

20 October 1983
0500 hours

Additional Talking Points on Grenada (Provided by the OPSCTR)

Prime Minister Bishop and three of his cabinet ministers reportedly are dead.

- Radio Free Grenada last night announced that Bishop and ministers Whitman, Bain, and Creft had died during firing at Fort Rupert.
- Embassy Bridgetown reports it is not clear if Bishop was even taken to the hospital.

A Revolutionary Military Council has been formed.

- Radio Free Grenada last night carried an announcement by Armed Forces Commander Austin stating the formation of a 16-man Revolutionary Military Council, chaired by Austin.
- The Council has full legislative and executive powers, and has dissolved the People's Revolutionary Government and dismissed all members of the present cabinet.
- Austin said all private and foreign property "will be guaranteed," and warned foreign governments not to interfere.

Curfew is in effect.

- Four-day, 24-hour curfew declared by the Council will last until 1800 on 24 October.
- Curfew violators will be shot on sight.
- Essential service workers will receive special passes and transportation to and from work.

Cuban connection is alleged, but unconfirmed.

- [redacted] arms shipments for Coard's forces are being unloaded from boats at night and are believed to have Cuban sponsorship.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

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(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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[Redacted]

(b)(1)

on Saturday night shipments of arms--amount and type unknown--were being loaded off a Cuban vessel in St. Georges Harbor onto a small boat and transported into Grenada.

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[Redacted]

(b)(1)

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[Redacted]

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

SECRET

(b)(3)

20 October 1983

Situation in Grenada

1. We are dealing with two different situations in Grenada, the first is the safety of US citizens, and the second a political question of whether we can take steps to improve the government of Grenada or whether, on the other hand, the Cubans themselves might take their steps to keep in power a government inimical to us.

2. Direct intervention by US military forces--aside from the temptation to use it as a "signal" to the Soviets, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, and so on--is undesirable in itself and should only be started if we are sure US citizens are in danger and it is clear that no other means of saving them is possible. Before we consider intervening directly, we should try simultaneously

- To continue to try to get a US party in with reliable communication under the UK High Commissioner's protection, to make representations on behalf of US citizens with the Grenadian authorities, to get in touch with the St. George's Medical School and other concentrations of US citizens.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

SECRET

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

-- Encourage the dispatch of [Redacted] token military forces from
Caribbean nations.

(b)(1)

-- [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. Our main discomfort so far is our lack of information on either the state of our citizens or what is happening politically. It would be rash to move US forces without having a clear idea of what could be gained politically or that our citizens are in such peril that this is our only choice.

4. We have no idea of what the Cubans are doing, which so far has encouraged loose hypothesizing, but we cannot ignore the possibility that they might move to guarantee that the situation can be turned to their advantage. Putting in a friendly foreign presence other than our own--the British which has a legal leg to stand on--would keep the Cubans from intervening.

5. These steps are designed to safeguard our interests until we can learn what is happening. Then we can see what further steps may be necessary in a clear emergency threatening to either our citizens or our interests, or what is possible to achieve politically.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

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