

2 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Survey of Domestic Operations Base (DOB) of SR Project
AE-ACHB

I. Introduction

a. The attached review of the Domestic Operations Base (DOB) of SR Division, is submitted in response to the request of Chief/OPS (DD/P) and as a part of the inspection of components of the Glanders Service by the Inspection and Review Staff. For convenience, the body of the report has been separated from the conclusions and recommendations which are being made the initial attachment to this memorandum.

II. Discussion

Purpose and General Conclusions

a. The purpose of the current survey of DOB is two-fold: (1) to provide a general inspection and review of this operation from its inception to date, and (2) to provide a foundation for an examination of the general concept which motivated the establishment of DOB, its continuing validity, and its possible application toward a solution of similar problems confronting other Area Divisions.

b. As concerns the execution of the primary purpose of this survey, suffice it to say that the most obvious delinquencies observed can best be described as untidiness in training, management, administration, and fiscal affairs. It has been most difficult to ascertain specific responsibility for this general untidiness. It is probably chargeable to the rapid growth of a training operation conducted at the same time with the problems of establishing the support mechanism largely from its own resources. Consequently, it has not been felt that a harsh approach should be taken toward the sincere and hard-working personnel for inadequacies due more to the complexities of the Agency than almost any other factor.

c. With reference to the secondary purpose of this survey, it has been concluded that the general concept which motivated the establishment of DOB was and is valid, and further, that the physical assets and many of the personnel so painfully gathered together could be used in training

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operations of "black" agents for other than penetration of the Soviet Union. These should be limited to Caucasians, hence, European Satellite nationalities to avoid undue attention in the Washington area. Such support from DOB for training operations of other Area Divisions would require language case officers and other personnel on temporary assignment. The physical assets of DOB are quite adaptable, however, to fulfill the support function.

Present Concept as Opposed to Integrated Base

d. There is one point that is not dealt upon in the report which deserves mention. In the original project proposal, and in certain references subsequently, reference is made to the possible establishment of a large integrated base for training of Redcoz agents. It is believed that this approach to the Agency's requirements is not only unrealistic but dangerous. A large integrated base would be blown to the opposition with the first compromise of a mission, and probably publicly, depending upon the inclinations of the opposition at the moment. Publicity could result, and then the Agency would be in the possession of a large base known to the world for what it was. Questions might be asked in Congress; newspapermen would mill about; the Agency would be in the position of a "sitting duck," immobile and embarrassed. This ignores the large cost of being completely autonomous in an isolated area and the service personnel required to keep a large base functioning. The present mechanism, on the other hand, is a temporary one with the safe headquarters and the series of safehouses as spokes emanating from the hub. A safehouse is used once and disposed of with the dispatch of the agent. If necessary, the Agency can detach itself from all or part of the present installations very quickly and build again more efficiently and more securely than could ever be accomplished with the big base concept. Past experience of the Germans further argues against becoming large and immobile in this type of activity.

Present Level of Training Activity

e. The Agency, at the present time, is committed to a certain level of Redcoz operations. Recent reviews of projects, however, have indicated that this level in numbers is not high, and probably will not involve the training of more than 12 to 16 agents at DOB during the current fiscal year. This decline in this type of activity is dictated by the almost complete absence of high-level agent material, plus a dearth of knowledge on how to keep that agent alive within the borders of the Soviet Union once he is dispatched. The Agency seems to be at dead center for the moment. It is redirecting its efforts along orthodox espionage lines, Redskin, Zodiac, etc. It has found that there is a high degree of casualties among Redcoz agents where there has not been sufficient planning and preparation. The activity, however, must be continued as one phalanx in execu-

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ting the Agency's responsibility in its attack on specialized targets, and as a training ground for case officers for wartime operations.

Necessity for Singleness of Purpose

f. It has been concluded, however, from the survey that to accomplish this activity most effectively, it is highly desirable that DOB restrict itself to the spotting, assessing, recruiting, and training of Redsox agents for ultimate dispatch into the Soviet Union. Recommendations have been made that all activity not directly bearing on this objective be transferred to other elements of the Agency, vis., the Training Division. It is believed that by the adoption of this purist attitude and a cessation of the use of DOB as a "catch-all" will result in a tighter training operation and a reduction of aborted missions. Furthermore, a departure from singularity is also contrary to the established project procedures both from the standpoint of use of personnel and expenditure of funds.

