

**SECRET**

**JOINT CIA/SIS INQUIRY INTO SECURITY  
OF EXISTING OPERATIONS IN LITHUANIA**

It is recommended that this study be circulated in each Service within a limited circle of those concerned in these particular operations.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

**SECRET**

CHAPTER 1. JOINT CIA/SIS INQUIRY INTO SECURITY OF EXISTING  
OPERATIONS IN LITHUANIA

1. The object of this inquiry is to present a picture of the security position of current operations in Lithuania with a view to affording guidance to those conducting any future joint CIA/SIS operations in that country. It has been necessary not only to study the developments surrounding the important M.G.B. offensive against networks in the field (December 1952 - January 1953) and subsequent news thereof, but also to make a retrospective examination of the security of those networks in the hope of discovering whether any of them were compromised before the said offensive took place. This has involved a considerable exchange of information between the two Services including traffic from the following:
  - (a) DEKSNYS (Swedish and S.I.S. traffic)
  - (b) DRANELYS
  - (c) SKRAJUNAS
  - (d) JACK
2. Although the inquiry is confined to purely operational questions and is not aimed in any way at presenting a verdict on the political controversies dividing the different emigre organizations from which operational staff has been recruited, it has nevertheless been necessary to study the relations between these organizations and to determine to what extent they may have affected the security position in the field. It has also been found necessary to study the traffic from all the networks in order to consider the possibility, in the event of hostile control, of the said controversies being exploited in order to maintain and even exacerbate existing divisions among the emigre organizations.
3. For the sake of clarity, the present report is divided into chapters on the four networks referred to in Paragraph 1 above (with appendices as required), followed by conclusions and recommendations for any future joint operations.

**SECRET**

## CHAPTER 2.

DEKSNYS GROUP

1. DEKSNYS, Jonas has a long record of anti-Russian activities. During the war he worked against the Germans and was imprisoned by them. He was liberated by the American forces in 1945 and managed to get himself repatriated to POLAND with another Lithuanian named BRUNIUS (as former Polish nationals, from one of the Lithuanian districts). After that, his record is chronologically as follows:

September 1945 - Crossed the frontier to LITHUANIA

December 1945 - Came out illegally via POLAND and travelled overland with one VALIULIS to WESTERN GERMANY.

1.5.46 - Returned to LITHUANIA in the guise once more of a repatriate to POLAND. He was sponsored by S.I.S. and was accompanied by a certain STANEVICIUS, now known as STANEIKA, who is at present in SWEDEN.

September 1946 - Came out again illegally from LITHUANIA to POLAND and then arrived in SWEDEN as a stowaway. STANEIKA had preceded him by the same route.

Spring 1947 - Left SWEDEN clandestinely in a Polish ship and landed in POLAND. There he met SKRAJUNAS and RIMVIDAS (reported dead in POLAND in 1949/50). He returned to SWEDEN from POLAND as a stowaway in a Swedish ship, helped by a Lithuanian member of the crew who was organising such traffic.

22.8.47 - Reported to have attended a meeting in SWITZERLAND to meet a Minister, LOZORAITIS, in that country, and from there to have returned to SWEDEN.

March 1948 - Left again for POLAND in the same Swedish ship and brought out SKRAJUNAS and AUDRONIS, who had been waiting for him there. All these arrived safely in SWEDEN.

April 1949 - Unsuccessful attempt to land in LITHUANIA in a Swedish speed-boat.

1.5.49 - Safely landed in LITHUANIA with five others. He has remained there ever since.

2. DEKSNYS' infiltration was a Swedish operation which used S.I.S. transport facilities, and DEKSNYS was accompanied by UOSIS and AUDRONIS. UOSIS had with him two W/T sets for transmitting to the Swedish Intelligence Service. In August 1949, a LITHUANIAN traitor named PESSECKAS revealed to the Russians in STOCKHOLM that DEKSNYS, UOSIS, and AUDRONIS were operating in the BALTIC States, and identified a photograph of DEKSNYS which was shown to him by the Russians.

