

1. Preface: There can be absolutely no doubt about the necessity of establishing assessment and training facilities for Redbird agent personnel in the United States for despatch by field bases. The reasons for this are well known and, I believe, accepted by all FDS staff personnel. There are, however, certain concepts involved in the implementation of the project as outlined in the paper presented this morning which might well be discussed prior to the transmittal of this project to concerned agencies.

2. Objectives:

a. While in accord with the basis objectives as outlined, it is still necessary to determine what type Redbird agent we intend training in the facility as presently contemplated. Will they be:

yes {

(1) relatively <sup>safe, low</sup> high or medium level personnel whose ultimate objective will be the performance of resident functions, either in a support or active intelligence collection role, thus requiring legalization;

or, (2) semi-tactical, tourist types (albeit with w/t) on hit and run missions where visual observation will be of primary concern and long residence within target area is of secondary importance;

no {

or, (3) OPC type sabotage, guerilla or other covert personnel who are intended to function in groups?

and try - some part  
want - some part

b. It is also necessary to make allowances for the phasing of this facility into an active wartime situation. The question then is, do we now want to throw all our personnel eggs into one or both of these two types of espionage activity. One type which will be required in wartime is:

take stage B  
formation

(1) OSO Team (resembling OSS teams) attached to Army Group or similar unit which recruits short term agents from corps PW cages and runs them thru small group training for short range tactical missions in the Soviet rear but well within the theater of operations.

develop (cl) bases in NA,  
2nd and 3rd units

The second type facility is:

*late stage*

(2) Training Facility in ZI which can further screen PsW or deserters already selected in theaters of operations and then train them on a more sophisticated level for resident work deep in the interior to expand profitable operations already begun by similarly qualified agents trained and infiltrated by OSO in peacetime.

3. If it can be assumed that OSO during peacetime intends to channel its Redbird potential into the training of selected, relatively high level (not in terms of the position they held in the Union, but in terms of their capacities and potential as residents) and that even during wartime we will not entirely ignore this level agent, then it is felt that mass training (group or school training) has serious disadvantages, both for the immediate future and in general.

*4/4*

a. Security: In this case "security" means those factors which would lead to the apprehension of an agent within the USSR as a result of compromise while in training. Physical security, i.e. protection from bodily harm, etc. is not involved here. Such compromise would evolve from:

(1) Introduction by KRU of a penetration agent into the channel which leads to the training center either as defectors or DP's recruited in the US. There is no known way to keep these people from talking about their personal lives and problems. Hence, in addition to physical description, the Soviet agent would gather material which would eventually go into legends since it is always necessary to some degree to incorporate real life into legends.

*① Tech. assess ment  
② agents' self defense*

(2) Recruitment, on an unwitting basis, of non-CIA personnel assigned to Training Center by the Soviets. Difficult but not impossible.

*in CIA personnel would  
on their own*

b. Disaffection and Morale Problems:

(1) Russians cannot be expected to live together over a three month's

*management +  
structure*

period and keep their mouths shut. Even with no involvement by the KRU, one disaffected apele can spoil the group.

(2) Exposure to the trainees of large numbers of Slavic contract employees, even though they are US citizens or applicants for naturalization, will multiply morale problems because even the Slavs with some American veneer can't get along without battling, and dissention in the instructor's ranks soon rubs off on the students. You know how fast the "smart boys" among the students would try to play off one instructor or administration officer against another.

*included in summary*

*same of 2 + oppo. 5  
Com me  
documental m  
physical + personal*

not 21

c. Operational Problems:

(1) Mass training would not relieve our personnel load where the strain is greatest, i.e. in trained, Redbird, linguist case officers capable of planning and controlling agent projects. This center would save on the utilization of service and support personnel who are easier to recruit and of whom less is demanded.

*in field*

(2) Under mass training conditions it is impossible to permit early area orientation and target briefing. As now conceived, agents would receive 4 - 6 months training in basic subjects at the center and then receive briefing, orientation, etc. at the field station. However, it is this latter activity which forms, along with ~~perhaps~~ w/t training, the biggest part of the training load. This is true because agents are seldom sent into an area in which ~~they~~ recently resided. On the contrary, we select a new area and for this ~~the~~ agent needs area briefing. Recruits of the 1940-1946 DP type will require not only intensive area briefing to acquaint them with physical changes but extensive briefing on overall changes in politico-sociological conditions and attitudes. If we adhere to the center concept we still do not take

*no. 6. done in field center  
selection stage*

*- basic*

the load off the field, because all <sup>area</sup> training and briefing would still be done there.

