB/2, the latter's sub-agent. Due to CAMUSO/2's apparent lack of the capability of effecting his own exfiltration successfully, AEBIAS/2, a REDSOX agent due to be dispatched on an FI type mission was given the collateral assignment of resupplying CAMUSO/2 with the necessary documents, operational supplies, and briefing designed to facilitate the latter's exfiltration.
- b. AEBIAS/2 was infiltrated into Latvian SSR in May 1953 by means of an air dispatch. No communication from him or information concerning him has ever been received and it is presumed that he met his death immediately subsequent to dispatch.
- c. CAMBARO/2 was infiltrated into Latvian SSR in May 1954 by means of an air dispatch. His primary mission was to effect the exfiltration of CAMUSO/2 and himself during the fall of 1954. His collateral assignment was to utilize the interim period involved in assessing and consolidating whatever assets CAMUSO/2 had already recruited. In addition to fulfilling this collateral assignment, he was successful in recruiting and training two other independent principal agents--AECOB/3 and AECOB/4--and in recruiting a support point/medical facility--AECOB/5. After sending a scout to case the proposed route and providing CAMUSO/2 with the necessary documents,

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maps and briefing, the two agents began their exfiltration attempt aimed at penetrating the Norwegian/USSR border. Due to their encountering stringent security measures and controls at Murmansk, the two agents were forced to deviate from the primary route and attempt an alternate means of crossing the Tuloma river. Because the physical obstacles involved proved to be insurmountable and since CAMBARO/2 suffered an injury to his leg severely incapacitating him, the agents were forced to abandon the attempt and return to Riga. They are now awaiting further instructions and orders.

3. REFERENCES

- a. Memorandum dated 27 January 1955 to Chief, Soviet Russia Division, from Chief, Air Maritime Division, PP, Subject: Latvian Exfiltration.
- b. CSI No. 50-12 AIR OPERATIONS APPROVAL AND CLEARANCE OF OVERFLIGHTS.

4. OBJECTIVES

Aside from the outstanding commitments and moral obligations involved, it is considered that the primary objective in this instance is the preservation of the established legal resident agents. It is felt that this can best be accomplished by the exfiltration of CAMUSO/2 and CAMBARO/2, thus removing them from their present position of extreme vulnerability. The compromise and capture of CAMBARO/2 would not only deprive this Agency of the services of a competent, trained REDSOX agent but would inevitably lead to the compromise of:

- a. AECOB/3; a legally residing and employed principal agent. He was recruited and trained in Latvia in tradecraft techniques by CAMBARO/2. This agent is capable of two-way S/W and W/T communications. He possesses an undetermined number of contacts among Latvian intellectual circles.
- b. AECOB/4; a legally residing and employed principal agent who was previously trained and employed by German Intelligence. He was recruited and trained locally by CAMBARO/2 in tradecraft techniques. He is capable of maintaining two-way S/W communications. He reportedly possesses extensive contacts among the local dissident elements and former Legionnaires.
- c. AECOB/5; a legally residing and employed support point. He was recruited and briefed by CAMBARO/2. He is capable of providing safehouse facilities and professional medical treatment.
- d. CAMUSO/2; this Agency's second trained REDSOX agent in Latvia. This agent's compromise would in turn lead to the compromise of:
- e. AECOB/1; a legally residing and employed principal agent. This agent was recruited and trained locally by CAMUSO/2 in tradecraft techniques. He is capable of maintaining two-way S/W communications. This agent has access to various Soviet office buildings and other official installations.

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- f. AECOB/2; a legally residing and employed sub-agent to AECOB/1 above. He was recruited and trained locally by CAMUSO/2 in the principles of tradecraft. He has access to an automobile and possesses considerable freedom of movement.