*Contrary
to par
& above*

Proposals for 1954 Fiscal Year

g. Based on the present level of Redsox training activity and the factors touched upon above, the proposals and concomitant estimates need complete revision. Status quo is recommended in DOB's T/O, minus a limited number of officers engaged in the Soviet Area Orientation Program, which by charter should be the responsibility of Training Division. Ceilings on safehouses, covert associates, motor vehicles have also been recommended in keeping with present realities.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

- a. The conclusions and recommendations based on the report are attached.
- b. Finally, it is strongly recommended that at the end of six months

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I&R make a spot re-survey of the project to determine what action has been taken with respect to the recommendations approved.

[
Chief, Inspection and Review

Attachments: Tube A & B

Distribution:

Original - DD/P
1 - Inspector General
1 - SR Division
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EYES ONLY

SURVEY OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS BASE (DOB) OF SR, PROJECT AL-ACRE

Conclusions and Recommendations

I. Conclusions

a. As presently constituted DOB has two basic responsibilities: (1) to spot, assess, and recruit agents in the Western Hemisphere, and (2) to train selected agents recruited world-wide for Redsox and Redskin programs. (This excludes SAOP, a staff employee training program.) Over 60% of the DOB time is devoted to Redsox activities.

b. The personnel allotment for DOB consists of 60 slots of which 56 were obligated. With reassignments, clerical slots to be vacated, and personnel actions in process for employees not yet aboard, the present incumbents, in a full-time capacity, is thereby reduced to a total of 43 staff personnel. Instances have been found where employees are carried in slots not in keeping with their duties or relative positions on the T/O. There also has been a policy of intermingling covert associates with individuals under contract to branches of SR which raises questions on selection standards and terms of contracts tending to weaken authority and control of DOB.

c. The operational accomplishments of DOB to date as to the Redsox program have not been encouraging. While it has successfully established a physical asset to which considerable man hour details were devoted, operational and training productivity has thereby been reduced.

d. There is no uniformity in the selection of safehouse keepers.

e. Some evidence is noted that projects and funding are contrary to project procedures.

f. The desire of SR to give DOB autonomy comparable to that enjoyed by overseas field stations has developed an anomalous organizational asset by a diffusion of SR authority. Division guidance to DOB is placed at once in several Division authorities: Chief/OPS, Support Section, Branch Chiefs, etc.

g. The DOB property is adequately suited for the training of European Satellite "black" agents, but not for non-Caucasian agents. The latter would certainly attract undue attention in the Washington area.

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h. There is a lack of firm direction from the SR Division in its selection of research subjects, coordination with other areas of research and training. DOB has by its own initiative independently obtained extensive training facilities from the military establishment, either gratis, or at little cost to support its program. This has been more practical and efficient and indeed more economical than any comparable effort made through Agency resources.

i. The Office of Training is unwilling to train "black" agents as it believes its primary function is to train staff employees and covert agents. It also is unwilling to use its facilities for reasons of administration and security, and is certainly not equipped either to give 24-hour surveillance of "black" agents during training, or to handle holding actions which originate from this type of training, from time to time. Apart from the practical aspects, the Training Division looks with reserve on the positive intelligence value of the Redsox program and, consequently, does not feel that the commitment or expense of training assets is warranted.

j. A general untidiness was noted in almost every aspect of the operations of DOB. Training operations have not always been tightly controlled. Administrative and financial affairs have not been precisely executed. A certain ad hoc atmosphere prevails in the approaches to daily problems without the formalization of procedures.

Approved

k. Support from other elements of the Agency complex has been generally adequate but not always sympathetically cooperative. Guidance from other elements of the Agency except from SR and Commo has been practically absent. DOB assets, both personnel and funds, have from time to time been siphoned-off for purposes quite unrelated to the DOB charter. No records have been kept of the shunting of personnel back and forth or of their day-to-day assignments either within or outside DOB on which an accurate cost accounting for personnel could be based. Funds expended for unrelated purposes have not been notified to the staff project authorities. In general, there has been a tendency to use DOB as a "catch-all" or a commando force to perform all and sundry duties as the exigencies of the moment dictate.

