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6 August 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/Plans

SUBJECT: Request for Renewal of Project ARGHAMP

1. On 3 August, [] of STC and [] of this office arranged a meeting with the project case officer, []. Since a good deal of the information acquired during this meeting is not contained in the project records submitted by SR Division, the following summary of operational activity may be helpful to Chief, FI in his consideration of the recommendations contained herein:

a. A review of REDSOX operations revealed that the first team infiltrated into Lithuania consisted of three agents who were air-dropped during the fall of 1950; no contact was ever established with the team and their fate is unknown. A second team was air-dropped during April 1951; this team consisted of two men, including [], about whom more follows. [] succeeded in establishing contact by W/T with base and indicated that, although security measures were strict within the target area, he had succeeded in establishing contact with resistance elements within the country. Finally, in December 1952, he reported that strong Soviet counter-measures had resulted in the extermination or dispersal of all resistance elements. [] also indicated at this point that he had lost his W/T set but would continue to make contact through S/W letters addressed to established drops in the West. Throughout this period, he revealed no signs of Soviet control. Meanwhile, in mid-1952, CIA had agreed to run operations into Lithuania jointly with the BIS, and a team was being trained in the UK for dispatch in the spring of 1953. However, with the news that resistance elements had been exterminated or dispersed, a joint CIA-BIS conference met and concluded that there was no longer a basis for joint operations. In June 1953, one of the agents who was being trained in the UK was brought to the US and trained for an infiltration in the fall of 1953; it was planned that he would establish contact with [] and assist the latter in exfiltrating. However, the agent balked 36 hours before his dispatch. No other REDSOX operations have been run since that date. Information developed through the [] has definitely confirmed the fact that [] is under RIS control.

*(sic) W/T
Part of W/T
contact 19 Feb 1951
11 contact
in case
please W.*

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b. Although the project records indicate the intent of establishing a Lithuanian REDSKIN operation, [] which was set up for this purpose, has been transferred to SR/3 and the project's P/A is no longer concerned with Baltic operations.

c. The only other operation that was conducted under ABCHAMP was the [], which recently collapsed with the evidence of RIS penetration. This operation started out as a REDSKIN attempt utilizing railroad employees with contacts in Lithuania. The P/A was [], the courier [], the internal contact [], and the cut-out (located in West Berlin) []. The RIS succeeded in doubling [], who finally confessed to his RIS mission but later escaped from his safehouse and returned to the East Zone in Germany.

2. The present capabilities of this operation are limited to the possible continued playback of [] with the objective of effecting the agent's exfiltration with the assistance of the RIS, and the possible CE operation which may develop from the interrogation of [] which is currently being conducted in Frankfurt. With the blowing of the [], however, it is doubtful that an attempted playback of [] would meet with any success. The only potential of project ABCHAMP is that represented by the planned REDSOX operation which is now only in the developmental stage, and the potential represented by the former P/A of [], []

3. FI/CPS Comments: It follows from the above that this operation has met with one disaster after another. The case officer indicated that, in the case of the early REDSOX missions (fall 1950, spring 1951), the lack of control over the emigre organization which produced the agents resulted in serious security breaches which probably contributed to the failure of these missions. All in all, about the only positive gain from this operation has been the CE knowledge gained of RIS techniques as revealed in the []; however, this is learning the hard way. As to future operational efforts, too little is presently known concerning the REDSOX operation now being developed. One agent has been assessed and is awaiting CC prior to entering DOB. The second agent has merely been spotted and has not actually been recruited. The dispatch of this team is tentatively planned for May 1955. The project is, for all practical purposes, now in the process of washing the slate and starting fresh with what SR hopes to be a worthwhile contract agent [], and a two-man REDSOX team. With this limited objective, little issue can be taken. If we are to have a program of FI operations against Lithuania, it must start somewhere and the limited assets represented by this project appear to be the only starting point available.

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4. Recommendation: We recommend the approval of those portions of AECHAMP for which financial commitments must now be made. A separate project should be written for the REDSOX operation planned for launching in May 1955 with reference, or as an amendment, to AECHAMP. This new project can then more definitely specify operational details and financial commitments. Specifically, we see no point at this stage to set aside almost \$16,000 for operational expenses which are quite unforeseeable at this time.

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DC/PI/OPS

FI/OPS:JWW:hk (August 1954

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