**SECRET**

SECRET

## CHAPTER 2. (Cont'd)

DEKSNYS

1. Before DEKSNYS was successfully re-infiltrated into Lithuania, he had had serious quarrels with both AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS on the subject of political affiliations. These differences possibly originated in a mandate given to SKRAJUNAS and AUDRONIS when they left Lithuania to operate a check on DEKSNYS' resistance activities. At the time of embarkation, SKRAJUNAS and AUDRONIS, on the one hand, and DEKSNYS on the other hand, were already making accusations and counter-accusations one against the other. On landing in Lithuania, AUDRONIS immediately left the remainder of the party and made his way independently to join the TAURAS partisans, while DEKSNYS appears to have taken up his quarters in KAUNAS. DEKSNYS' brief was to organize passive resistance in Lithuania as opposed to the more violent method in favor with the partisans; meanwhile, SKRAJUNAS had remained in the West and had a link with AUDRONIS by correspondence in innocent code.
2. There is no reason to suppose that at the time of his landing in Lithuania, DEKSNYS was not a perfectly free agent, and the first suggestion of his being under control came in a communication from AUDRONIS of 22 June 1949 sent in SIS S/I to a post box in Sweden. This letter referred to the suspicion that DEKSNYS had fallen into the hands of "provocateurs" shortly after AUDRONIS broke contact with DEKSNYS. The gist of this communication was passed on to SKRAJUNAS (who was then in France) by the post box in question. As far as is known, however, there was no actual contact between DEKSNYS and AUDRONIS after they separated. DEKSNYS did not, in fact, refer to AUDRONIS in his messages until January 1951 after the Swedes had asked him (in December 1950) for news of AUDRONIS. His reply was merely to the effect that AUDRONIS had been expelled from the DEKSNYS organization but no date was given for this expulsion.
3. The operation under which DEKSNYS was infiltrated was a Swedish one utilizing SIS facilities. Apart from AUDRONIS, DEKSNYS was accompanied by a W/T operator known as "UOSIS" who was to transmit to the Swedish Service. Included in the party were also one agent due to join a Latvian network and two others to operate in Estonia. DEKSNYS intended to organize a direct link with SIS and utilized for this purpose one of the W/T sets which he took in with him. This necessitated his recruiting locally a volunteer to operate the set, and the first message received from this channel was in November 1950. No information was given by DEKSNYS regarding the identity of this W/T operator known under the pseudonym of "ANTANAS". "ANTANAS" began with slow and defective transmission which improved progressively, and he went on sending messages until the beginning of 1953.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4. SKRAJUNAS was infiltrated into Lithuania in early October 1950 under CIA auspices. He was in communication with CIA by W/T between 16 November 1950 and 8 December 1950, and he and ALFONSAS, a team mate, sent a certain number of S/W letters between 1 November 1950 and 14 January 1951. By W/T on 24 November 1950 he sent a message consisting of the words: "DEKSNYS in hands of MGB. AUDRONIS perished." In his S/W letter of 1 November 1950 he reported: "DEKSNYS and BRIEDIS in hands of MGB. AUDRONIS perished." No amplification of these messages or indication as to the origin of the information was ever received. According to information received at a later date from JACK, SKRAJUNAS perished in an ambush in the Autumn of 1951 when he had gone to meet VANAGAS. There is nothing to explain the lack of communication from SKRAJUNAS between January 1951 and the presumed date of his liquidation, his only relevant messages being to the effect that his transformer was working defectively and that he would use his W/T facilities to a lesser degree because the MGB were conducting searches.
  
- 5. It was decided by SIS in the Spring of 1952 to infiltrate a W/T operator to join "DEKSNYS". "MIKE" was recruited in the U.K., trained and duly infiltrated in April 1952. He took with him a W/T set. The reception arrangements were in the hands of a Latvian network which later helped "MIKE" to reach Lithuania, where he eventually made contact with DEKSNYS in June 1952. "MIKE" sent a few messages by W/T until 13 September 1952, when his set appears to have broken down. He acknowledged signals until 17 November 1952 since when he has been silent. There is evidence, however, that "MIKE" had received broadcasts up to December 1952, as certain of these broadcasts were acknowledged by DEKSNYS and replied to through "ANTANAS".
  
- 6. DEKSNYS reported by S/W in September 1952 that he was setting up "UOSIS" independently for continuing W/T contact with the Swedes at his own discretion. On 22-24 January 1953, "UOSIS" sent messages which, while denouncing DEKSNYS as an impostor who was spending operational money for his own benefit, launched into a pro-Soviet tirade using the phraseology employed currently in Soviet propaganda broadcasts. Since that date, no news whatever has been received from DEKSNYS or from any persons connected with his organization.

## CHAPTER 2.

COMMENTS

1. The joint examination of the case of DEKSNYS has been directed towards ascertaining:
  - a. Whether he is at present eliminated or under control;
  - b. If he has in the past been under MGB control, and the date at which this control started;
  - c. The implications of his conflict with AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS.
2. As regards (a), both CIA and SIS are convinced that there are strong grounds for suspecting that DEKSNYS is, if he has survived, not a free agent at the present moment. This conclusion is based primarily on the messages of 22-24 January 1953 from "UOSIS" referred to above, which can be interpreted only as showing that "UOSIS" himself is under Russian control and suggesting that he must have revealed to the MGB enough about DEKSNYS to make the situation of the last named practically untenable. The subsequent silence of DEKSNYS, "MIKE", and "ANTANAS" tends to confirm this conclusion.
3. Long before January 1953 the MGB must have been in a favorable position for discovering the whereabouts of DEKSNYS. There is evidence that they possessed his full description and photograph in 1949 when they interrogated PESSECKAS. Examination of the DEKSNYS traffic both to SIS and the Swedes does not permit a definite conclusion that his messages were sent under control, but a number of inconsistencies in his attitude leave a certain amount of suspicion attached to him. In order to convey an impression of the complexity of this problem, it was decided that the CIA delegate should draw up a list of points tending to show that DEKSNYS might have been in enemy hands sometime between his landing and January 1953, and the SIS delegate drew up a corresponding number of points tending to disprove this. The two lists are appended to the present report, and it is now agreed that the problem remains an open one.
4. A certain amount of mystery surrounds the traffic from "ANTANAS" and "MIKE". The slowness of the former's transmission exposed him to Russian D/Fing, and the theory that his gradual progress was engineered by the MGB should not be entirely excluded. If this theory is accepted the appearance of "MIKE", followed by his early elimination as a W/T operator, with "ANTANAS" continuing his transmissions on the old set, could be considered as possible supporting evidence. Nevertheless, in order to carry out a plan of deception, it would appear that the MGB would have had every advantage from utilizing "MIKE's" superior transmission, under their control.

