

EYES ONLY

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CRYPTONYM AECHAMP

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

AREA DIVISION SR

[ ]

Room No. 2607 J

STATION Washington D.C.

Extension 8545 3582

Date 31 May 1955

The attached basic plan is presented for renewal.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

[ ]  
Chief, SR/2

[ ]  
SR/COP/PI

[ ]  
Chief, SR Division

25 June 55  
Date

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REF CSH 43-23

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~~BASIC PLAN~~

Project

CRYPTONYM AECHAMP

1. Area of Operations.

Lithuanian SSR. Other Baltic or Eastern European states may be used as needed to gain access to the target area.

2. Purpose.

- ✓ a. To develop contacts and secure assets in Lithuania with a view to procuring positive intelligence as these assets and contacts are developed.
- ✓ b. To direct efforts to exfiltrate [ ] from Lithuania. It is anticipated that considerable strategic intelligence can be obtained from this agent if his exfiltration is accomplished.

3. Background.

- a. The AECHAMP project was approved by the DC/FI in October 1953 for the period of 1 July 1953 through 30 June 1954 at a cost of [ ] In April 1954, COP/DD/P approved an amendment involving [ ]. Renewal of the project in November 1954 authorized an expenditure of [ ] and an amendment in January 1955 authorized the use of an additional contract agent at a salary of \$4,800. annually.
- b. This project originated in June 1949, under the name of AECAPSTAN, as an operation against the three Baltic states through a base in Lithuania. It has been amended and renewed numerous times since, but with its basic mission substantially unchanged except to concentrating it primarily on operations in and against the Lithuanian SSR. Past operations under this project have involved the dispatch of agents, their capture and execution, the doubling of our agents by the RIS, and joint operations with the British.
- c. The present renewal is to be considered a restatement of goals, a summary of present obligations requiring to be carried on a continuing basis, and an outline of plans for a new operation as described elsewhere in this project.
- d. Contact is being maintained with [ ] presumably an RIS-controlled agent inside the USSR. Exfiltration of this agent-- a most difficult project--presents such intelligence advantages that every reasonable possibility should be exploited to bring

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it about. Consideration is being given to the possibility of exfiltration via an alleged underground organization represented by two RIS-controlled exfiltrees from Lithuania, [ ]

[ ] If this plan is unsuccessful, other possibilities would include providing AECHAMP/4 with an overland route to accomplish his own exfiltration.

- e. [ ] came out of the USSR in July 1954 and, while they were later found to be RIS agents, we continue to use them for PP and CE purposes under strictly controlled conditions.
- f. [ ] came out of the USSR in August 1953. He has been used by a Lithuanian emigre organization (VLIK), subsidized by us largely for PP purposes. After close interrogation--including a polygraph test--it was established with reasonable certainty that [ ] is free of RIS control. A short-term mission is being planned for him and has been approved for implementation in the summer of 1956.
- g. Another REDSOX mission is being planned for the spring of 1956. It calls for the use of two additional agents. Selection of suitable personnel is now under way. The principal purpose of the mission will be to establish contact points in the USSR for future use. The agents are to be infiltrated by plane or balloon and exfiltrated by an overland route.

4. References.

The present project is undertaken in accordance with and in furtherance of the USSR country program for the Fiscal Year 1956, as approved by the DD/P.

5. Objectives.

- a. To spot, recruit, and train two agents for a REDSOX mission into Lithuania.
- b. To determine the suitability of the alleged underground organization reported by [ ] as an instrument to accomplish the exfiltration of [ ]

(NOTE: These are unrelated objectives.)

6. Targets.

Legal residents of the USSR of potential interest as possible agent material. Other targets will be determined as assets are developed.

7. Tasks.

- a. To recruit legal residents and to train them in basic tradecraft and S/W techniques so as to enable them to maintain contact with the West. Other tasks will depend on the capabilities of the agents.

b. To develop support points for E and E in case of hot war.

8. Personnel.

a. Two agents, yet to be selected, for dispatch to the target area.

b. [ ]

c. ~~Otis V. Teters~~

d. Grover R. Molonorie

e. Arthur J. Haworth

f. [ ]

g. [ ]

h. [ ]

Personnel Data (keyed to preceding paragraph)

a. Not applicable, since agents have not yet been selected.

b. [ ] is an agent dispatched into the USSR in the spring of 1951. He was originally employed by the French IS and was being trained by them for a mission. This mission, however, was cancelled, and he became disaffected with the French service because of their inadequate methods, as well as disappointed because of the cancellation of his mission. This Agency then recruited him, together with several other agents, and we continued his training and ultimately dispatched him with one companion. The latter was reported killed in partisan activity in the fall of 1951. [ ] assessment reflected high intelligence and capabilities. He is now assumed to be RIS-controlled because of the unusual length of time during which he allegedly managed to "live black" with little support, and also because of information obtained during debriefings in the [ ]. However, correspondence with him is being maintained, and he is being played "straight" with the hope of eventual exfiltration. He has always indicated a desire to return to the West.