II. Recommendations

The following general recommendations are submitted. It is recommended that:

1 ✓ a. The establishment of a DOB for the purpose of training in the United States of "black" agents for the Redsox program only be approved.

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CSK

This means the relatively long-term training of Redsex agents who will be brought into the United States "black", trained under completely controlled conditions "black", and dispatched to target areas "black".

2 ✓ b. DOB immediately cease the training in DOB of Redskin principal agent personnel.

3 ✓ 1. The training of Redskin principal agent personnel recruited in the Western Hemisphere shall be the responsibility of Training which will provide such training for, and obtain whatever assistance it may need from SR Division or DOB in order to meet requirements and objectives.

4 ✓ 2. The training of Redskin principal agent personnel recruited abroad shall be the responsibility of case officers abroad and except in unusual circumstances Redskin principal agent personnel will not be brought to the United States for training nor will such training be conducted in established training sites other than in individually and reportedly secure safehouses. Such material as may be required by case officers to train Redskin principal agent personnel will be furnished by DOB with the approval of the Office of Training.

5 ✓ c. Familiarization of officials of foreign intelligence services be assumed by Training with such assistance or guidance from SR and DOB as the circumstances require.

6 ✓ d. The spotting and assessment program of DOB, while not an integral part of the DOB training program, be approved without the provision for language professional personnel such as psychologists, psychiatrists, and medical personnel.

7 ✓ e. There be established between DOB and the Office of Training direct liaison for the purpose of exchanging current training guides, aids, and material.

8 ✓ f. DOB establish direct liaison with R&M/OIS, the research element of DD/P to obtain guidance on research already in existence of possible use to DOB and to secure appropriate research titles to be assigned the covert associates under DOB direction during slack periods.

9 ✓ g. While recognizing and accepting the present policy of using military personnel on tours of duty in SR, the Office of the Chief of DOB be held by a Senior Career Agency case officer to maintain continuity of Agency purpose and objective.

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10 h. Authority and responsibility, in fact, be granted to DOB in the direction, administration, and execution of its training of Redox agents with guidance from the Chief, Operations, SR Division. As case officers responsible for their agent personnel require the use of DOB, they will for DOB purposes be considered temporarily assigned to DOB and under the direction and responsibility of Chief, DOB, for administration, operational, and security reasons, and for that period for ratings on efficiency. J/SK

11 i. The Soviet Area Orientation Section be transferred to the Office of Training. This latter office will assume complete responsibility for the training of language case officer personnel which is in keeping with their charter. The post training of case officers in Soviet realities shall be under the supervision of Training with whatever assistance DOB may contribute in its knowledge of SR requirements. The Soviet Area Orientation Section, while conceived in good faith "to professionalise" a language case officer after his course in a language school, represents an extension of, even though approved by, Training. The present training program at Georgetown admittedly is not satisfactory. SR requirements in light of its needs have not been made available to Training. Until now, Training has not established an in-service language training program which meets the requirements of the SR Division.

12 j. The proposed budgetary and personnel increase requests for AE-ACRE be revised and reduced to conform to a program established along the above recommended lines, and not to exceed the present personnel complement, minus slots presently occupied by SAOP personnel. (See Section XI for specific ceilings on safehouses, covert associates, house trailers, and motor vehicles requested in Budget FY 1954.) This amounts to the approval of a T/O of 57 for DOB for the current FY which, with the re-direction of operations toward Redskin and other orthodox means of espionage, should be again carefully reviewed at the end of the current FY. budget
available
current
YSK

13 k. The spotting and assessment program represents a single centralized control mechanism for seeking agents. Its stated objectives and procedures are logically sound for the purpose intended. While there is a belief in DOB that the lack of language qualified psychologists, psychiatrists, polygraph and medical assessors has posed problems of establishing rapport in DOB assessment of agents, cooperation with professional Agency personnel has been good. The necessity, therefore, of adding language qualified professional personnel to DOB, while desirable, appears unwarranted. OX

* * *

The following specific recommendations dealing with various aspects of DOB operations are set forth and related to the narrative report by reference to section and paragraph.

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a. Section V, Present Staff, sub-section, Contract Employees (Covert Associates), paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8: *Pages 14+15*

14 ✓

That covert associates under contract to other elements of the Agency not be intermingled with personnel under contract to DOB or housed in the same facility for any purpose.