6,

SECRET

-2-

5. The question of how the MGB intended to take advantage of that possibility if they managed to get DEKSNYS under their control has also been carefully examined. The only possible advantage which can be seen clearly is that they may have endeavored to utilize him to maintain dissensions among Lithuanian resistance leaders and provoke further ones. In spite of the unfortunate attempts of DEKSNYS to discredit resistance workers, such as AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS, there is evidence that toward the end of 1952 he did endeavor to preach union between the different factions. DEKSNYS in his traffic could justifiably be accused of complicating the situation in regard to the unanimity of Lithuanian resistance, but no very clear picture emerges of a consistent enemy plan of disruption. While the SIS delegate suggests that the Lithuanian emigre organizations require very little outside aid to fan the flames of their internecine conflicts, the CIA delegate makes the reservation that the Russians had every interest in controlling an infiltrated network not only to widen the breach between rival Lithuanian groups but to learn of future Western operational plans, and possibly to provoke the disclosure of information regarding parallel networks in the field.
6. Careful examination has also been given to the suggestion by AUDRONIS, and the accusation by SKRAJUNAS, that DEKSNYS was in MGB hands in 1949 or 1950. The suggestion made by AUDRONIS in June 1949 is not a conclusive one, and unfortunately the short statements made later by SKRAJUNAS were not substantiated with any detailed evidence. Moreover, the SKRAJUNAS traffic broke off suddenly before he could be questioned more closely on this subject by CIA. It is certain that DEKSNYS, AUDRONIS, and SKRAJUNAS were engaged in a bitter conflict on the subject of political loyalties before the first two were infiltrated. Both CIA and SIS consider it regrettable that DEKSNYS should have denied the well-proven patriotism of AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS. On the other hand, while it is possible that the accusation by SKRAJUNAS that DEKSNYS was in MGB hands may have been a counter-accusation due to political feeling, there is no available evidence to support this theory.
7. Appendix C which is attached gives a historical survey of the careers of both AUDRONIS and SKRAJUNAS as coordinated from SIS and CIA records.

SECRET

## APPENDIX A to CHAPTER 2

POINTS IN FAVOUR OF DEKSNYS

1. His infiltration party in May 1949 consisted of 6 persons. All of these can be accounted for, and contact is still being maintained, as far as we know, between the Swedes and one Latvian and one Estonian to this day.
2. Before the infiltration of May 1949, there was an open quarrel between DEKSNYS and AUDRONIS/SKRAJUNAS on grounds of political loyalties. Each side was already making accusations against the other, and it does not seem unreasonable to balance the accusation relating to DEKSNYS' being in M.G.B. hands against that relating to alleged faulty resistance credentials held by AUDRONIS/SKRAJUNAS.
3. No details were given by either AUDRONIS or SKRAJUNAS to explain their bare statement that DEKSNYS was in M.G.B. hands, nor is there any clue as to how they acquired such knowledge.
4. Although links existed which might have led DEKSNYS to have knowledge of movements in the DRAMBLYS group (notably the safe house in Poland used by ARUNAS), there is no evidence whatever to show that the M.G.B. did any harm to the DRAMBLYS group as a result of these links.
5. The recruitment by DEKSNYS of a local volunteer to operate W/T for S.I.S. under his (DEKSNYS') instructions gave poor results at first, which could hardly have served M.G.B. plans, and the subsequent progressive improvement took place in a perfectly normal manner. On the other hand, the successful infiltration of a trained W/T operator (MIKE) in June 1952 could hardly have been taken proper advantage of by the M.G.B., as MIKE's transmissions broke down, apparently for technical reasons, in September 1952.
6. In a S.I.S. telegram of 27.3.52 to DEKSNYS the name was mentioned of a little girl of whom he had been very fond during his stay in the West. DEKSNYS' reply mentioned the Christian name of the mother of this child, and he signed his message with a boyhood nickname which was known only to one of his Lithuanian friends in the West.
7. The only suggested use that the M.G.B. could have made of a control of DEKSNYS and his group was to pursue a policy of deception with a view to splitting Lithuanian resistance still further and to fostering the dissensions created within the different sections of the resistance. Two S/W letters of December 1952, one from DEKSNYS and another from one of the leading members of the LOKYS group, preach unity among the different resistance groups and do not fit in at all with the Russian policy referred to above.
8. The recent betrayal of the Partisans appears to be the work of VANAGAS, who was not connected with DEKSNYS. Incidentally, the complete black-out of the DEKSNYS organization dates approximately from the round-up of the Partisans. It is possible, therefore, that it was an all-out offensive on the part of the M. G. B. which led to their uncovering DEKSNYS and that he was not in their hands before then.



**SECRET**

8.

-2-

9. The messages from UCOSIS of 22-24.1.53 were clearly Soviet-inspired. While they accused DEKSNYS of being an impostor, they did not convey any suggestion that he was controlled. We assume that UCOSIS was in a position to put the M.G.B. on the track of DEKSNYS, and it is notable that the last message received from the latter was dated 22.1.53. It does not, therefore, seem unreasonable to place the arrest or liquidation of DEKSNYS at some time in January 1953 .

**SECRET**

## APPENDIX B to CHAPTER 2

## POINTS NOT IN FAVOR OF DEKSNYS

1. DEKSNYS' operation was compromised by a dropped team member, PESSECKAS, who defected to the Soviets in Stockholm in August 1949. PESSECKAS identified DEKSNYS' photograph to the Soviets.
2. Although DEKSNYS was to stay only a year it is difficult to understand why he made no effort to exfiltrate by requesting exfiltration. Instead, he has remained in the area since 1949 which may be considered a little strange for a man who had been most active in the past and who had gone in and out of the area three times previously.
3. SKRAJUNAS and DEKSNYS did have differences. SKRAJUNAS was not returning to carry on activities against DEKSNYS but was to reach agreement with DEKSNYS. It seems incredible that SKRAJUNAS should fabricate the message that DEKSNYS and BRIEDIS were in MOB hands and AUDRONIS was dead, simply to discredit DEKSNYS. While details would be valuable, it should be pointed out that the SKRAJUNAS report was not accepted by SIS and that no independent effort seems to have been made to check on this report. Therefore, it is doubtful whether a report giving place and date of the assumed capture of DEKSNYS and BRIEDIS would have been more convincing.
4. Since DEKSNYS himself passed copies in 1948 of SKRAJUNAS' resistance documents (which incidentally gave DEKSNYS authorization to work in the resistance's behalf) the subsequent attempts of DEKSNYS to discredit SKRAJUNAS' credentials with the resistance could fit in with the MOB tactics for creating doubt and confusion as to the real status of a bona fide underground member like SKRAJUNAS.
5. DEKSNYS' traffic is most unsatisfactory. Operational intelligence is lacking, whereas the intelligence which he procured from the area prior to his last infiltration was evaluated as good. This information consisted of such items as Soviet OB, etc.
6. Resistance information is lacking. Although briefed to set up a passive resistance organization no information appears to be known about his friends or those comprising his organization, the VKLT V. Information is lacking on RAMUNAS, BALKONIS and BUKAS. It is felt that the identity of RAMUNAS after his assumed arrest in March 1951 should have been reported. There would be no security risk involved once the man had been arrested. Information exists that BUKAS in 1947 and 1948 was in hiding as the leader of the Zemaitija partisans but there appears to be no evidence that BUKAS is really a part of the DEKSNYS organization, apart from the fact that he was a signatory of a VKLT V letter which was lost en route in 1950.
7. Although it is presumed that DEKSNYS is in KAUNAS no information exists on his location or area of operation. Could DEKSNYS' organization be located if DEKSNYS were to die?

