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ANNEX 1

ANNEX I

The following documents will be referred to as references
in this attachment:

- A. Memorandum, Chief I & R to DD/P dated 2 October 1953,
subject "Survey of Domestic Operations Base (DOB) of
SR Project AEACRE"
- B. Attachment to reference "A" entitled "Conclusions
and Recommendations"
- C. The full report "Survey of Domestic Operations Base
(DOB) of SR, Project AEACRE", completed 2 October 1953.
- D. C/SR/Admin reply to CAO/Deputy Director (Plans)
dated 9 January 1954, subject "Audit Report of Project
AEACRE", copy attached.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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Ref. B. Page 2, para a. & b.

Recommendation:

a. "The establishment of a DOB for the purpose of training in the United States of "black" agents for the REDSOX program only be approved. This means the relatively long-term training of REDSOX agents who will be brought into the United States "black", trained under completely controlled conditions "black", and dispatched to target area "black".

b. DOB immediately cease the training in DOB of REDSKIN principal agent personnel.

Dissent on Recommendation:

SR dissent on these recommendations is based on their over-severity. While the recommendations are accepted as general policy, operational and security considerations will on occasion necessitate utilization of the assets of DOB for other purposes than only "the training of 'black' agents for the REDSOX program". This will be limited however to direct support of the REDSOX program and any other training which cannot be properly provided for by OTR.

Any exceptions to the above such as the use of safehouses, safehousekeepers, vehicles, personnel for special SR Division projects, e.g. debriefing, will be specifically approved by C/SR and the Senior Staffs as appropriate. All such exceptions will necessarily be based on maximum efficient use of SR Division assets and will not be allowed to detract from the capability of DOB to train REDSOX penetration agents.

SR Division requirements for REDSKIN training will be levied on OTR through DOB for coordination and liaison purposes. DOB training support for SR REDSKIN projects will be provided only in these areas where OTR is not able to provide this support.

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Ref. B. Page 3, para II f.

Recommendation:

"DOB establish direct liaison with RQM/OIS, the research element of DD/P to obtain guidance on research already in existence of possible use to DOB and to secure appropriate research titles to be assigned the covert associates under DOB direction during slack periods."

Dissent on Recommendation

A dissent to this recommendation was made by C/SR to DD/P on 2 November 1953 on the grounds of jurisdiction. It was felt that DOB as a field unit of the SR Division should maintain its channel to RQM/OIS through SR/6 (Intelligence Support) and not direct. This dissent has been approved by Chief, I & R.

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Ref. B. Page 3, para II. g.

Recommendation:

"While recognizing and accepting the present policy of using military personnel on tours of duty in SR, the Office of the Chief of DOB be held by a Senior Career Agency case officer to maintain continuity of Agency purpose and objective."

Dissent on Recommendation:

SR dissent is based on the lack of any pertinent findings or conclusions to support such a recommendation.

Past and present Chiefs of the Domestic Operations Base have been chosen not because of their military status but because of their qualifications for directing the training of agents for clandestine operations directed against the USSR.

The military, because of the Army 4 year course in Russian Area Specialization, the Navy language school, the attache system and the extensive training experience of most military officers, represents a source of personnel uniquely qualified for such activities as DOB.

While SR has devoted considerable effort, time and money to the training of its own career personnel, it is particularly difficult to provide an individual with the benefits and experience of living with and dealing with the peoples of the USSR without making such experience first hand knowledge. CIA is not able to assign its personnel to the USSR and must rely for such qualifying experience on the less intimate and less frequent contact with Russian peoples which is possible in the peripheral areas and countries where Soviet installations are maintained.

While it is possible that a properly qualified agency career officer can be made available in the future for the post of Chief, DOB, such a recommendation as is made above cannot be accepted as a policy for implementation under the circumstances that exist today.

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Ref. B. Page 4, para i.

Recommendation:

"The Soviet Area Orientation Section be transferred to the Office of Training. This latter office will assume complete responsibility for the training of language case officer personnel which is in keeping with their charter. The post training of case officers in Soviet realities shall be under the supervision of Training with whatever assistance DOB may contribute in its knowledge of SR requirements. The Soviet Area Orientation Section, while conceived in good faith "to professionalize" a language case officer after his course in a language school, represents an extension of, even though approved by, Training. The present training program at Georgetown admittedly is not satisfactory. SR requirements in light of its needs have not been made available to Training. Until now, Training has not established an in-service language training program which meets the requirements of the SR Division."