The foregoing itemization of the assets this Agency is in danger of losing represents the sum total of all our assets in Latvia. It does not, however, include approximately six other legal individuals who have been contacted locally and as a result are witting to some degree. Inasmuch as they have not as yet been developed to any appreciable degree and are not fully operational, they are not considered here.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

- a. Although CAMBARO/2 has previously received training in the procedures involved in selecting a landing zone (LZ) and in organizing a reception party, it is considered to be more desirable that the details involved in these procedures be repeated to him, not only for the sake of review, but also in order to insure that there will exist a mutual understanding between him and Headquarters as to the specific procedures that will be followed at the time of the actual exfiltration. This process has already been initiated by means of blind broadcasts to the agent and will be continued until the final scheduled transmission on 20 February 1955.
- b. CAMBARO/2 will be instructed to report the coordinates of the LZ by means of W/T as soon as he has selected it. He will transmit the precise details and measurements of LZ at that same time by means of S/W. It is not expected however, that this S/W message will be received any earlier than the last week of February.
- c. CAMBARO/2 will be instructed that, subsequent to his selection of the LZ, he will begin training and rehearsing CAMUSO/2 and the two recruits who will serve as the reception party. It will be recommended to CAMBARO/2 that he enlist the aid of AECOB/1 and 2, since AECOB/1 has already proven himself operationally and, having access to a car and travel documents, has considerably more freedom of movement than the other AECOBs. Moreover, AECOB/1 and 2 comprise one separate unit, compartmented from all other AECOBs and their possible capture could not result in the compromise of any of the other resident agents.
- d. CAMBARO/2 will also be directed to arrange for safehouse facilities for the two aircrew members in order that they may have some chance of survival in the event of damage to aircraft on the ground.
- e. During the scheduled transmission of 20 February, instructions will be passed providing for an extra W/T schedule on 24 February. In the 20 February transmission the necessity for developing natural cover for his reception party in order to cover its members post-exfiltration movements will be impressed upon him. He will be informed that he will be required to preselect a cache site and

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prepare it for burial of infiltrated equipment at a minimum distance of 1 kilometer removed from the LZ during the same night that he will be alerted to receive the airplane. He will be asked to determine the minimum number of hours advance notice of the airplanes ETA which he will require in order to acknowledge receipt of the message and accomplish the above as well as assembling his reception party and having them in place at the LZ. He will be requested to prepare his reply, including a local weather report, and transmit it on 23 February.

- f. On the 24 February transmission to him he will be given a specific time of day which he will be required to monitor daily effective at once. This time of day will be determined on the basis of his minimum advance notice requirement as received the previous day with an added time margin for processing of traffic. He will be placed on his QRX schedule providing for daily transmission and instructed to transmit a short local weather condition report every alternate day beginning 25 February. He will be instructed to keep his transmitter within ready access inasmuch as he will be required to acknowledge receipt of the message containing the planes ETA as soon as possible after the receipt of it.
- g. The Frankfurt air section will be required to secure weather data enabling them to arrive at a decision whether or not to mount the operation far enough in advance in order to meet the daily scheduled transmission to CAMBARO/2. QRU "Nothing for you" will be transmitted to the agent daily beginning 25 February.
- h. Beginning 1 March, on the first day that favorable weather conditions exist and Frankfurt air section has decided to mount the operation a message will be transmitted to the agent during his regular daily broadcast. CAMBARO/2 will be given the ETA at the LZ, and the safety signal he is to use in signaling the plane when it approaches. He will be instructed not to acquaint any of the reception party members with this signal and to acknowledge receipt of this message without delay.
- i. After transmitting a short receipt for this message and a local weather condition report, CAMBARO/2 will cache his W/T set and alert his reception party. The party will then proceed to the LZ either singly or jointly, depending upon the existing conditions, in order to arrive at the LZ approximately three hours in advance of the ETA of the aircraft. CAMBARO/2 and CAMUSO/2 will remain at the LZ while the two other members of the reception party continue on to the preselected caching site and prepare the ground for burial. Upon completion of this task the two recruits will return to the LZ, conceal their car some distance away from it and take up their positions for reception at lights No. 3 and No. 4. (see annex #1) One or both of these men should be armed.