## SECRET

-2-

8. NERIS, a Swedish Lithuanian infiltrator of 1950, was to go to DEKSNYS. NERIS was reported killed on the shore but it is presumed that DEKSNYS received the help that NERIS was to bring to him. Since no independent information of this incident has been received, it is conceivable that NERIS was captured by the MGB.
9. It is open to doubt whether a bona fide man would hesitate to reveal the identity or some background information about his local W/T operator. It is true that a name in itself is of little significance, but it seems logical to think that he would inform his controlling base of his operator's occupation or something other than "trustworthy".
10. It is remarkable that DEKSNYS' old set has been of service to him from 1949 to 1952 (taking into consideration a possible resupply of crystals), and more amazing that Soviet D/Ping has not picked up his local W/T operator who has been slow at sending (20 letters, not groups, per minute), while MIKE who was well trained couldn't make contact because of "technical difficulties", and although heard, has noticeably disappeared. This date is prior to the mass arrests reported in December. What could be the safest, most logical way of explaining the non-communicative ability of an agent by the MGB than to say that the agent's radio is not working, while leaving room for the receipt of messages from the West?
11. There is no explanation to account for MIKE's lack of S/W from June to January 1953, for it is assumed that MIKE had independent S/I. It would be natural for MIKE to wish to send a greeting if his radio set had broken down to indicate that he was all right.
12. Use of a local man would be a clever method of operation and an ideal situation for an MGB officer. Since DEKSNYS was required to report something to the Swedes via the UOSIS link, utilization of a slow operator would not require great intelligence demands.
13. It may well be that DEKSNYS sent S/W letters that urged unity. However, these letters were sent in late 1952. DEKSNYS in the Swedish traffic breeds disagreement among the political groups. Clever Soviet propaganda is known to unite and divide; it does not openly divide.
14. With regard to mention of a name used by DEKSNYS when he was a boy, it appears quite natural that an MGB interrogator would attempt to procure all the names used by an individual during his life time. DEKSNYS might have given a lot of innocuous information when interrogated to fill in the gaps under pressure of interrogation. What would be more natural than for the Soviets to take a childhood name for authenticity? If the Soviets already had DEKSNYS' picture one may assume that they knew a great deal about his activities in Stockholm, including his habits, friends, etc.

SECRET

-3-

15. Accusations against KUBLICKAS by DEKSNYS create suspicion. KUBLICKAS had been assessed and proven as a bona fide individual. Here again may we suggest a pattern of confusion.
16. Soon after the KUBLICKAS messages, DEKSNYS in his message of January 10, 1953 requests material support and "considerable financial support" although MIKE brought him a sufficient amount of roubles in June 1952.

## APPENDIX C to CHAPTER 2

AUDRONIS comes from a family of Lithuanian Government officials. He was one of the most distinguished underground fighters and has been decorated with the Underground's highest order, Us Drasa (for bravery). He was wounded five times and participated in 22 major engagements with MVD troops. He is personally credited with killing some 60 MGB/MVD officials.

- August 1944 - C.I.A.:  
Joined Lithuanian underground. Became Chief of an operational group in the Jeznas-Darsuniskis-Kruonis-Silavotas area.
- November 1945 - C.I.A.:  
Adjutant to the Commander of a partisan detachment, and served on staffs of two other detachments.
- October 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Orders to proceed to the West as HDPS special delegate.
- December 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Crossed over into Poland with SKRAJUNAS and four others who were killed during the border crossing.
- January 1948 - C.I.A.:  
Arrived with SKRAJUNAS in Warsaw and met in Gdynia by DEKSNYS. Taken to Sweden and handed over to the Swedish Intelligence Service.
- May 1948 - S.I.S.:  
Made an unsuccessful Swedish sponsored attempt to land in Estonia with others including UOSIS.
- June 1948 - C.I.A.:  
Travelled with DEKSNYS and SKRAJUNAS to Germany for political meeting.
- July 4, 1948 - S.I.S.:  
Received a letter from Lithuania saying his return would be welcome.
- December 7, 1948 - S.I.S.:  
Reported to have made two unsuccessful attempts to leave Sweden for Germany. Out of favour with ZILINSKAS group.
- May 1, 1949 - S.I.S.:  
Landed in Lithuania as Swedish agent with DEKSNYS, UOSIS and others.
- May 31, 1949 - C.I.A.:  
SKRAJUNAS received a letter dated this date from AUDRONIS.
- June 6, 1949 - S.I.S.:  
S.I.S. possesses copy of a letter this date from AUDRONIS stating that DEKSNYS had possibly fallen in with provocateurs soon after landing.