Note of Explanation:

While no dissent is made to this recommendation, it is considered necessary to offer an explanation of the present status of the program.

Several discussions have taken place with the Office of Training, with the I & R Staff and with the Inspector General in an effort to work out satisfactorily the participation of OTR in this endeavor.

Approval by OTR and the Inspector General was given in March 1954 to continuance of SAOP under the SR Division until such time as OTR has the properly qualified personnel and facilities to take it over.

Under the approval thereby obtained, SR expects to offer the first 3 - 4 months course of the program in the fall of 1954.

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Ref. B. Page 5, para a.

Recommendation:

"Section V, Present Staff, sub-section, Contract Employees (Covert Associates), paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8:

That covert associates under contract to other elements of the Agency not be intermingled with personnel under contract to DOB or housed in the same facility for any purpose.

That additional covert associates presently assigned to CSOB or any of its complexes such as NTS not be transferred to DOB until complete inquiry is made concerning recent RIS penetrations, and then only by specific justification for additional slots through the usual project procedure."

Dissent on Recommendation

A dissent is registered only to that part concerning justification for additional slots for NTS covert associates on the grounds of an error in conclusion.

NTS covert associates or trainees will not be brought into a DOB training area until security, management and operational problems have been settled with the NTS by SR and co-ordinated with FI/STC.

Once such problems have been solved however, NTS Covert Associates may be brought into a DOB training site but will not be hired under authorized DOB slots for such personnel. The NTS protocol with the Agency does not permit employment or contracting by the Agency of an NTS agent trainee or an NTS covert associate. These personnel will be paid by NTS out of the overall Agency subsidy funds. Thus no additional DOB slots will be necessary to effect transfer to a DOB site. DOB control of its training activities is in conflict with the clear sovereignty of NTS in its joint endeavor with the Agency established by the Protocol of December 1952.

It should be noted nevertheless that while NTS personnel may have contact with certain DOB contract instructors at the safe-house reserved for NTS, they will not be given access to the safe office where all DOB contract instructors are housed and where agent training material for other projects is prepared. It is considered too cumbersome and expensive however to fully compartment NTS instructors from those under contract to DOB.

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Ref. B. Page 5, para e.

Recommendation:

"That DOB continue to use assets of the military for specialized training such as airborne, maritime, and survival training. There should be cross-fertilization between DOB and Training Division in order that the latter is aware of the facilities that have been secured and so may exploit them on an Agency-wide basis. Further, Training Division assets should be utilized wherever available. Facilities of the military under no circumstances should be duplicated by either DOB or Training Division."

Dissent on Recommendation

The principle of complete fertilization between DOB and OTR is accepted and is being followed but a dissent is made on the grounds of impracticality to that part of the recommendation covering exploitation of DOB obtained facilities on an Agency wide basis by OTR.

It should be understood that what facilities DOB has been able to obtain at military bases have been secured by informal procedures, yet are official in nature. These are generally on a need-to-know basis and do not lend themselves to a mass exploitation.

Considerable effort is devoted by DOB to maintenance of the friendly and informal nature of these relationships. Great care is also exercised to avoid DOB becoming an administrative burden to the military facilities involved in order to avoid the official Army procedures and consequent red tape that would then result. Up to this point the Agency has not reimbursed the military for the considerable costs of this support. Wholesale exploitation would conceivably make reimbursement an issue.

Cover stories and ground rules furthermore have been established by DOB specifically directed to the problems of handling and training REDSOX personnel in the military areas involved. Experience has shown that unless these measures are enforced by DOB personal representation, the security of the facilities for REDSOX training becomes immediately threatened.

In view therefore of these conditions, use of DOB obtained military facilities by other Agency units is limited by two factors: the ability of DOB to supply proper supervisory personnel for the time of use and the need to avoid official Army procedures.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 32, para f.

Recommendation:

"That no firearms familiarization or training be given at any safehouse, but that all such training be given at military installations."

Dissent on Recommendation

A dissent is made on the grounds of over-severity. The distances involved are too great to have all forms of weapons training take place at military sites and not safehouses. Such exercises as dry run breathing, aiming, squessing and weapons stripping can take place at a safehouse with no detriment to security.