15 ✓

That additional covert associates presently assigned to COMB or any of its complexes such as NIS not be transferred to DOB until complete inquiry is made concerning recent NIS penetrations, and then only by specific justification for additional slots through the usual project procedure.

b. Section V, Present Staff, sub-section, Spotting and Assessment Staff Contract Employees *Pages 15+16*

16 ✓

That DOB under no circumstances be permitted to place under contract any individual or count any project for the expenditures of funds outside the United States without compliance with normal project procedures which would be required of any Area Division to accomplish similar purposes.

c. Section VI, Accomplishments, 4, (b) *Page 20*

17 ✓

That staff employees engaged in training operations for DOB be required to complete the basic training courses established by the Training Division in all instances in the future before entering upon duty. Those individuals at the base who have not undergone such training should be made available for that purpose as soon as possible.

d. Section VI, Accomplishments, 4, (d) *Page 21*

18 ✓

That DOB be responsible for the guidance and direction of senior case officers in the execution of their collateral function of giving on-the-job training to junior case officers serving under them, and require detailed reports on their efficiency and performance.

e. Section VI, Accomplishments, 6, (e) *Page 22+23*

19 ✓

That DOB continue to use assets of the military for specialized training such as airborne, maritime, and survival training. There should be cross-fertilization between DOB and Training Division in order that the latter is aware of the facilities that have been secured and so may exploit them on an Agency-wide basis. Further, Training Division assets should be utilized wherever available. Facilities of the military under no circumstances should be duplicated by either DOB or Training Division.

Handwritten notes:
I made base
in base
Restrictions
not appropriate
restriction

f. Section VII, Security

That specific recommendations on physical security, safehouses, personnel, and cover set forth following the appropriate sub-sections of this portion of the survey be adopted in toto.

g. Section VIII, Preliminary Audit

That the general recommendations of the auditor be adopted in toto with the following revisions which are intended to strengthen their import (numbered paragraphs below apply to similarly numbered paragraphs under recommendations):

1. That [] former finance officer presently assigned to other duties at DOB, be recalled from those duties and assigned full-time to accounting for \$13,277.31 still outstanding in his name. If this accounting extends beyond a 30-day period, a status report shall be made to L&R.

4. That a firm policy be established and made the subject of an internal memorandum at DOB that personal checks will not be cashed for personnel under any circumstances.

8. That suspended items, the majority of which are entertainment of agents, be written-off in a manner satisfactory to the Finance Division in order that DOB may start afresh in their accountability for funds and subsequent audits will be meaningful.

Apart from the audit report, it is recommended that entertainment of all forms be paid from the agents' personal funds and contracts with agents for the period of their training should adequately provide for these items. This will help prevent suspensions by Finance Division and keep the record clean.

Lastly, it is recommended that a re-audit of DOB be made in six months and that if the recommendations made in this survey have not been complied with, appropriate administrative action be taken.

h. Section IX, 1, b, (1) ⁽⁶⁾ ~~(X)~~ Page 50

That Chief, OPS, SR be the executive authority for resolution of differences between SR Branches and DOB regarding assessment of an agent where there is a variance of opinion as to whether the agent should be terminated or continued.

20-49
see full report p. 31-42

50 ✓

51, 52 (see full report page 47)

53 ✓

54, 55, 56 (see full report page 47)

57 ✓

58 (see full report page 47)

59 ✓

60 ✓

61 ✓

Wagon
disagree
see OK
Members
disagree
in exception
OK

62 1. Section IX, 1, b, (1) (c) *Page 51*

That as a matter of doctrine "black" airdrops of agents into denied areas be used only as a last resort as a means of entry, and that W/T be used only for priority communications such as early warning, compromise, etc.

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63 j. Section IX, 1, b, (1) (e) *Page 51*

That DOB be represented in the early planning of operations in order that it may be better able to tailor the training to the specific requirements of the mission.

OK
c/sr

64 That DOB have full and complete access to all information concerning agents accepted for training with the responsibility resting upon the branch to supply PB's, prior assessments, etc.

OK

65 k. Section IX, 1, b (1) (f) *Page 51*

That an administrative plan be approved delegating sufficient authority to DOB to accomplish its mission, while at the same time maintaining full accountability with various elements of the Agency for action taken. Grade B station status would appear substantially appropriate for this purpose. (See also Administrative Section and related recommendations.)