SECRET

- September 14, 1949 - C.I.A.:  
Letter this date arrived in West to SKRAJUNAS from partisan leader stating AUDRONIS is with him and not in contact with DEKSNYS or BRIEDIS. Added he is worried about the latter two.
- October 1949 - C.I.A.:  
Letter by SKRAJUNAS to AUDRONIS requesting newmail drops inside the Iron Curtain.
- February 7, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
AUDRONIS reported through a mail drop he is alive and well.
- March 1950 - C.I.A.:  
A letter to SKRAJUNAS from mail drop stating that AUDRONIS died.
- April 15, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
Letter mailed by mail drop from KAUNAS. Confirms AUDRONIS' death.
- November 1, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
S/W letter this date from SKRAJUNAS group stating AUDRONIS had perished.
- November 24, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
W/T message from SKRAJUNAS group reporting AUDRONIS had perished.
- January 4, 1951 - S.I.S.:  
Message from DEKSNYS to Swedes reporting that because of false bluffs and void promises "we have released him from his functions".

SECRET

SECRET

SKRAJUNAS

- January 1947<sup>f</sup> - C.I.A.:  
Commander of a 300-man illegal underground group.
- April 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Received order to go to Poland for purpose of establishing contact with Lithuanian organizations outside Iron Curtain.
- May 1947 - C.I.A. & S.I.S.:  
Met DEKSNYS in Gdynia.
- July 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Returned to KHUNAS, Lithuania after an exchange of information with DEKSNYS.
- August 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Chief intelligence officer for KAUNAS district. Chosen to sit as seventh member of the HDPS Presidium, in DEKSNYS' absence.
- October 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Received orders to proceed to the West as HDPS special plenipotentiary.
- December 1947 - C.I.A.:  
Crossed over into Poland with AUDRONIS and four others who were killed during the border crossing.
- January 1948 - C.I.A. & S.I.S.:  
Arrived with AUDRONIS in Warsaw then went to Gdynia where they were met by DEKSNYS. Boarded a ship for Tralleborg, Sweden and handed over to the Swedish Intelligence Service.
- June 1948 - C.I.A. & S.I.S.:  
Flew with DEKSNYS to Paris on way to VLIK meeting at Baden-Baden.
- May 31, 1949 - C.I.A.:  
Received a letter from AUDRONIS.
- September 10, 1949 - C.I.A.:  
Letter to him from a partisan leader stating AUDRONIS was with him and not in contact with either DEKSNYS or BRIEDIS. The leader was concerned about them.
- October 1949 - C.I.A.:  
Wrote AUDRONIS requesting new mail drops.
- December 1949 - S.I.S.:  
According to S.I.S. information he was informed about message from AUDRONIS (who had been infiltrated into Lithuania with DEKSNYS on 1 May 1949) that DEKSNYS may have fallen in with provocateurs.

SECRET

SECRET

- February 7, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
Mail drop in Lithuania reports that AUDRONIS is alive and well.
- March 1950 - C.I.A.:  
Received letter from contacts in Lithuania announcing AUDRONIS death.
- April 15, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
Letter from KAUNAS confirming AUDRONIS' death.
- October 1950 - C.I.A.:  
Parachuted into Lithuania by C.I.A.
- November 1, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
S/W letter received from his group this date stating that "DEKSNYS and BRIEDIS are in the hands of the MOB. AUDRONIS perished."
- November 24, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
W/T message received this date from his group stating "DEKSNYS in hands of M.G.B. AUDRONIS perished."
- December 8, 1950 - C.I.A.:  
Last W/T message.
- January 14, 1951 - C.I.A.:  
Last S/W message.
- February 1951 - C.I.A.:  
Reported by C.I.A. agent JACK in June 1951 to be working LLES. Headquarters this date.
- August 14, 1951 - C.I.A.:  
Agent JACK reported by W/T that he was making every effort to get in touch with SKRAJUNAS.
- October 13, 1952 - C.I.A.:  
Further message from JACK that SKRAJUNAS was killed "during the Autumn of 1951."
- November 26, 1952 - C.I.A.:  
W/T message from C.I.A. agent JACK stating SKRAJUNAS was summoned for visit in September 1951 by LLES leader, VANAGAS; on the way, ambushed by the MOB and killed.

SECRET



## CHAPTER 3.

DRAMBLYS GROUP

1. "DRAMBLYS" is the pseudonym of an apparently prominent Lithuanian living overtly who has not left Lithuania since the end of the war. Being a patriot and wishing to join in resistance work, he sent out a delegate known as "ARUNAS" on 25 July 1950 in order to endeavor to make contact with Lithuanian resistance leaders in the West. ARUNAS managed to cross the Lithuanian-Polish frontier twice clandestinely and was exfiltrated from Poland on his second journey, finally reaching the U.K. He reported on conditions in Lithuania and was re-infiltrated on 19 December 1950 with two W/T operators and sets with instructions to join "DRAMBLYS" and to assure communications between the latter and SIS. The W/T operators, Peter and Anton, had regular communications with SIS, and later another friend of "DRAMBLYS" known as EDMUNDAS was exfiltrated from Lithuania by SIS in April 1952. He was re-infiltrated into Latvia on 25 October 1952 with a W/T operator known as "CONRAD". After a successful landing in Latvia, he left the landing party on 25 October 1952 and made arrangements to collect "CONRAD" on 15 November 1952. "MAESIS", the head of the Latvian network, confirmed the departure of EDMUNDAS and CONRAD on the two dates in question. CONRAD took in a W/T but did not enter into communication with SIS within several months of his arrival. A ciphered message dated 26 November 1952, written by EDMUNDAS in S/W in his own code, was forwarded to SIS through the intermediary of "DRAMBLYS". The letter explained that owing to important D/Fing activities, he had been obliged to hold up W/T communications from CONRAD until he could transfer him to a safer place. Shortly thereafter, DRAMBLYS reported further that he had met EDMUNDAS who had delivered to him all the mail, money, etc. sent to him by SIS.
2. PETER was last on the air on 16 January 1953, when he reported that ANTON (who had not been heard of since July 1952) had fallen into MOE hands at a date presumed by SIS to be between 26 November 1952 and the date of PETER's message. PETER's message also reported the arrests in KAUNAS of several members of the "DRAMBLYS" organization without giving names.
3. Since PETER's last message and the complete subsequent silence of "DRAMBLYS", three S/W letters have been received from EDMUNDAS. The first dated 27 January 1953 stated that EDMUNDAS had no news of "DRAMBLYS" and his assistant, "RUGIMIS". He added that "it is possible that they have perished or fallen into enemy hands". He referred also to the liquidation of the HDPS organization in KAUNAS; i.e. the "DRAMBLYS" group and added that, according to rumors, members of several resistance groups not belonging to the said organization had been arrested including active resistance members. The second