The following security precautions have however been taken in this regard: the firing of weapons by agents or case officers at other than military sites is prohibited, and any weapons kept at safehouses are stored in safes and used only for the properly supervised training of agents at areas of the safehouse installation out of sight of safehousekeepers or other unauthorized personnel.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 32, para f-1.

Recommendation:

"That all weapons other than those used by the guard force at the DOB be stored at those military installations used for firearms training."

Dissent on Recommendation

As in the case of the preceding recommendation, a dissent is registered on the basis of over-severity.

Weapons firing may take place at more than one military site and the weapons may be used for field stripping and familiarization purposes at safehouses. DOB Headquarters is the central point for all DOB activities and represents the most efficient and secure place for permanent storage of most DOB weapons. To store all of them at a military site would require a far greater amount of vehicle trips for transport of weapons than DOB is capable of handling. Only roving guard is provided at a military installation.

DOB weapons are of a great variety, of a specialized nature and consequently quite valuable. A greater need exists therefore for tight control and security measures covering their handling and storage. This can better be accomplished at DOB Headquarters where are located the personnel necessary for the proper care of these firearms and where exists a 24 hour guard of DOB personnel. Here also can be handled more efficiently the ordering and replacement of any defective mechanisms or parts.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 33, para h-1.

Recommendation:

"That separate files be maintained on each automobile assigned to the DOB in order that a complete history of the security experience with each vehicle will be available."

Dissent on Recommendation:

A dissent is made on the impracticality of this recommendation as it is understood by SR.

An automobile cannot be handled security wise in the same manner as a safehouse or an agent. DOB does not have sufficient vehicles to permit the use of a vehicle on a one-time basis or for one training unit only and cannot assign a permanent driver to each vehicle. The identity of a vehicle likewise cannot be changed after exposure to DOB installations or agents without excessive administrative manipulations.

If this recommendation is interpreted to signify those security experiences recorded with the public, such as police records, or publicity resulting from litigation proceedings or security flaps, DOB does concur and is implementing the recommendation as stated.

A further security measure has been taken in regard to DOB vehicles by arranging to license them in the state where they are located the installations at which they are normally used. This measure helps to make the vehicles less conspicuous in the area of their normal use. In event of security violation, registration license is changed immediately.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 39

Recommendation:

"That a safehouse be disposed of as soon as a dispatched agent, who has been trained at that safehouse, reaches his target, or whenever an agent trained at that safehouse becomes a disposal case and is disposed of under uncontrolled conditions."

Dissent on Recommendation

A dissent on recommendation is made on the grounds of impracticality. DOB rents a safehouse for no more than two years and disposes of it when an agent who has been trained there is known to have fallen into enemy hands or when the security record of the safehouse or its former occupants indicates that any further operations conducted there will be compromised.

Because however of sudden and unforeseeable demands for safehouses which continue to arise, DOB cannot always dispose of a property under the conditions recommended. Safehouses meeting DOB requirements take several months to obtain and are difficult to find. To follow the recommendation as stated, would unduly jeopardize the ability of DOB to discharge the functions for which it was organized.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 40

Ref C. above makes a recommendation that a letter of reprimand be directed to a former DOB staff officer. A dissent has been registered by C/SR in memorandum to C/I & R which dissent was concurred in by C/FI and accepted by I & R.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 42

Recommendation:

"In view of the present cover problems encountered because of the foregoing conditions, plus the fact that personal automobiles of DOB personnel entering the present DOB site present another security problem, it is recommended that a change be made in the cover of the DOB. In this regard, consideration should be given to locating the DOB Headquarters in a government building housing components of the Army. Such an arrangement would remove many of the security problems of the DOB and its operations, particularly in view of the fact that the employees, their personal automobiles, and the official vehicles would then be blended in with other employees and vehicles of the Army installation utilized. If such arrangements can be made, it is further recommended that the DOB be placed in an Army building which does not house any Army component engaged in intelligence activities."

Dissent on Recommendation.