c. Otis V. Teters is a contract agent who was associated with project AEACRE before being transferred to the present activity. He is a Rumanian and was a sergeant in the Soviet Army in Germany before his defection in Berlin in March 1950. Since then, he has been employed by this Agency as an instructor and translator in the US. He has rendered valuable services in this capacity. If cover and other operational problems can be worked out, Teters is to be sent to the field to assist our case officer in surveillance, interrogation, handling of defectors, refugees, double

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- agents, spotting of agents and leads, and to act as cut-out for servicing letter-drops. He may also be called upon to perform other miscellaneous tasks as needed by the case officer. However, the complexities of the cover problem in Teters' case are such that it may yet prove impossible to send him back to Germany.
- d. Grover R. Molonorie, a covert contact, is a prominent newspaper editor and chairman of a Lithuanian political party. As such, he has access to a large segment of the Lithuanian community. He is being used as a spotter of possible REDSOX and REDSKIN leads and is currently on a business trip to Europe, engaged in this type of activity. He does not receive any salary, but is reimbursed for traveling and operational expenses incurred on our behalf. He has a memorandum in lieu of contract.
- e. Arthur J. Haworth, a covert contact, is an influential Lithuanian political leader and former member of the Lithuanian diplomatic corps. He is a leader of the Committee for Free Lithuania and is otherwise active in emigre circles. He serves as an informant and consultant on Lithuanian emigre affairs. A trip to South America is being planned for him in connection with his spotting activities and to follow up some leads which we will provide. He has natural cover for such a trip by reason of his close association with emigre organizations. Haworth worked for us for three years on a contract basis, but is currently employed under memorandum in lieu of contract, with reimbursement for travel and operational expenses.
- f. [ ] (formerly [ ]) is an escapee from Lithuania who came through Poland via the [ ] net. He is in West Germany. He was formerly employed by a Soviet commercial trust and escaped from Lithuania because he was afraid of arrest by the Soviets for his black-market activities which he had used to supplement his income. During his contemplated mission in the summer of 1956, he will explore his old contacts and, if the mission is successful, will provide us with valuable support points for subsequent operations in the spring of 1957.
- g. [ ] is an escapee who came out of Lithuania in July 1954, together with [ ]. It was at first believed that he was an unwitting instrument of the RIS because of his comparative naivete and limited intelligence. Certain recent developments, however, point to the possibility of his being a witting RIS agent and an effort will be made in further debriefings to elicit more information about his and his partner's activities.
- h. [ ] was the companion and leader of [ ] in their flight to the West. His RIS control was suspected from the beginning, but both men were treated ostensibly as bona fide escapees. [ ] is not aware of the suspicions we now have with regard to [ ]. Both [ ] are in West Germany.

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9. Operational and/or Security Clearance. (keyed as above)

- a. Future personnel, not yet selected.
- b. [ ] was granted Operational Clearance No. 562 on 24 July 1950.
- c. Otis V. Teters, Covert Security Clearance C-25806, #76542, granted on 14 January 1955.
- d. Grover R. Molonorie, Covert Security Clearance C-26572, #98396, granted on 21 June 1954.
- e. Arthur J. Haworth, Original Covert Security Clearance PZ-373, #45735, was originally granted 11 January 1951 and has been renewed several times since. The latest renewal was requested in May 1955.
- f. [ ], Provisional Operational Approval #c-36856, granted on 5 May 1955.
- g. [ ] No clearance was requested. Individual handled as a CE case.
- h. [ ] -do- -do-

10. Cover.

- a. N.A.
- b. [ ] is living "black" and is aware, of course, of the fact that he had been dispatched to the USSR by an American intelligence service.
- c. Otis V. Teters. This individual's [ ] [ ] but there are some difficulties involved in maintaining this cover for him should he be sent to Germany. The situation is currently under close study and has not yet been clarified. Teters is aware of the identity of the organization sponsoring his activity.
- d. Grover R. Molonorie has a satisfactory natural cover, provided by his overt connections.
- e. Arthur J. Haworth: -do-
- f. [ ] This individual is now living in Germany under an assumed name, with documentation provided by us. He is aware of having defected to an American intelligence service and is being handled by a field case officer.
- g. [ ] -do-
- h. [ ]: -do-

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11. Contact and Communications.