**SECRET**

-2-

letter dated 19 March 1953 referred to "DRAMBLYS" and "RUGINIS" as having vanished and to news from a "contact man" that "DRAMBLYS" had certainly been arrested. In each letter EDMUNDAS stated that he and CONRAD were in hiding and had buried their W/T equipment. He asked for advice and help and gave local safe addresses for communications. A third letter from EDMUNDAS dated 10 May 1953 confirmed his previous letters and announced that CONRAD would try to start contact from the beginning of June 1953. On 9 June 1953 a W/T message was received from EDMUNDAS via CONRAD stating that he had written three letters and asking if they had been received.

4. A letter dated 27 April 1953 has been received from PETER which did not reach SIS until 15 June 1953 owing to the departure of the post box to a foreign country and the forwarding of PETER's letter to that post box abroad. PETER stated in his letter that he had lost contact with the "DRAMBLYS" organization since January 1953 and had heard nothing about it since. He had been informed by a "DRAMBLYS" courier in January 1953 that ANTON and several members of the organization had been arrested. After sending a W/T message to this effect, he had for security reasons broken contact completely with the "DRAMBLYS" organization and was then in hiding at a safe house. He added that he was in a position to listen to broadcasts and asked for instructions.

**SECRET**

## CHAPTER 3.

COMMENTS

1. In examining the security of the DRAMBLYS organisation from July 1950, when ARUNAS was exfiltrated, until January 1953, when EDMUNDAS wrote his first letter referring to the reported arrest of DRAMBLYS, it is necessary to consider known links between the DEKSNYS and the DRAMBLYS groups in order to envisage the possibility of the hostile control of the former having led to the uncovering of the latter. These links certainly existed, notably in the common knowledge of a safe-house in Poland utilised by ARUNAS, in the use of a dead letter box for depositing supplies from base received by one group for the other, and in various references in W/T traffic suggesting that each organisation was aware of the parallel activities of the other. In view, however, of the impossibility of reaching a definite conclusion regarding the fate of the DEKSNYS organisation prior to January 1953, that of the DRAMBLYS organisation must remain equally problematic. There is no evidence to show that DRAMBLYS was not a genuine resistance leader with a certain number of followers, and nothing in his traffic points clearly to M.G.B. control. The first certain evidence of the breaking-up of the DRAMBLYS group came with the report of the arrest of ANTON, and although it is assumed that this took place between 26.11.52 and 16.1.53, it is possible that ANTON was captured at an earlier date without the knowledge of DRAMBLYS (i.e. some time after his last W/T message of 30 July 1952).
2. An important gap in W/T traffic from both DEKSNYS and DRAMBLYS occurred at about the same time, i.e.

DEKSNYS, between 5.10.52 and 12.12.52  
 DRAMBLYS, between 24.10.52 and 16.1.53

It will be recalled that MIKE was infiltrated to DEKSNYS in June 1952 and EDMUNDAS to DRAMBLYS in October-November 1952. While this gap in the traffic would not explain completely M.G.B. tactics employed with the knowledge of MIKE's infiltration and of the impending arrival of EDMUNDAS, the dates are sufficiently significant to merit recording in case there should occur later a possibility of checking events in the field during the period in question.

3. The question of the present situation of DRAMBLYS cannot be solved without a definite conclusion as to that of EDMUNDAS. S/W communications from the latter show undeniable suspect features, such as a mistake in one security check and an enigmatic confusion of dates in one overt text. If EDMUNDAS wrote his three letters under control, his categorical statement that DRAMBLYS had fallen into M.G.B. hands might indicate that DRAMBLYS had escaped and was in hiding; on the other hand, if EDMUNDAS is a free agent and reporting genuine information, DRAMBLYS must be considered as lost. The survival of PETER presents a somewhat similar problem.

-2-

4. It can serve little purpose at present to speculate on whether the destruction of the DRAMBLYS organisation had any relation to the round-up of Partisans reported by JACK in January 1953. There were links between RUGINIS of the DRAMBLYS organisation and VANAGAS, accused by JACK of having betrayed the Partisans, but the beginning of the disintegration of the DRAMBLYS group seems to be situated at an earlier date, i.e. that of the arrest of ANTON.
5. To sum up, while there is no positive evidence to show that DRAMBLYS and his organisation were in M.G.B. hands before the latter part of 1952, it is reasonable to suggest that hostile penetration of some level had been successful before the arrest of ANTON. The only hope of learning the real facts of the case would be if PETER could be exfiltrated and interrogated professionally.
6. From the political point of view, it is to be regretted that DRAMBLYS adopted the appellation B.D.P.S. for his organisation, which has led to some confusion with a former organisation bearing the same name. This does not suggest, however, that DRAMBLYS deliberately provoked such confusion or that his political action was dictated by the M.G.B.