1. This dissent is made on the grounds that the facts and conclusions presented do not warrant the change recommended.

a. While it is admitted that many facets of the cover of DOB headquarters are not ideal, it is also a fact that these deficiencies have not resulted in identification of DOB headquarters as an Agency installation to unauthorized persons. As long as this condition exists the cover of DOB headquarters will be serving its main purpose.

b. This cover although only lightly backstopped has withstood several potential security flaps in the past and is considered durable enough to handle such future needs as can be anticipated.

c. The personal backstopping afforded to individuals has been adequate in all instances where the individual has acted properly and made the exact nature of his needs known ahead of time. The factor of personal automobiles would still be present under another cover or another location for DOB headquarters.

d. It is not considered feasible to change the DOB cover without changing its location and the location will not be changed until the present one or the condition of its cover is considered to be jeopardizing training operations. At such time, however, as a move becomes necessary, consideration of cover will affect the choice of a new location and vice versa.

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Ref B. Page 6, para. g. 1

Recommendation:

"That [] former finance officer presently assigned to other duties at DOB, be recalled from those duties and assigned full-time to accounting for \$13,277.31 still outstanding in his name. If this accounting extends beyond a 30-day period, a status report shall be made to I & R."

Dissent on Facts, Conclusions and Recommendation.

While a technical reply to this recommendation was furnished in Reference D, para 1a, the following dissent is made to the recommendation based on its over-severity, omission of fact and conclusion.

From the wording of this recommendation the inference is made that [] had been derelict in his duties by not properly accounting for the funds charged to his name. This inference or conclusion is wholly erroneous and is not that believed drawn by [] at the time the audit of DOB was made. The following material not included in the full I & R report is offered in this connection.

[] had in fact submitted accountings for \$11,425.93, of the amount in question, as early as October 1952. These accountings were held by the Finance Division without audit and returned to DOB after a six months period. It was learned informally that the area certifying officer felt that an audit of these accountings would be unwise until the AEACRE Administrative Plan had been approved.

At the time of the AEACRE audit [] of the audit office noting the previous action taken, suggested that the accountings for \$11,425.93 be returned in their existing state to the area certifying officer for audit, despite the lack of an Administrative Plan. This was in fact done within two weeks after the audit.

Of the balance of \$1,851.38 for which [] was accountable, \$1,286.20 consisted of suspended accountings and \$565.18 was an apparent shortage. Resubmission or write-off of the suspended accountings was dependent on approval of the Administrative Plan and the apparent shortage of \$565.18 could not be reconciled until the accountings referred to above had been finally audited and settled.

Thus while, in a technical sense, the Finance Division had not finally settled on its books the amounts in question, and while it is admitted that these amounts were charged to [] in name, it is also evident that [] had on his part complied with his obligations to account. That these accountings had not been finally settled was due to the action of higher authority in returning the accountings to DOB, for holding until an AEACRE Administrative Plan had been approved.

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Ref. B. Page 6, para f.
Ref. C. Page 42

Recommendation:

"In view of the present cover problems encountered because of the foregoing conditions, plus the fact that personal automobiles of DOB personnel entering the present DOB site present another security problem, it is recommended that a change be made in the cover of the DOB. In this regard, consideration should be given to locating the DOB Headquarters in a government building housing components of the Army. Such an arrangement would remove many of the security problems of the DOB and its operations, particularly in view of the fact that the employees, their personal automobiles, and the official vehicles would then be blended in with other employees and vehicles of the Army installation utilized. If such arrangements can be made, it is further recommended that the DOB be placed in an Army building which does not house any Army component engaged in intelligence activities."

Dissent on Recommendation.

1. This dissent is made on the grounds that the facts and conclusions presented do not warrant the change recommended.

a. While it is admitted that many facets of the cover of DOB headquarters are not ideal, it is also a fact that these deficiencies have not resulted in identification of DOB headquarters as an Agency installation to unauthorized persons. As long as this condition exists the cover of DOB headquarters will be serving its main purpose.

b. This cover although only lightly backstopped has withstood several potential security flaps in the past and is considered durable enough to handle such future needs as can be anticipated.

c. The personal backstopping afforded to individuals has been adequate in all instances where the individual has acted properly and made the exact nature of his needs known ahead of time. The factor of personal automobiles would still be present under another cover or another location for DOB headquarters.

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From the wording of this recommendation the inference is made that [] had been derelict in his duties by not properly accounting for the funds charged to his name. This inference or conclusion is wholly erroneous and is not that believed drawn by [] at the time the audit of DOB was made. The following material not included in the full I & R report is offered in this connection.

