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BASIC PLAN

CRYPTONYM AECHAMP

1. Area of Operations

Lithuanian SSR. Other Baltic or Eastern European States may be used as needed to gain access to the target area.

2. Purpose

- a. To provide a vehicle for the increasing CE need of the Lithuanian field. To exploit the growing number of defectors and RIS agents coming from Lithuania and elsewhere in the Soviet Union for positive intelligence on Soviet Lithuania and for information on the RIS.
- b. To gain information on the methods used by the RIS to penetrate Lithuanian emigre organizations in the West.
- c. To direct efforts to exfiltrate [ ] from Lithuania.
- d. To resettle [ ] .
- e. To explore and use methods of introducing agents illegally into the Lithuanian SSR.

3. Background

- a. The AECHAMP project was approved by the DC/FI in October 1953 for the period of 1 July 1953 through 30 June 1954 at a cost of [ ] . In April 1954, COP/DD/P approved an amendment providing an addition [ ] . Renewal of the project in November 1954 authorized an expenditure of [ ] . and an amendment in January 1955 authorized the use of an additional contract agent at a salary of \$4,800 annually. Renewal of the project from 1 July 1955 through 30 June 1956 was approved on 18 November 1955 in the amount of [ ] . Extension of the project for the period 1 July 1956 through 31 August 1956, approved on 13 July 1956, authorized funds in the amount of [ ] for this period.

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- g. [ ] is a Lithuanian who defected in Germany in October 1955. He had been recruited by the Soviets for a mission to penetrate a Lithuanian emigre organization, VLIK, and possibly be recruited by them. He also had as a goal the confrontation of one of the prominent members of VLIK with a photostat copy of the latter's signed agreement to work for the RIS. [ ] confessed his mission and a double agent operation was planned to send him back to Lithuania as a long-term penetration agent. However, this plan was not realized when [ ] was seen with a woman who may have been associated with a known RIS member. He has also displayed a liking for life in the West and a reluctance to return to the Soviet Union. It was decided therefore to dispose of him after further debriefing.
- h. [ ] is a German POW returnee from the Soviet Union who had been a member of the Lithuanian partisan forces. After his capture by the Soviet security authorities he was recruited as an agent by the RIS. He was allowed to repatriate to Germany by the Soviets after agreeing to work for them in the West. He confessed this mission to a CIA case officer in Germany and is being further debriefed on his knowledge of Lithuanian partisan activity.

4. References

The present project is undertaken in accordance with and in furtherance of the USSR country program for the Fiscal Year 1956, as approved by the DD/P.

5. Objectives

- a. To determine the suitability of the alleged underground organization reported by [ ] as an instrument to accomplish the exfiltration of [ ]. Failing this, to examine all other means to exfiltrate [ ].
- b. To have [ ] exfiltrate, bringing with him the leader of the alleged underground organization.
- c. To resettle [ ] after the completion of the [ ] mission.
- d. To attempt apprehension or identification of [ ] RIS courier. Failing this to resettle [ ] and neutralize his use by the RIS.
- e. To resettle [ ].

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became disaffected with the French service, he severed his connection with it, and was later recruited by this Agency. He was trained and dispatched to the Lithuanian SSR as a member of a two man team. The other member of the team was reported killed in partisan activity in the fall of 1951. [ ] assessment reflected high intelligence and capabilities. He is now assumed to be RIS-controlled because of the unusual length of time during which he allegedly managed to "live black" with little support, and because of information obtained during debriefings in the [ ]. However, correspondence with him is being maintained, and he is being played "straight" with the hope of eventual exfiltration. He has always indicated a desire to return to the West.

- b. [ ] (formerly [ ]) is an escapee from Lithuania who came through Poland via the [ ] net. He is in West Germany. He was formerly employed by a Soviet commercial trust and escaped from Lithuania because he was afraid of arrest by the Soviets for his black-market activities. When [ ] confessed to being an RIS agent, several attempts were made to apprehend his RIS courier during scheduled meetings but, to date, the courier has not made an appearance. [ ] under our direction has written several letters to his RIS drop expressing his dissatisfaction with the failure of the courier to keep his meeting, but with no results.
- c. [ ] is an escapee who came out of Lithuania in July 1954, together with [ ]. Their mission was ostensibly to contact VLIK, a Lithuanian emigre organization, as representatives of VIENYBE, an alleged underground organization in Lithuania. [ ] had a mental breakdown, apparently from the ideologic conflicts in his mind, and confessed that he and [ ] were sent as RIS agents to penetrate VLIK. [ ] stated that he believed VIENYBE was controlled by the Soviets. [ ] was not aware of confession as the two were kept separated. It is expected that [ ] will be kept under our control until the [ ] operation (see 3 e above) is completed. He will then be resettled.
- d. [ ] was the companion and leader of [ ] in their flight to the West. He was treated as a bona-fide defector and returned for a mission to Lithuania. He was told that we did not feel [ ] mental capabilities were sufficient for the important tasks with which we were entrusting [ ] therefore were not sending [ ] back with him, but would employ him for simple tasks such as safehousekeeping.
- e. [ ] - see 3 g above.

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- f. [ ] see 3 b above.
- g. Grover R. MOLONARIE, a covert contact, is a prominent newspaper editor and chairman of a Lithuanian political party. As such, he has access to a large segment of the Lithuanian community. He is being used as a spotter of possible REDSOX and REDSKIN leads and is currently on a business trip to Europe, engaged in this type of activity. He does not receive any salary, but is reimbursed for travel and operational expenses. He has a memorandum in lieu of contract.
- h. Arthur J. Haworth, a cover contact, is an influential Lithuanian political leader and former member of the Lithuanian diplomatic corps. He is a leader of the Committee for Free Lithuania and is otherwise active in emigre circles. He serves as an informant and consultant on Lithuanian emigre affairs. Haworth worked for CIA for four years on a contract basis and is currently employed under contract for \$100 a month.