## CHAPTER 4.

SKRAJUNAS

1. The early history of SKRAJUNAS is covered by the chapter on DEKSNYS. It is therefore proposed to deal with his short career from the time he was reinfilitrated under CIA auspices in October 1950 until the presumed date of his death in the Autumn 1951 as reported later by JACK. SKRAJUNAS was sent on a mission to report on resistance activities and eventually to set up an intelligence network. He intended to join the Resistance group which had sent him to the West, and he reported after arrival that he had made the desired contacts and was installed at L.L.K.S. headquarters and working with the organized active Resistance. SKRAJUNAS was accompanied by two W/T operators known as JOHN and ALFONSAS. They took in two W/T sets. The container in which one of the sets was included was subsequently reported as lost. All three were equipped with S/W material. SKRAJUNAS sent only 11 W/T messages and it is supposed that he went off the air after 8 December 1950 on account of MOB activity and possibly as a result of a technical breakdown in his equipment. He and ALFONSAS continued sending S/W messages but the last one received was dated 14 January 1951. SKRAJUNAS pointed out that JOHN was not corresponding by S/W as he had forgotten his security check.
2. No other news was received of SKRAJUNAS until JACK was infiltrated in April 1951 and referred in his W/T traffic on 26 June 1951 to news that SKRAJUNAS was alive and working at LLKS Headquarters at the beginning of February 1951. JACK stated on 14 August 1951 that he was making every effort to get in touch with SKRAJUNAS. In various later messages JACK referred to SKRAJUNAS and his two operators but he finally reported on 13 October 1952 and 26 November 1952 that SKRAJUNAS had been killed in September 1951, while ALFONSAS perished in February 1951. He added that JOHN was alive and was with a partisan unit of which he was the leader.
3. It is agreed that there is a mysterious gap in the career of SKRAJUNAS between his last S/W message in January 1951 and the claim by JACK that he did not perish until the autumn of 1951. While the assumed death of ALFONSAS and the report that JOHN had forgotten his security check might account for the absence of S/W communications from these two, this would not account for the silence of SKRAJUNAS himself. This point will be discussed more fully in the examination of JACK's traffic in Chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 5.

JACK

1. In April 1951 CIA infiltrated a team of two men by parachute, HENRY and JACK, into Lithuania. They were briefed to report on military and political information as well as information on the resistance. Also they were to organize intelligence nets. HENRY was the leader of the team. Both men were trained in W/T and were equipped with two W/T sets and W/W material. The first message received from the team was on 15 June 1951 and informed CIA that they had arrived safely, had reached their contact point, and had only made contact with the partisans on 8 May. Because of uncertain conditions HENRY and JACK separated on 19 May 1951 at which time HENRY left to make contact with the Partisan Headquarters of the TAURAS region from where he hoped to make contact with the LLKS Headquarters. JACK reported that contacts between the TAURAS region and the LLKS had broken down in February 1951. He was remaining in place with a partisan detachment.
2. On 26 June 1951 JACK, who had met SKRAJUNAS in the West, reported that in February 1951 SKRAJUNAS was alive and working at LLKS Headquarters, and that the fate of SKRAJUNAS' team mates, JOHN and ALPONSAS, was not known definitely. On 14 August he stated he was making every effort to get in touch with SKRAJUNAS and had sent him a letter through contact men. On 5 August 1951 JACK informed CIA that a contact man arrived with word that HENRY had been killed and upon request for details reported in October 1951 that HENRY had been killed in a farmhouse which was surrounded by MGB forces while he was meeting with a partisan detachment leader.
3. JACK continued sending messages answering queries put to him. While preparing a reception for a future team he went off the air in November 1951. His last W/T contact was 27 November 1951, and JACK did not return on the air again until 6 April 1952. He reported that he could not maintain contact because of a faulty generator which was still acting sporadically. The second generator and W/T apparatus could not be found in the place where JACK and his companion had buried it after landing. JACK asked whether CIA had received two letters which he sent in the early and latter parts of December 1951 and a third letter in the middle of March 1952. In fact, none of these letters were received. Subsequent messages reported that the MGB were carrying out heavy round-ups but that he was safe and had moved into a bunker of a partisan detachment chief with his radio. JACK was on the air regularly until December 1952.
4. When pressed to legalize himself he stated he was investigating possibilities and that one of his legalized contacts had promised to provide various identification and secondary documents through acquaintances in KAUNAS. He reported that a considerable amount of money was necessary for legalization and that some of his fellow partisans viewed the idea of legalization negatively whereas others considered it to be abandoning the common cause.

-2-

5. On 13 October 1952, JACK stated that after a long time he had been successful in making contact with the leader of the TAURAS region and had met him personally. During the meeting he learned that SKRAJUNAS had been killed in the Autumn of 1951 and that ALFONSAS had been killed in February 1951. JOHN was alive and leader of a partisan unit, but contact had been lost with him. JACK hoped to contact JOHN through the efforts of DEMONAS, the leader of the TAURAS partisans. DEMONAS had contact with the LIKS Headquarters and leaders of other TAURAS detachments but this was only of slight effectiveness since enemy sweeps were very active in the area. The partisan leader with whom JACK was staying was brought into the full scope of JACK's activities, and JACK was teaching him W/T at CIA's direction.
6. When pressed for more information on SKRAJUNAS' death, JACK reported that on the basis of DEMONAS' information, SKRAJUNAS was killed in September 1951 when he set out to meet the leaders of the LIKS, VANAGAS. It appears that he was ambushed by the enemy patrols but that two of his companions managed to escape. JACK reported further that ALFONSAS' and two other fighters were found dead in a bunker and that DEMONAS was of the opinion that they had been murdered by local inhabitants because it is unusual for the militia to leave behind bodies of resistance men.
7. The next news received from JACK was in the form of an S/W letter reporting that the leader of the LIKS Armed Forces had called out the TAURAS partisans for a parley and had appeared himself at the head of a military unit. A battle ensued in which JACK and a friend named AZUOLAS were wounded. Besides these two, the above-mentioned partisan leader with whom JACK had been staying and a few others managed to escape.
8. Two further letters from the partisan leader in question, both dated 13 January 1953 gave particulars of the treason of the LIKS Presidium members, VANAGAS, ZEMAITIS, LITAS, and MIRAINIS, who had been under enemy control for some time. The writer added that a certain number of TAURAS partisans managed to break through the encirclement but that many of the survivors were either finished off or betrayed by the local inhabitants. The second letter from the partisan leader reported that AZUOLAS died from injuries and of the entire detachment he and JACK were the only survivors. JACK's wound was festering, and the letter contained an urgent request for penicillin and money to buy food since it was dangerous to apply to the local farmers.