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- j. CAMUSO/2 will take his position at Light No. 2 and CAMBARO/2 will assume light No. 1. He will conduct periodic inspections of the reception party members until 15 minutes in advance of the ETA-- when he will resume his position and maintain it.
- k. As soon as the aircraft is detected by sight or sound, CAMBARO/2 will signal his reception party's lights on by means of a sweeping side to side motion of his flashlight. He will then begin blinking his safety signal to the plane until it enters the landing pattern and it is clear that the signal has been recognized. In the event of ambush a sweeping up and down motion of the flashlight will be given as a danger signal. This signal can be given by any one of the reception party members and will be used only in the event of an armed attack in force. It will not be used in the event of the approach of some casual passerby in which case the reception party members will be expected to be able to cope with the situation. In the event of a danger signal the plane will, if airborne or in position for takeoff, immediately return to base and the reception party members will take cover and disperse. In the event the situation is such that the plane cannot escape, the reception party members will take cover and attempt to rescue the air-crew, eventually delivering them to the prearranged safe-house.
- l. All lights, once signalled on, will remain lit until the plane takes off. As the plane lands and passes light No. 2, CAMUSO/2 will place his lit flashlight in a previously prepared makeshift holder and join CAMBARO/2 at light No. 1. The plane will taxi back to light No. 1 and turn for takeoff. It will discharge the container (see annex #2) of operational equipment. CAMUSO/2 will get aboard while CAMBARO/2 drags the container clear of the plane. The latter will leave his weapon by the container and climb aboard whereupon the plane will take off.
- m. As soon as the plane has passed overhead, lights No. 3 and 4 will be turned off. The two reception party members will proceed to the container, turning off light No. 2 enroute. They will recover CAMBARO/2's weapon, carry the container to their car, proceed to the preselected caching site and bury it and the weapons, eradicating all traces of burial. They will proceed either back to their homes, or if they have had any success in arranging it, to the home of the person they have recruited for cover purposes.

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
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LANDING ZONE

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NOTE: LIGHT (A) IS RCL-CODED RECOGNITION SENT FROM THIS POINT. RED LIGHT PREFERABLE IF AVAILABLE FOR THIS POSITION, IF NOT, ALL LIGHTS WILL BE WHITE.

RED LIGHT (A) PREFERRED (RCL POSITION)

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Annex #2

RESUPPLY COMPILER

One fabric bag-type container equipped with carrying handles at each end and containing:

400,000 Rubles in 20 packages of 20,000 Rubles each, numbered 1-20.

1 RS-6 W/T set, complete with batteries, pads and crystals, in two packages, numbered 21, 22.

1 package of miniature encode and decode pads, numbered 23.

1 package of antibiotic drugs, numbered 24.

1 package containing automatic repeating sequence camera, complete with film and batteries, numbered 25.

1 package containing magnetic type Dip Needle, numbered 26.

1 package containing a conversion chart and instructions for "short-code" procedure, numbered 27.

1 package containing blank Soviets documents, numbered 28.

1 package containing S/W developer, numbered 29.

All of the above listed individual packages are to be prepared for long term burial.

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ANNEX #3

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

1. In view of the limited range of the Beaver L-20 aircraft, even when equipped with extra belly and wing-tip fuel tanks, the Air Maritime Division has the following possibilities of launching the operation, listed in their order of preference:

- Flight Plan A - Take-off in Germany, land and refuel in Gotland or other nearby Swedish territory, into the target area and return and refuel at the Swedish base, then return to Germany.
- Flight Plan B - Take-off in Germany, into the target area, land and refuel in Gotland, return to Germany.
- Flight Plan C - Take-off in Germany, land and refuel in Gotland, into the target area and return to Germany.
- Flight Plan D - Take-off in Germany, land and refuel in Bornholm, into the target area, return to Bornholm for refueling, then to Germany.
- Flight Plan E - Take-off from a Northern Germany British-controlled base, into the target area and return to the same base. This variation, however, is contingent upon the installation of special internal auxiliary fuel tanks and even thus equipped, the aircraft would be operating dangerously close to its extreme range.