9. Operational and/or Security Clearance. (Keyed as above)

- a. [ ] was granted Operational Clearance No. 562 on 24 July 1950.
- b. [ ] - Provisional Operational Approval #C-36856, granted on 5 May 1955.
- c. [ ] No clearance was requested. Individual handled as a CE Case.
- d. [ ] -do-
- e. [ ] -do-
- f. [ ] - Operational Approval has been requested.
- g. Grover R. Molonarie - Covert Security Clearance C-26572, #98396, granted on 21 June 1954.
- h. Arthur J. Haworth - Original Covert Security Clearance PZ-373, #45735, was originally granted 11 January 1951 and has been renewed several times since. The latest renewal was requested in May 1955.

10. Cover

- a. [ ] is living "black" and is aware of the fact that he had been dispatched to the USSR by an American intelligence service.

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- b. [ ] is now living in Germany under an assumed name, with documentation provided by CIA. He is aware of having defected to an American intelligence service and is being handled directly by a field case officer.
- c. [ ] -do-
- d. [ ] was dispatched into Lithuania, and has been provided false documentation. He is aware of having defected to an American intelligence service.
- e. [ ] is now living in Germany under an assumed name, with documentation provided by CIA. He is aware that he is dealing with an American intelligence service and is being handled by a field case officer.
- f. [ ] defected originally to a US Air Force intelligence unit who turned him over to CIA. He is aware that he is dealing with an American intelligence service and is being handled by a field case officer.
- g. Grover R. Molonarie - has a satisfactory natural cover provided by his overt connections.
- h. Arthur J. Haworth. -do-

11. Contact and Communications

- a. [ ] Communications with this agent were carried on via W/T until early 1953. Since then, as alternate, S/W system has been used by means of letter drops in various parts of the world.
- b. [ ] Personal contact with field case officer.
- c. [ ] -do-
- d. [ ] S/W communications via mail drops.
- e. [ ] Personal contact with field case officer.
- [ ] -do-
- g. Grover R. Molonarie. Contact is maintained by letter via a mail drop, by sterile phone, and through occasional meetings with a Headquarters case officer.

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h. Arthur J. Haworth - do -

12. Control and Motivation

- a. [ ] originally was vehemently anti-Communist and was patriotically motivated. No control can be exercised over him while he is in the USSR, but we have provided him with some material support and have promised more. Though probably under RIS control, as we suspect, we believe he would be anxious to participate in any exfiltration plans we may have for him.
- b. [ ] originally left the USSR because of his fear of arrest for his black market activities. His motivation is presumed to be partly financial and partly ideological. He confessed because he said he felt he could not go on leading a life of lies and wanted to start a new life for himself.
- c. [ ] can be physically confined and prosecuted for his activities on behalf of RIS if--as seems likely--these can be legally proved.
- d. [ ]. No control except insofar as it can be made to appear that he is fulfilling his RIS obligations. It is felt that he is ideologically a communist.
- e. [ ] can be physically confined, "burned" to other intelligence services, or turned back over the USSR border.
- f. [ ] appears to be ideologically motivated and probably wants revenge on his Soviet captors for his former imprisonment.
- g. Grover R. Molonarie is deeply involved in emigre affairs and any revelation of his connections with us would be greatly prejudicial to his political standing within the emigre community. Moreover, he is a known Lithuanian patriot, ideologically opposed to communism, and with a long history of working for the cause of Lithuanian freedom and against communism.

h. Arthur J. Haworth - do -

13. Equipment and Other Support

It is expected that S/W equipment, as well as some documentation, will be required. However, it is impossible to estimate the exact requirements at this time. Rubles and other foreign currencies for caching in the target areas will probably be needed.

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14. Coordination

The present project originated at Headquarters to be implemented out of Germany. Necessary coordination would be effected with the FOB. The field station is familiar with the problems and background of this project and has concurred in accepting responsibility for its implementation. Coordination with other components, dealing with entry of aliens, citizenship, etc., will be effected as needed.

15. Timetable

Some aspects of the project are currently in operation and will so continue subject to the approval of the present renewal. New aspects of the project will be initiated during the coming year when new defectors come out of the Lithuanian SSR.

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PART II

16. Estimated Cost

The estimated cost for AECHAMP for one year, 1 September 1956 through 30 June 1957 is as follows:

Compensation:

C ]	.....	\$ 2,000.00	←
C ]	.....	3,000.00	
C ]	.....	3,000.00	←
C ]	.....	2,000.00	
C ]	.....	2,500.00	
Arthur J. Haworth.	.....	<u>1,200.00</u>	
			<hr/>
			\$13,700.00

Travel:

Domestic travel.	.....	C ]	
Station area travel.	.....	C ]	
			<hr/>
			C ]

Entertainment:

Entertainment.	.....	C ]	
Purchase of information.	.....	C ]	
			<hr/>
			C ]

GRAND TOTAL

17. Special Problems and Commitments

- a. An additional request of a \$5,000 bonus for C ] will be submitted in the case of his exfiltration. Additional amounts of C ] have been promised for each additional person that may bring out.

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- b. Disposal of [ ] has not yet been decided.
- c. [ ] It is expected that he will be resettled on the German economy.
- d. [ ] is currently residing with his parent and presents a problem in debriefing and establishment of bona-fides because of difficulties in explaining prolonged absences to his family.

[ ]

CONCUR: [ ]

Chief, SR/2

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