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TO: Chief, FDS

FROM: []

SUBJECT: Plan Redcap

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Implementation:

1. On the basis of the experiences of installations such as ECIC, the US Detailed Interrogation Center in Austria, the Unternehmen Zeppelin training camps, etc., and on the basis of our knowledge of the working methods of the Sov. Int. Service, I do not believe that an agent training compound can be made secure.

a. As soon as any closed compound is established - no matter what the cover or the area - it is bound to attract attention. ~~Any-~~ This attention will in large part take the form of questions put to the guards, cooks, electricians, etc., who will ultimately - wittingly or unwittingly - reveal the activities of the personnel in the compound and the fact that "Russian-speakers" are undergoing some kind of training.

b. In view of the fact that technical training involving equipment such as radio sets and probably a "jump" tower ~~will be~~ will take place daily, it will not be long before the housekeeping personnel and guards become aware of the fact that they are not in an interrogation center, and this knowledge will inevitably become the knowledge of persons in the surrounding communities. In short, despite any attempts to maintain interrogation or other cover, persons in the towns nearest the compound will learn that Russian-speakers are undergoing training. The experiences of ECIC, Camp Ritchie, Camp Dietrich, and USDIC/Austria are sufficient to make it clear that this will happen.

c. Our first assumption, then, must be that persons not connected with this program will learn of the existence of ~~TOP SECRET~~

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"a secret camp" with Russian-speakers who are being trained, and the corollary to this assumption is that any such installation will become the target of Soviet Intelligence.*

d. As soon- as any large-scale recruitment program is initiated, it will unquestionably become known to Sov. Int. In Germany and Austria, the DP camps are so well covered ~~that~~ by the Soviets that their local informants will soon be reporting - as a minimum - that an American agency is making offers to selected DP's who are ex-residents of the USSR. In the U.S., the news that U.S. Intelligence is interviewing selected DP's and that several of them ~~are~~ soon thereafter leave their families and places of residence for an unknown destination will travel the length and breadth of the grapevine. That some kind of recruitment program, regardless of its ultimate purpose, is being conducted will sooner or later be known to Soviet Intelligence. This in itself will not be dangerous to our agent-training effort, but this combined with the fact that "a secret installation with Russian-speakers" has been established near Washington or elsewhere will add up in the Soviet CE mind to one thing: the recruitment and training of agents for use against the USSR, with the installation at which it is suspected that this training is taking place becoming an immediate, high-priority target to determine (1) the identities and backgrounds of the trainees, (2) the identities and backgrounds of the instructors, (3) what training is given, and (4) what the ~~dispatch~~ ^{operations} plans are for the agents.

* Even if interrogation cover is maintained, it will at least become known that "Russians" are being interrogated, and this fact will make the center no less a penetration target. I say this on the basis of statements made to me by several Sov. Int. defectors to the effect that Sov. Int. authorities assume that any Russian sent to an interrogation center is a potential agent against the USSR. ~~One~~ One of the principal reasons

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e. Attempts at penetration will take two forms: (1) the collection of information from the housekeeping personnel as witting or unwitting informants and (2) the use of double agents. With regard to (1), three years at ECIC were enough to convince me that piece by piece ~~the-~~ it will not be difficult to learn from cooks, electricians, guards, librarians, etc., who is in the installation and what is ~~going~~ going on there. It may prove difficult to learn the true identities, ~~of-the~~ backgrounds, and dialects of the trainees in this way, but detailed descriptions, if not pictures, of the trainees would not be difficult to obtain. It would certainly pose no great problem to find out what kind of training is being given. At the very least, we must allow for a Soviet effort to gain ^{such} information by the use of the housekeepers as unwitting informants. Admittedly, if the Soviets obtain the detailed descriptions of the trainees, this will not jeopardize the operations planned for them. It will, however, serve to confirm information obtained through (2) above - double agents. (That both types of penetration operations are used by the Soviets, one to confirm the results of the other, can be documented by two of the outstanding ECIC cases of 1947.)

The

f. Since the Soviet use of double agents to penetrate the proposed training center will represent the major Soviet effort

for Sov. Int. interest in ECIC is the inability of the Soviets to believe that an installation engaged in interrogating defectors is not also engaged in training selected defectors as agents to operate against the USSR in one way or another. There is no reason to believe that Soviet assumptions with regard to an interrogation center in the U.S. would be any different.