[] had in fact submitted accountings for \$11,425.93, of the amount in question, as early as October 1952. These accountings were held by the Finance Division without audit and returned to DOB after a six months period. It was learned informally that the area certifying officer felt that an audit of these accountings would be unwise until the AEACRE Administrative Plan had been approved.

At the time of the AEACRE audit [] of the audit office noting the previous action taken, suggested that the accountings for \$11,425.93 be returned in their existing state to the area certifying officer for audit, despite the lack of an Administrative Plan. This was in fact done within two weeks after the audit.

Of the balance of \$1,851.38 for which [] was accountable, \$1,286.20 consisted of suspended accountings and \$565.18 was an apparent shortage. Resubmission or write-off of the suspended accountings was dependent on approval of the Administrative Plan and the apparent shortage of \$565.18 could not be reconciled until the accountings referred to above had been finally audited and settled.

Thus while, in a technical sense, the Finance Division had not finally settled on its books the amounts in question, and while it is admitted that these amounts were charged to [] in name, it is also evident that [] had on his part complied with his obligations to account. That these accountings had not been finally settled was due to the action of higher authority in returning the accountings to DOB, for holding until an AEACRE Administrative Plan had been approved.

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 6, para g.
Ref. C. Page 46, para 2.

Recommendation:

"Require [] to (a) prepare and submit proper accountings through August 1953 and (b) submit accountings for each subsequent month in sufficient time to reach Finance Division by the fifteenth of the following month."

Dissent on Facts, Conclusions and Recommendation

While a technical reply to this recommendation was furnished in Reference D, para 1 b, the following dissent is made to the recommendation based on its over-severity, omission of fact and conclusion.

From the wording of this recommendation the inference is made that [] had not properly discharged his duties as Finance Officer of DOB. The following material not included in the full I & R report is offered in this connection.

As explained to [] of the Audit Office at the time of the audit of DOB, the accountings in question, those for June, July and August had been prepared by [] but had been held at DOB on the recommendation of [] of the Finance Division and [] of SR. These officers had unanimously agreed that it would be wiser to hold the accountings at DOB until an Administrative Plan was approved and thereby eliminate suspensions and reclaim vouchers.

[] at the time of the DOB audit recommended that these accountings be submitted, despite lack of an Administrative Plan and despite the advice of other officers of the Finance Division and SR. This was done within ten days.

Thus while in a technical sense the Finance Division had not finally settled on its books the amounts in question, it is evident that [] as Finance Officer of DOB had complied with his obligation to account and had been prevented from forwarding these accountings by higher officials.

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 6, para g. 4

Recommendation:

"That a firm policy be established and made the subject of an internal memorandum at DOE that personal checks will not be cashed for personnel under any circumstances."

Dissent on Recommendation

Reference E. para 1. d. stated SR Division opinion on this matter. The dissent is based on an error in the conclusion leading to this recommendation.

It has been determined by SR with the concurrence of the Audit Office that the cashing of personal checks is feasible and is not in contradiction with normal agency procedure.

SECRET

53

Ref. B. Page 6, para g.

Recommendation:

"Apart from the audit report, it is recommended that entertainment of all forms be paid from the agent's personal funds and contracts with agents for the period of their training should adequately provide for these items. This will help prevent suspensions by Finance Division and keep the record clean."

Dissent on Recommendation

1. This recommendation although not so stated in the I & R report is presumably supported by the fact that vouchers for entertainment made up the majority of suspended accountings at the time of the audit. This fact has apparently led to the conclusion that the solution is to handle entertainment as stated in the recommendation. SR dissents for the following reasons:

a. The Admin Plan approved on 21 Jan 1954 gives the Chief DOB authority and responsibility for the expenditure of funds for the entertainment of agents. This provision recognizes the need that exists for entertainment funds and charges the Chief DOB with properly supervising such expenditures. This clause will prevent any future suspended accountings covering entertainment expenses.

b. A specific provision for entertainment in the agent's contract would necessarily involve a discussion with the agent at the time of contracting of the how, when and where entertainment would take place. This is not a fit subject to discuss with an agent who is being contracted for training and dispatch into a denied area and who in any event is not going to be allowed to decide the conditions or terms of any entertainment he may have during his training. It should be noted here that most of the agents trained in DOB are in the U.S. "black", and consequently are virtual hostages of the Agency.

c. To include funds for entertainment in the agent's contract would detract from the authority of the Chief DOB and the senior case officer over the agent trainee and give to the agent an undesirable degree of decision in the, at best, difficult relationship that the Agency must maintain with this type of agent.

