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22 July 1952

Relinquish to U.S. for Acad.

In a conference between [ ] the following subjects were discussed and conclusions drawn:

1. NTS shall remain as a school in Germany. It is not possible for DB to make arrangements for the only presently acceptable instructor to the group on the grounds of poor physical condition. His entry into the United States would be impossible. By October 15 it will be known what teams and what areas these people will be set up for.

2. Latvian - All future recruitment will be carried on in the United States. AECOB will return to the United States. It consists of two Latvian trainees. Available for the training are [ ] and CAMBERA 1 and CAMBERA 2.

3. Lithuanian - Will be carried on as a joint operation with the British, planned for Spring 1953.

4. Estonians - There are five candidates available who are undergoing assessment. [ ] is considered the most capable man **as** indigenous training instructor for this group.

5. Aerodynamic - After the dispatch of the present Aerodynamic-Carthage group now in training, holdovers must be retained at MOB pending receipt of information from inside desiring reinforcement for any of the Aerodynamic groups within the Ukraine. This in essence means that the holdovers from the Carthage Project will not be available for shipment to DB until October. [ ] presently Chief of the Ukrainian Section here in MOB, is slated to return to Washington in December. At that time it is estimated that he will take over the job as Desk Officer at Headquarters. [ ] presently the Senior Case Officer of the

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Carthage Project, will be sent to the States in October to continue in this capacity with future Aerodynamic groups. It is our understanding that [ ] and [ ] are presently in Washington riding the desks on the Ukrainian projects. In regard to the question of recruitment, it is estimated here that [ ] might very well handle follow-ups on potential agent candidates in ~~US~~. Cassowary 4 is designated as Ops. representative for this group in the States.

6. In regard to the future of the AEQUOR-type of project within the Byelorussian framework, [ ] at the present time is handling the AEQUOR II Project and will be made available to escort back to the States any future AEQUOR recruits and also to act as Case Officer for AEQUOR III Project in the States. If, however, no candidates are available for the AEQUOR III Project arrangements should be made in Washington to start recruitment in the United States to obtain bodies for the AEQUOR Project. ~~It is anticipated here that Ed Galloway~~ An examination here of the available United States personnel leads to the conclusion that [ ] would be the Desk Officer for this project, and due to the fact that [ ] is not fluent in Russian, the addition of an individual like [ ] or similar person would strengthen this project appreciably.

7. In planning for any AESOP-type operation similar to the AESOP-CASINO Project dispatched last May, the following items come up for consideration:

- a. All singleton type agent personnel slated to be dispatched from Japan will be trained at the DB.
- b. All singleton type agent personnel slated for dispatch from

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Germany will be trained in Germany.

c. The above two points pertain if a large pool of singleton types are recruited (10 or more).

d. If this large pool is non-existent, then of necessity the training of singletons would be split between DB and CSOB. ~~XXXXXX~~

e. On the other hand, if only a small pool of such type personnel exists and if it is desired to dispatch these individuals from Japan, then some decision must be reached as to where these groups will be trained. There is available in CSOB, [ ] an individual who was utilized as an Assistant Case Officer within the CASINO Project, who not only is fluent in Russian, but who has developed a certain amount of experience from exposure to a CASINO-type operation. This individual will be transferred to DB for the AESOP type operation.

8. In regard to the consultants, or indigenous-type instructors, the following individuals will be made available to DB:

a. CALIDO and family (wife and two children) ✓

b. CARGO and family (wife and mother-in-law) ✓

c. CAMPEACHY and family (wife and child). ✓

9. U.S. Training Personnel ✓

[ ] the individual who has done all the airborne training at CSOB/K and who will also dispatch the groups now in training, will be made available to DB for utilization in a similar capacity there.

[ ] will be released only after he has thoroughly briefed his successor here.

[ ] will also be made available to DB soonest. [ ] has handled all photography requirements at CSOB/K and at CSOB, along

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lines of passport pictures, document photography, agent training photography.

This individual is also capable of handling assistance in any P/T program or in any small arms weapons training.

[ ] presently on TDY in Washington, will be put on PCS to Washington.

[ ] also on TDY to Washington, will be put on PCS orders to Washington.

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Subject of Conference between CSCE and DE

I. A. To be taken up later

B. Dispatches are worked out through Wiesbaden by German Mission Air Unit commanded by Col. Petty. DZs, etc. are coordinated with the Air Unit.

C. Airborne training will continue for group training units active in Germany. If possible airborne training will be used as part of the assessment program of new candidates.

II. A, B., C., and D See attached dispatch

E. and F See attached dispatch

G. It is the belief and solid opinion of CSCE Senior Officers that S and W facilities are safest and should be utilized for all shipments. It has been laid on with local S and W representatives to carry out such shipments with a minimum of "have to know personnel".

H. Reporting Officer will make contacts with MATS to further discuss priorities and procedures of travel to the United States. Now it is the opinion of CSCE Senior Officers that MATS travel is not as secure as S and W. It is my belief that these procedures should be established and maintained with MAT. It is hoped that a conference with MAT officials will be arranged in the next few days.

III. A. 1. Safehouses will continue to be maintained for training assessments, pre-dispatches and turnabouts.

2. Warehouses will not be maintained except as minor supply facilities in the training section.

3. The packing of parachutes can and will be done by an airborne GI company. Packing of operational equipment will be done insofar

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as practical wherever the training unit receives its final staging of training.

B. 1. Safehouses are available in the United States.  
2. A supply room is established in the headquarters of DB.  
3. The training areas are provided as needed in Idaho, New Hampshire, Maine, and locally.