## CHAPTER 5.

COMMENTS

1. On examination of JACK's career since infiltration, both the SIS and CIA delegates have expressed the opinion that from examination of JACK's W/T and S/W traffic there is no clear evidence that would indicate that JACK has not been hitherto a free agent. It has been pointed out that one of the security checks given him for his W/T traffic has been answered correctly and those of his S/W letters have contained the correct security checks. However, at the same time the CIA delegate has signalled the following points which may tend cumulatively to indicate a possibility of JACK's having been under control. These points are as follows:
  - a. JACK was landed in April 1951 but did not make contact with the base until 15 June 1951.
  - b. JACK, in a message sent on 10 September 1951, asked for one of two reinforcements to aid him in propaganda activities although he had been opposed before infiltration to carrying out such activity in Lithuania for security reasons. He suggested in this message a man whom he indicated by a pseudonym which turned out upon investigation to be possibly that of JACK himself. However, there is room for speculation, in this matter, for if JACK really wanted to draw the base's attention to this individual, the use of his own pseudonym known only to the latter may have been his only means of pinpointing the said individual.
  - c. In November 1951 and in April 1952 CIA sent two W/T messages to JACK containing a security check. On each occasion, JACK, somewhat contrary to his habit, asked for a repeat of the message, and he did not later answer the check. However, there is some doubt as to whether the check was contained in the repeating messages.
  - d. One of the LLKS Presidium members mentioned in the S/W letter of 13 January 1953, namely ZEMAITIS, has a record with CIA which indicates that it would be unlikely that ZEMAITIS would take part in the betrayal of the Partisans.
  - e. The statement in the same letter of 13 January 1953 to the effect that Partisans were "finished off" or betrayed to the enemy by local inhabitants is not considered consistent with information received previously on the attitude of the Lithuanian rural population, and the statement by JACK in his W/T message of 9 December 1952 that local inhabitants may have killed ALFONSAS and two other partisans in their bunker might be viewed with similar skepticism.



-2-

2. These points have been discussed between the SIS and CIA delegates. While the SIS delegate does not wish to rule out the possibility that JACK is, at least at present, under control, he does not consider that these points constitute a sufficient mass of evidence to place JACK under very grave suspicion. Notably, as regards Point B, he does not take it to be out of the question that Lithuanian peasants sympathetic to the Soviets would refrain from aiding the latter against Partisans who had possibly made armed attacks against farmers. The CIA delegate agrees with this reasoning on point e, and there is general agreement that JACK'S present situation cannot be cleared up on available evidence. The considerable mystery surrounding the security aspect of the Partisan organization could be dispelled only if it became possible to exfiltrate JACK and to submit him to a comprehensive examination.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The security of each of the networks examined has been discussed under their respective chapters, and it is agreed that the three which were apparently active at the end of 1952 became seriously compromised and at least completely disorganised by January 1953. Whether this state of affairs resulted entirely from the large-scale round-up of the Partisans by the M.G.B. as reported by JACK and EDMUNDAS, or was brought about partly through other means remains an unsolved problem, but it is plausible that a general co-ordinated M.G.B. offensive against all Resistance networks in Lithuania took place in December 1952 - January 1953 with the object of smashing those networks effectively, thus cutting off all communication between them and their Western controllers. That there should have been a few dispersed survivors was only to be expected and three of these have already sent messages:
  - (a) EDMUNDAS/KONRAD, of the DRAMBLYS organisation; by three S/W letters and a W/T message;
  - (b) PETER, of the DRAMBLYS organisation, by one S/W letter;
  - (c) JACK, the C.I.A. agent with the Partisans, by three S/W letters

These messages must be considered as a possible M.G.B. operation to leave correspondence channels open with a view to learning whether the Western Services have any further plans for re-establishing networks in Lithuania, and although the evidence in support of this theory cannot be regarded as conclusive, a period of observation during which only strictly non-committal communications to the field is recommended. It would also be helpful for the clarification of the future situation in Lithuania if S.I.S. and C.I.A. continued to exchange information on all developments regarding these putative survivors.

2. The intrusion of political controversy among emigre groups into these field operations is greatly to be deplored, as it has tended to obscure the issue in the course of this joint enquiry into the security situation. Both C.I.A. and S.I.S. delegates have endeavoured to remain completely objective as to the merits of the different groups and individuals involved in these controversies, but it is recommended that in future the two services should combine to keep all operational details completely secret from emigre organisations. Although no evidence in the past of leakage of such details to the enemy has ever been established, any leakage to persons outside of the two Services must be considered as potentially dangerous. It is realised that agents for infiltration and exfiltration can be recruited on ideological grounds only and may naturally resent being cut off from their political friends during

**SECRET**

-2-

periods of training or of awaiting the launching of their operations. It is felt, however, that an attempt to persuade both agents and emigre organisations that security measures are aimed at preserving the personal safety of the former and the eventual progress of the latter is well worth attempting as a systematic programme.

SIS Delegate



CIA Delegate [

]

25 June 1953

**SECRET**