2. Coordination with WE Division has been initiated in order to implement Flight Plans A, B or C above, as first choice, and Plan D, as second choice, all of which have considerable advantages over Plan E.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET Attachment B

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	TELEPHONE NO.
SR/2	
	DATE
	10 February 1955

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D			
1. CSR/2			10 Feb	[Signature]		<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">HAND CARRY</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em;">x 4122</p>
2.						
3. SR/COP						
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10.						
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10 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/COP

SUBJECT : Control of AECOB Agents

1. A review of CAMUSO 2 and CAMBARO 2 traffic has been completed by the undersigned committee. The following factors were considered in the review:

- a. Case officer internal indicators
- b. Commo indicators
- c. Responses to challenges
- d. Content of messages
- e. Characteristics and temperament of the agent personnel
- f. Development of the operation

2. Although there remains a professional suspicion as a result of the apparent success of the operation, particularly since CAMBARO 2 arrived on the scene, we conclude that there is no tangible evidence that CAMUSO 2 and CAMBARO 2 are under control at the time of the last communication.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: *c/p/r/lam* TELEPHONE NO. DATE *27 January 1955*

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D.	FWD'D.			
<i>1. c/sr/cop</i>				<i>ES</i>		<p><i>EYES ALONE</i></p> <p><i>Must be controlled.</i></p> <p><i>ES</i></p> <p><i>SEEN BY (SIGN, including secretaries)</i></p> <p>1 []</p> <p>2 []</p> <p>3 []</p> <p>4 []</p> <p>5 []</p> <p>6 []</p> <p>7 []</p> <p>8 []</p> <p>9 []</p> <p>10 []</p> <p>11 []</p> <p>12 []</p> <p><i>HAND CARRY ONLY</i></p>
<i>2.</i>						
<i>3. csp/12</i>				<i>a</i>		
<i>4.</i>						
<i>5.</i>						
<i>6.</i>						
<i>7.</i>						
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27 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Soviet Russia Division

SUBJECT: Latvian Exfiltration

In accordance with [] request, our comments and recommendations regarding subject operation are as follows:

a. We believe that the operation is technically feasible. The Beaver (L-20) equipped with tip and external tanks has a range of 800 nautical miles. Therefore, the Beaver has the capability of flying from Bornholm to Riga, landing and returning to Bornholm with a one hour fuel reserve.

b. It is possible to equip the Beaver with a combination wheel-ski landing gear that will give the aircraft the capability of landing on snow, ice, land or any combination thereof.

c. A competent crew, pilot and navigator, is available for the operation. This crew is starting an accelerated training course on low altitude night operations in the Beaver and should be proficient on the aircraft on or before 1 March 1955. The determination whether or not the crew will be ready to conduct operations on skis is contingent upon the availability of the skis. The earliest delivery date for the skis is now 15 February 1955 which may be too late for this operation. Should the time limitation, 15 March 1955, preclude a ski operation, an operation during the dry season is feasible and more desirable from an air operations viewpoint.

d. The Soviet Defense system in Latvia has equipment capable of tracking a low flying aircraft from a position approximately 25 miles out in the Baltic Sea to the target area. Nevertheless, with proper flight planning, we believe the aircraft will never be under surveillance long enough to enable the Soviets to determine its track. We must assume that the Defense system will be alerted and an interception attempt is not a remote possibility. However, the capability of a high performance fighter materially to affect a low flying Beaver type aircraft is not considered to be very great. In our opinion, the greatest danger would be from the ground fire we must expect from the previously alerted concentrated defense area that would have to be penetrated to reach the landing site near Riga.

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e. In view of the above, we recommend that an attempt be made to select a site approximately 25 miles inland from the West Coast at Latvia, possibly in the vicinity of Priekule. We realize that although a landing site near the coast enhances the probability of success of the air operation, it may jeopardize the security of the agents to a prohibitive degree and only submit this suggestion for your consideration. Three advantages realized from a near the coast landing site are less overflight time, shorter range and a simplified navigational problem.

f. It must be recognized that, although the mission is technically feasible, the risks involved are very substantial. Unless the purpose of the mission has a very high priority, we do not recommend that it be undertaken.

[]

Psychological Warfare Maritime Paramilitary Operations Staff

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