4. Parachute packing is accomplished under the supervision of Major McDowell, head of the Airborne Section.

C. Transfer of property and operational equipment will be done in the proper fashion in the future and the reporting officer will carry along some transfer memoranda with him.

D. Certain operational items will be procured in Germany, however final packing of operational equipment prior to dispatch should be done at the point of final training stage.

IV. See attached list

V. Operational Problems

A. The following is a list of projects which will be transferred to DB if agreed to by employees: Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and AESOP singleton program.

B. Technical difficulties currently being encountered in Germany will remain as topics for discussion during the REDSOX meeting at Headquarters in October.

C. -----

6. Security Problems

a. Agents drink too much on recreational trips and are picked up by police.

b. Agents are inclined to talk too much while carrying

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- on recreational activities. Case officers should always be present to prevent breaches of security.
- c. Agents were allowed to go home on weekends, which is a breach of the principle of twenty-four-hour coverage.

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CALCROSO (TIBERTUS 1) is on a six-month probational period and will remain in CSOB.

Additions to be considered will be schooling for the children of CALLIDO and CAMPEACHY.

On both the AERODYNAMIC and Byelorussian projects CSOB will continue to train until covert clearances are obtained.

See what can be done about expediting full clearances on CARGO and CAMPEACHY.

We will have same facilities as field station overseas.

Check into overtime with Case Officers in United States.

Teams can not be mixed, especially those of different origins and philosophy.

For the NTS school there will be eight W/T men available.

Junior case officers should be utilized from any available source from the Headquarters in Washington. It is believed that personnel within the Headquarters would be more efficiently utilized if they would put more in the operational end.

What about language courses for three people at DET-R.

Reaction of [ ] and [ ] on the singleton program. In answer to all this should be forthcoming in ten days.

- [ ] - singletons
- [ ] - photography, weapons and P/T - no language - some German.

CALLIDO - tradecraft and Sovietization

CAMPEACHY - Survival (use Kerwin along with CAMPEACHY).

CARGO - Commo - practical aspects, set up sets, aeriels, operate set in covert fashion, Theory. Speaks good English. Check on answer to CARGO contract.



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15 July 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: CSOB and DB

FROM: Chief, SR/SO

SUBJECT: Agenda for Conferences between Representatives of CSOB and DB

1. Chief, SR/DB will proceed to Munich, Germany, on or about 23 July 1952, for the purpose of conferring with senior officers of CSOB.

2. Annex "A" is a proposed agenda for the conferences mentioned above.

3. Minutes of the conferences will be kept, and a minimum of three copies will be made available to Chief, SR/DB for use of DB Staff Officers.

[ ]

COB-1-1-2

COB-1

DB-1-chron-2

AE ACHE-2

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ANNEX "A"  
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**SUBJECT: Agenda for Conferences between CSOB and DB**

**1. Linison with Air Force**

a. MATS priorities for "Special Procedure" entry passengers flying to the U.S.

b. Increased assistance on dispatch and target data. (It is not clear in Washington where our point of contact is for operational purposes.)

c. What airborne training should continue in Germany. What airborne training of agents should be done in the U.S.

**2. Official Papers Required for Travel between Germany and U.S.**

a. Paper work necessary to leave Germany by MATS.

b. What is the procedure for procuring AGO cards in Germany (EUCOM).

c. Determine the regulations concerning passports when traveling by MATS.

d. Determine the possibilities and advisability of by-passing passport regulations.

e. Discuss memo prepared by SR/DB on "Special Procedure" entry. (Copies attached).

f. Explain why commercial air travel is undesirable. (Passports are required - to get waivers attracts undue attention).

g. Discuss Seaboard and Western facilities and limitations.

h. Brief all concerned on DB efforts to improve our priorities on MATS. Mention our discussions with Colonel McNeiss.

**3. Logistical Problems**

a. What facilities are to be maintained in Germany?

1. Safehouses (for what purposes)
2. Warehouses
3. Parachute packing
4. Packing of Operational Equipment

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b. What facilities are to be developed in the U.S.:

1. Safehouses
2. Warehouses - operational
3. Training areas
4. Parachute packing

c. Notice of transfer of property and operational equipment should be sent to SR/DB at the time case officer and agents enter the United States with the equipment. It is suspected that some equipment is being transferred from Headquarters to the Field and from the Field to Headquarters without proper accounting for property.

d. It is understood that certain operational equipment and supplies are to be procured in Germany. In most cases final packing of operational equipment prior to dispatch will be done in the field.

4. Personnel Problems

a. In each case list the following: name, cryptonym, pseudonym.

Grade (or pay)

Duty assignment

General efficiency

General comments which will help DB to use the individual to maximum efficiency.

- b. Staff employees who will be transferred to DB.
- c. Staff employees who will be remaining in Germany.
- d. Contract agents who will be transferred to DB.
- e. Contract agents who will be retained in Germany.
- f. Discuss SR/DB T/O.

5. Operational Problems

a. List all projects currently underway which will be transferred to DB.

b. Discuss technical difficulties currently being encountered in Germany:

1. Target data
2. Dispatch
3. Communications
4. Operational documentation
5. Training materials

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c. CSOB views on what type of training and safehouse facilities they will continue to need for future operations, for holding purposes prior to dispatch, and for brief training of turn-around agents of opportunity. CSOB views on how they intend to cover such facilities.

6. Security Problems

- a. Safehouses
- b. Training sites
- c. Contract agents (instructors)
- d. Recreation.

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