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to find out what we are up to, let us follow the course of such a double agent to determine what he could learn and whether what he learns could seriously impair our operations: First, we must expect that for ~~penetration-of-a-single~~, a target such as a training center the Soviets will select a high-level agent who will be given the most thorough training and whose cover story will be flawless. This agent, Ivan, will then desert to Germany, Iran, or Turkey, where he will be subjected to interrogation. (I think it is safe to assume that the Soviets know that such deserters are eventually interrogated by Americans.) Ivan will learn the ability of the interrogators in the country to which he will desert and will learn of the use of technical interrogation aids. (This information, once reported to Ivan's superiors, will certainly guide them in training future double agents to meet our interrogation procedures.) Having successfully passed the CE interrogation - and at this ~~point~~ juncture I should like to make the point that, ~~in~~ technical aids or no, there will be double agents who will be accepted as genuine deserters - Ivan will be evacuated to the U.S., since he has been assessed as a high-level individual with agent capabilities. Once in the U.S., he will be brought ^{To} the training installation. Another interrogation will probably produce the same results as the first one, and Ivan will be accepted as an agent trainee. Up to this point he has learned the entire procedure for interrogating, assessing, and recruiting agent trainees, all very useful to the Soviets in preparing other double agents so that they will be recruited by US Intelligence. Thus far, we have unwittingly recruited a double agent, but, by virtue of the fact that he has been

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handled on an "isolated" basis, we have not exposed any other agents to him. However, from the moment when he enters a compound-type training installation the risk increases considerably, and I believe beyond the point of a calculated risk. Over a period of weeks or months in the training installation he will have many a bull session with other trainees, since it will be impossible to keep the trainees apart, ~~and at~~ During the course of such sessions, he will learn the backgrounds, dialects, and precise physical descriptions of other trainees. Even though there may be no training in the compound in cover or in ^{intended} operations areas, a well-trained Soviet agent would be able to draw conclusions ^{from an} ~~as to what an~~ individual's background as to ^{his} ~~what~~ cover could be or probably would be, and the dialect (s) spoken by a trainee would provide clues as to where he might be sent. If Ivan, for example, learns that two trainees agents being trained together (and in the case of teams, they will have to be trained together) speak a Kazakh dialect, have never been in another part of the USSR but Kazakh SSR, and have certain vocations, he could, after having been dispatched, report this information to his superiors and add a detailed description of the two men on the team. Soviet CE officers would, at the least, alert MGB stations in Kazakh SSR, and could probably draw some conclusions as to where these agents would go, since there are only certain areas in Kazakh SSR in which we would have an intelligence interest. I do not consider this far-fetched. Although we ^{would not necessarily} ~~might not~~ be training Kazakh-speaking agents for a mission to their own area in the USSR, we might do this, and their chances of success would be considerably decreased by Ivan.

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g. Aside from the security considerations, I foresee two factors working against the successful operation of a center of the type proposed: (1) Inevitably in keeping a group of Russians (used in the broadest sense) together, intrigues, jealousies, and suspicions will make themselves noticeable. The differences between motivations for having left the motherland and between personal ambitions will provide the bases for such intrigues and accusations. Cliques will in all probability grow up, and a good part of case officer effort will be expended in trying to find what is going on in the minds of the trainees and in trying to ~~remedy~~ solve the problems posed by the many accusations that will be registered. (2) I do not believe that agents can be mass-produced. The individual handling through which loyalties can be developed and psychological assessments made will be lacking, and no agent will have the feeling that he personally has been selected for a mission of trust and importance. Such a feeling can contribute much to an agent's success.

2. Instead of a compound-type training establishment, I propose a series of safe houses for individual training (not to exclude team training where two or more agents are to be dispatched together). This may require more training personnel + *see. News* than would be required by a compound, but the results would be more satisfactory and the security risks would be decreased to an irreducible minimum. A double agent would have no opportunity to learn anything about other agents. The training would not have to be confined to technical training, but could safely include cover and documentation, map study of operations areas, briefing on

targets, city briefs, etc. Loyalties could more easily be cultivated on a personal case of icer-agent relationship. The cost would not be prohibitive, since the experiences of ECIC and Camp Ritchie have shown that any construction or remodeling of a center far exceed original estimates, whereas individual safe houses would require the money for rent and furnishings only.

Admittedly, there might be greater problems in keeping the agents happy during the evening hours, but these are problems which have been met and solved in the field - there is no reason why they cannot be solved here. There would be no establishment to attract attention and no specific target for Soviet penetration. We would, by virtue of the more complete training given in safe houses, be able to lift the burden from the field - and this is one of the purposes of establishing training facilities in the US.

myr *Altho I haven't had an opportunity to study the Redcap plan carefully, I fully agree with the objectives stated here. I do not believe it possible to train any minority group with Great Russians as these people are not only anti-Communist but anti-Russian.*

I feel the security factor is extremely important as pointed out []