OK

66-72 1. Section IX, 2, a, (1) *Page 52*

73 That DOB and Training Division combine their separate efforts in the survival fields. Personnel assigned to DOB should not independently embark on preparation of special manuals, training materials, etc., without prior determination from the Training Division as to the availability of prepared material.

OK

74 m. Section IX, 2, b, (1) and (2) *Pages 53, 54 & 55*

75 1. That daily logs be kept at the safehouses carefully recording the happenings of the day, arrivals, departures, phone calls, etc.

OK

76 2. That weekly progress reports be submitted promptly and in detail summarizing the significant happenings of the week.

OK

77 3. That a careful formal record be kept of all training pseudonyms.

4. That all of the above records be prepared in triplicate and distributed as follows:

- Security Officer, DOB
- Appropriate Branch case officer
- Office of Operations, DOB

Approved by
1/1/52

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78 5. That upon completion of training cycle, the above records of DOB be forwarded to the appropriate SR branch and there destroyed after a determination that the case file is complete. *6 months to 1 year*

79 6. That agents irrespective of determination of final mission be under contract during training with clear provisions re benefits and disposal if agent found unsatisfactory during training period, bonuses, gratuities, etc.

n. Section II, 3 *Page 57*

80 That no case officer pool be established since this ostensibly amounts to stockpiling personnel. (See recommendations against proposed T/O.)

o. Section II, 6 *Page 72*

81 That the Tradecrafts Section of DOB which has been literally operating in a vacuum as regards source material for training be included in the distribution of all material originating with the Support Section of SR which in any way would contribute to more efficient briefing of REDSOX agents. *J/SK*

82 That the Tradecraft Section, through the Support Section of SR and directly through liaison with the Training Division, and RCM/OIS, and other elements of the Agency develop other sources for source material for training. *disagree*

p. Section II, 7 *Page 74*

83 That officers of the Fieldcrafts Section be present during all the final stages of preparation of an agent or team for dispatch.

84 That the technical recommendations of these specialized officers as to type of equipment, weight of equipment to be saddled on agents, be considered final in the absence of overriding considerations, and not be overruled willy-nilly by the branch case officers. *disagree*

85 That SR through its various branches attempt to keep the Tradecrafts Section informed of experience gained on these subjects from field operations. *disagree*

q. Section II, 8 *Page 77*

86 That all reports prepared by Commo personnel be prepared in sufficient copies to afford distribution to DOB and to the appropriate branch of SR for inclusion in the agent's master file. There should be no exception to this procedure. *ck*
C/SR

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q. Section IX, 8 (Continued)

87 That Commo trainers expand their "remarks" on their monthly and final training reports to include general observations on the agent, to be given such weight as deemed appropriate by the senior case officer.

88 That where the physical assets permit, a Commo training area be established in the safehouse and retained exclusively for that purpose.

89 That DOB, at the conclusion of each training cycle make a memorandum on the Commo trainer concerning his efficiency and adaptability to perform this type of work, which should be forwarded through SE to Commo for use in the preparation of the annual efficiency report on the employee.

90 That on-the-air W/T training be given all agents as an integral part of their preparation for dispatch.

91 That Chief, Training Branch, Commo be held responsible for full utilization of Commo personnel.

92 That on the completion of a training cycle, Commo records be forwarded to Headquarters, those from the Commo Section to Commo, and those from DOB to the appropriate branch of SK.

r. Section II, 9, (b), 2. Pages 83 + 84

93 That Chief, DOB, be held responsible for a more efficient use of personnel rectifying such practices as are described in this section.

s. Section IX, 9, (c), 4. Pages 85 + 86

see 66-72 above That in consideration of the proposed administrative plan, the provisions of this paragraph be taken into consideration, and in the absence of overriding considerations be incorporated into the final draft.

t. Section IX, 10, i., j., and k. Page 91

94 That the Liaison Section be the Headquarters point of entry for visitors from DOB and the point of exit for visits by Headquarters personnel to DOB and that a complete log be kept of this exchange of visitors. There should be no exceptions to this procedure.

95 That a request from DOB to the Liaison Section for services be in writing when time permits, and be confirmed in writing when made orally and that answers to these requests be submitted by the Liaison Section in writing or confirmed in writing.

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