2. As a matter of practice, entertainment of all forms is being closely supervised and adequate safeguards have been instituted by Chief, DOB to prevent any excesses in the future. In addition, the Admin Plan provides for quarterly review by SR and the Office of the Comptroller of entertainment vouchers for the purpose of furnishing policy guidance on these matters.

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 7, para 1.

Recommendation:

"That as a matter of doctrine "black" airdrops of agents into denied areas be used only as a last resort as a means of entry, and that W/T be used only for priority communications such as early warning, compromise, etc."

Dissent on Recommendation

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 8, para m., subpara 5

Recommendation:

"That upon completion of training cycle, the above records of DOB be forwarded to the appropriate SR branch and there destroyed after a determination that the case file is complete."

Dissent on Recommendation

The following dissent is based on the overseverity of the recommendation.

DOB cannot properly conduct its affairs without ready access to the record of its past experience in training. Such records are vitally necessary to provide continuity of methods of handling and training and to enable DOB to profit by and correct any errors committed in the past.

No paper however directly bearing on the training of an agent is produced in DOB which is not available to the SR branch concerned and as presently regulated, the branch receives copies of all formal reports written on an agent.

The publication of all papers concerning an agent training unit is also being controlled on distribution and in filing. Upon termination of the training of an agent, existing files on the training unit are consolidated in one file and retired as a DOB file to RI Archives after a 6 months period, with access to such files thereafter being limited to DOB. This assures the branch controlling the agent at the target that the material existing at DOB after dispatch is rigidly and securely held. All file material is also screened at the time files are consolidated, in order to remove any operational information leading to the agent's identity or target.

SECRET

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 8, para p.

Recommendation:

"That the technical recommendations of these specialized officers as to type of equipment, weight of equipment to be saddled on agents, be considered final in the absence of overriding considerations, and not be overruled willy-nilly by the branch case officers."

Dissent on Recommendation

This following dissent is based on impracticality.

Since the question of equipment to be taken by an agent on his mission is an operational and not a training decision, disagreement can only be resolved by higher authority. SR/COF will be that authority for resolution of differences between COB and an SR branch as in the recommendation concerning assessments of agents, Ref. B., page 6, para h.

SECRET

84

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 9, para q.

Recommendation:

"That on the completion of a training cycle, Commo records be forwarded to Headquarters, those from the Commo section to Commo, and those from DOB to the appropriate branch of SR."

Dissent on Recommendation

As in the case of the recommendation concerning training records, Ref. B., page 8, para. m, sub-para 5, the following dissent is based on the over-severity of the recommendation.

Upon termination or dispatch of an agent, his commo training records will be consolidated in the appropriate training unit file and retired to RI Archives after a 6 months period, with access to such files thereafter being limited to DOB. Copies of all commo reports are as a matter of course furnished to the responsible branch of SR and, as appropriate, to Commo itself.

SECRET

SECRET

Ref. B. Page 9, para r.

Recommendation:

Section IX, 9, (b), 2

"That Chief, DOB be held responsible for a more efficient use of personnel rectifying such practices as are described in this section."

Dissent on Recommendation

The following dissent is registered to the conclusions prompting this recommendation.

The personnel practices referred to in the recommendation all have become an operational necessity at one time or another and are only resorted to as the most practical and secure expedient under the existing circumstances. In attempting to administer an organization such as DOB with its widely scattered installations, each with its own cover story and special security problems, the occasions will arise again when personnel are called on to perform a task not provided in their job descriptions. The only alternative for instance to asking a finance assistant to keep the furnace going in a house temporarily vacated by a training unit, where a regular housekeeper is not on duty, may possibly be to let the pipes freeze.

Good management practices will over a period of time reduce to a minimum any unusual demands by DOB on its personnel and it is not the intent of this dissent to condone permanent mishandling of personnel. It is rather our aim to register the unusual nature of DOB's activity and the recurrent possibility of emergency conditions. To increase the DOB staff to include sufficient personnel at all times to take care of peak loads of activity would unjustifiably increase the cost of the project to CIA and also increase the security and administrative problems of this sensitive activity.

SECRET