(3) Documentation and Legend: If we assume a four months training cycle, then at the end of it we are to have from 15 to 30 trainees on their way to the field where they will receive their first inkling of what they are to do and where they are going (this in itself is a big problem. The <sup>uof =</sup>EXOGENOUS case is an example ). Also the case officers in the field begin for the first time discussing documentation and legend. Then there will come to OAD within the space of one month the sum of the all these requests. Even if none require reproduction, the tax on preparation facilities will be terrific. To have to keep the agent inactive at the field station from which he is to be despatched while awaiting documentation is unwise and places a  <sup>SERIOUS</sup> strain on local facilities. Under the center concept it would be impossible for case officers to begin working with the agent on his cover as soon as he enters training, thus spreading OAD's work out over a period of four months, or the duration of the training cycle.

*prob. would not be 2!*

(4) W/T: For simple W/T training, most of the work is done by the agent on his own, using the practice key and tape. One visit per day by the instructor will permit satisfactory progress. If the agent is to be trained in radio theory and set construction, then individual training is almost a must.

4. Recommendations: In order to carry out a program such as that outlined in paragraph 3 above, it is recommended that , a training facility be established as follows:

a. Headquarters Base: This would continue to be L Bldg,  Here would be located:

- (1) files
- (2) case officers, area officers (residence in the Wash. area)
- (3) Ops research support
- (4) documentation and special equipment
- (5) commo supply and training control center

This base would remain static, even in the event of war.

b. Area "X": To include an assessment unit and facilities for training in infiltration and exfiltration techniques. It would be a functioning air force, naval or army training base (with air activity) of relatively low security interest, i.e. training or reception center with no classified equipment or activity visible.

The assessment center and training facilities to be covered as follows:

- (1) CO and S-2 (A-2) of installation informed of our action;
- (2) assessment unit equipped to handle a maximum of 8-12 persons for screening at one end of base under cover of stockade or brig guarded by normal guards on reservation. Maximum time for holding and assessment is 30 days in an isolation room or apartment.
- (3) Training facilities: jump training using normal facilities of station, a sector of the Soviet frontier could be made part of obstacle course, etc. All similar facilities to be utilized on a scheduled basis so that agent personnel never see more than fleeting glimpses of other trainees and never engage in conversation. Uniforms appropriate to the installation will be worn by agents while there for training. US personnel normally attached to base might suspect something was going on but since the whole show will never be there at one time, and since they will not be involved but will have other duties, security and just plain "gossip" risks will be reduced.
- (4) Staff and Contract agent training personnel: One staff employee

assigned to the facility with a direct pipeline to the CO and S-2 (A-2) and a small staff of contract employees and staff officers could handle the assessment and training. Personnel could live on or off the reservation depending on marital status and personal desires. A duty system would be set up at the assessment center.

b. Training Cluster: Procure on rental basis for easier turnover if transfer for security reasons required, detached, residence type houses within one hour's drive of Wash. and two hours drive of Area "X". Recruit, train and assign one contract employee ("10-2" applicant, former DP, retired military personnel, etc.) to each house. Set up minimum W/T training equipment, i.e. practice key and tape. Assign one case officer to every two agents (senior officer could handle three). [Each of the four area desks initially and the division support section would be available to support each project.] Commo would provide one instructor per two to four agents, depending on the level and extent of competence desired. With a four month's course, ten to twelve students per course and three cycles per year, an extremely large number of capable agents could be delivered to the field for despatch already documented and briefed, except for last minute details, thus leaving field case officers free for handling of a maximum amount of actual agent traffic and ~~mission~~ to cope with initial assessment of defectors in the area, etc.

5. Advantages of recommended system:

✓ a. Would provide maximum elasticity in terms of facilities tied up. For example, if we have a capability of recruiting eight agents for a training cycle, we have only 8 houses. There will never be a "white elephant" on our hands, which can suddenly be noticed by OFC, or other agencies, as a good place for intensive training of sabotage teams, etc.

b. Would enable us to shift the most sensitive aspect of the facility,

i.e. the actual houses in which the agents are trained (and on a much less frequent basis even Area X could be changed providing the new defense program gives impetus to the reopening of military installations in the area), such shifting would provide a less readily identifiable target for Soviet penetration.

c. Would lessen the load on the field and enable Wash. to build up an installation where junior case officers would be trained under close supervision.

d. Would provide better control of each agent through having a limited number (actually three or four at most) of persons involved in his training, *at least* one of whom would be a staff officer of FDS.

e. Would enable us to speed up or slow down, raise or lower the rate and level of instruction. This will be a problem if we have agent trainees of different backgrounds in training for varied tasks.

f. In the event that this same type facility could continue functioning on the same basis, while at the same time providing trained personnel (staff and contract), for activation of either teams to be attached to theaters of operations, or a second training facility for mass training along OPC, tactical agent lines.