- a. Action agents will be supplied with regular, alternate and emergency communications channels.
- b. [ ]. Communications with this agent were carried on via W/T until early 1953. Since then, an alternate, S/W system has been used by means of letter drops in various parts of the world.
- c. Otis V. Teters: while the individual is still in the Washington area, personal contact with him is being maintained by the case officer.
- d. Grover R. Molonorie. Contact is maintained by letter via a mail drop, by sterile phone, and through occasional meetings with the the case officer.
- e. Arthur J. Haworth: -do-
- f. [ ] Personal contact with field case officer.
- g. [ ]: -do-
- h. [ ]: -do-

12. Control and Motivation.

- a. Only persons with a high ideological motivation and a strong personal animus against the Soviets will be considered for the mission.
- b. [ ] originally, was vehemently anti-Communist and was patriotically motivated. No control can be exercised over him while he is in the USSR, but we have provided him with some material support and have promised more. Though probably under RIS control, as we suspect, we believe he would be anxious to participate in any exfiltration plans we may have for him.
- c. Otis V. Teters' originally defected because of his ideological opposition to communism. Also, he is dependent upon us financially.
- d. Grover R. Molonorie is deeply involved in emigre affairs and any revelation of his connections with us would be greatly prejudicial to his political standing within the emigre community. Moreover, he is a known Lithuanian patriot, ideologically opposed to communism, and with a long history of working for the cause of Lithuanian freedom and against communism.
- e. Arthur J. Haworth: -do-
- f. [ ] originally left the USSR because of his fear of arrest for his black market activities. His motivation is presumed to be partly financial and partly ideological. If he goes on a mission for us, prospects of subsequent resettle-

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ment in the US and an opportunity to start a new life here would be a strong motivating force.

g. [ ] can be physically confined and prosecuted for his activities on behalf of RIS if--as seems likely--these can be legally proved.

h. [ ] -do-

13. Equipment and Other Support.

It is expected that S/W and W/T equipment, as well as some documentation, will be required. However, it is impossible to estimate the exact requirements at this time. Either balloon or airplane launchings will be used, with support to be requested as needed. It is further expected that a W/T set, signal plans, S/W supplies and money will be introduced with the agents for caching in the target area for future use.

14. Coordination.

The present project originated at Headquarters and would be implemented out of Germany. Necessary coordination would be effected with the FOB. The field station is familiar with the problems and background of this project and has concurred in accepting responsibility for its implementation. The Office of Communications will be requested to provide support for any W/T traffic involved. Coordination with other components, dealing with entry of aliens, citizenship, etc., will be effected as needed.

15. Timetable.

After the two new action agents have been selected and cleared, they will be given six months' training, with departure for the area of operations to take place in the spring of 1956. Their exfiltration, it is hoped, will follow in the fall of 1956. Other aspects of the project are currently in operation and will so continue subject to the approval of the present renewal.

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PART II

16. Estimated Cost.

Authorized for period 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1955 is \$23,300.  
Of this \$23,300.- it is anticipated that \$10,000.- will be spent.  
The estimated cost for AECHAMP for one year, 1 July through 30  
June 1956 is as follows:

Compensation: *Note: See page 10 for revision of costs.*

.....	\$ 4,000.-
.....	3,000.-
.....	3,000.-
.....	800
Otis V. Teters	<del>4,800.-</del>
Total:	<del>\$14,800.-</del>
	\$ 10,800

*Changed per conversation with C/O 8/11/55. Proj. Branch*

Travel:

Domestic travel	( )
Station area travel	[ ]
South America and area travel for Arthur J. Haworth	( )
Travel of Otis V. Teters and family to Germany	( )
Moving and storage of household effects of Otis V. Teters	( )
Total:	( )

Entertainment:

Operational entertainment in connection with South American trip	( )
Entertainment	( )
Total:	( )

Purchase of information ( )

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Supplies . . . . . [ ]

Equipment . . . . . [ ]

[ ]

It is anticipated that when the two REDSOX agents for the Spring 1956 mission are recruited, an amendment to the project will be submitted requesting approximately [ ]-

17. Special Problems and Commitments.

a. Insurance and death benefits would be provided for the two REDSOX agents, and if they are not residents of the US, an offer to assist them to emigrate to the US would be made. This would be coordinated with the Alien Affairs Staff of the Security Office.

b. An additional request of a \$5,000.- bonus for [ ] will be submitted in the case of his exfiltration. Additional amounts of [ ]- have been promised for each additional person that [ ] may bring out.

c. Assistance in emigrating to the US or Canada and a \$5,000.- bonus have been promised [ ] in the case of the successful completion of his mission. He understands that US officials will be the sole judges of the success of his mission.

d. Promise of eventual resettlement of Otis V. Teters has been made.

e. Disposal of [ ] has not yet been decided.

*3 Copies destroyed  
9. Sept 1957*



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7 June 1955

MATERIEL AND FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS ANNEX

BASIC PLAN AECHAMP - FI

Fiscal Year 1956

1. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT (08 - 09)

<u>Stock No.</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Ser.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Qty.</u>	<u>08</u>	<u>09</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. ZI								
(1) LOGISTICS								
2/1670-005-0251	PARACHUTE, Personnel, XT-10, 32' canopy, camouflage, troop type	1	each	[ ]	2		[ ]	[ ]
2/1670-112-9265	PARACHUTE, Cargo, G-1	1	each	[ ]	2		[ ]	[ ]
7/8465-005-0671	CARRIER, Shovel, Intrenching	1	each	[ ]	4		[ ]	[ ]
3/5120-005-0331	SHOVEL, Intrenching, M-1943	1	each	[ ]	4		[ ]	[ ]
2/1670-242-9171	CONTAINER, Assembly, Aerial Delivery, A-6	1	each	[ ]	1		[ ]	[ ]
	BAG, Self-sealing, plastic type, with zipper	1	each	[ ]	12	[ ]		[ ]
1/1005-000-0576	PISTOL, Cal. 9mm., Belgium Browning, with magazine	2	each	[ ]	2		[ ]	[ ]
	BINOCULARS, Bausch & Lomb	1	each	[ ]	2		[ ]	[ ]
5/6720-003-0211	CAMERA, Minox III, 8.5mm., 3.5 lens	1	each	[ ]	2		[ ]	[ ]

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MATERIEL AND FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS ANNEX  
BASIC PLAN AECHAMP - FI  
Fiscal Year 1956

<u>Stock No.</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Ster.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Qty.</u>	<u>08</u>	<u>09</u>	<u>Total</u>
5/6750-003-0506	FILM, 8mm., Minox, ASA 40	1	can	C ]	8	C ]		C ]
	WATCH, Wrist, 17 jewel, German or Swiss	5	each	C ]	2	_____ C ]	_____ C ]	C ]
	Total Logistics Items					C ]	_____ C ]	C ]
(2)	MEDICAL							
	KIT, First Aid, 1 man, short term	5	kit	C ]	1	C ]	_____ C ]	C ]
	Total Medical Items					C ]	_____ C ]	C ]
(3)	TSS							
	TOILET ARTICLES, Soviet	5	kit	C ]	2	C ]		C ]
	BLANKET, Soviet, wool	5	each	C ]	2		C ]	C ]
	COMPASS, German	1	each	C ]	2		C ]	C ]
	BOOTS, Soviet	5	pair	C ]	2		C ]	C ]
	Total TSS Items					C ]	_____ C ]	C ]
	TOTAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT (08 - 09)					C ]	_____ C ]	C ]

B. Offshore - Offshore Logistics support will not be required.

2. FACILITIES (05) - Facilities are not required for this Basic Plan during the renewal period.

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MATERIEL AND FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS ANNEX  
BASIC PLAN AECHAMP - FI  
Fiscal Year 1956

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3. SUMMARY - The logistics support for Basic Plan AECHAMP - FI, as submitted for renewal for the period 1 July 1955 thru 30 June 1956, consists of \$1,500 for supplies and equipment.

*C*  
*for C* *]* *]*  
SR/2 Logistics Liaison Officer

Approved:

*C* *]*  
*C* *]*  
Chief, SR/Logistics

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7 SEP  
1955

Review of Project AECHAMP [SR - Lithuania (Headquarters)]

Period of Review - 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1955

1. Production

Number of reports received ..... 45  
Number of reports used in disseminations ..... 14  
Number of actual disseminations ..... 11

2. Evaluation of Product

Project AECHAMP is directed against the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Although its objectives are primarily operational, positive intelligence is obtained through debriefings of agents when they come out of the country. For this reason, AECHAMP's collection activity has proved fragmentary and sporadic. Some reports contain intelligence that was acquired in mid-1952 while only in one instance was the information procured during the period under review.

Evaluations of all but two of AECHAMP's 11 disseminated reports were obtained from Army, State or ORR. The Army analyst considered reporting on military maneuvers near Kaunas of value and listed further details on which information would be of great value. State evaluated information on Lithuanian reactions to Kremlin developments and policies as substantially true and mostly of value, while ORR adjudged the economic reporting as largely accurate and confirmed to a significant degree by other sources.

Rating - "C"

3. Requirements

There are no requirements specifically tailored to meet positive intelligence needs on Lithuania. However, certain customer requirements on the USSR are applicable to this area, where, furthermore, a few IPC targets are located.

4. Recommendation

In view of the general lack of positive intelligence on Lithuania, RQM/RE will discuss with the SR Division the feasibility of soliciting from FI end-users a list of priority objectives which could serve as adequate guidance for the collection activity of AECHAMP agents yet to be dispatched and for debriefing ( ) whose "exfiltration" is a principal objective of this operation.

Renewal is recommended.

*for* Chief, FI/RQM/RE