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26 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/3

FROM: SR3/W2B

Subject: Contact Report - Meeting with GAMBISTA 4

1. On 19 May 1953, the undersigned met with GAMBISTA 4, at the latter's request, for a conference which lasted four and one-half hours. The meeting took place in Washington, D.C. The conversations were conducted mainly in French; during the last few minutes there was a switch to a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian.

2. GAMBISTA 4's first questions, after greetings were exchanged between himself and the undersigned, were in regard to [ ] and [ ]. The undersigned explained that they were no longer in Washington and that their duties had been assumed by the undersigned.

3. During the taxi ride to a local restaurant, the undersigned asked GAMBISTA 4 whether he was finding his current visit to the United States profitable. GAMBISTA 4 answered that he had been very busy from the moment of his arrival and that he had spent most of his time in conferences with personalities connected with the American Committee of Liberation. These discussions were one of the reasons for his trip to the United States at this time; the other being, of course, internal EER matters. GAMBISTA 4 then offered to recount the progress of his talks if the undersigned was interested. The undersigned answered that although such matters were of no official concern to him, he was personally curious about developments in the political field.

4. GAMBISTA 4 stated that he was very optimistic regarding the possibility of obtaining participation of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR in the activities of ANCONLIB. Admiral STEVENS, during his recent visit to Paris, set forth three points on the basis of which the Nationalities should reconsider their earlier refusals to join the Coordination Committee. The three points are, in effect, (1) the agreement of non-Russian peoples to participate in a joint anti-Bolshevik front with the Great Russians, (2) each participating member or group would have the right to propagate its own aims and ideals, but on a

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reasonable and unpassionate basis; (3) no group (Great Russian or non-Russian) would be allowed to impose its will upon another. The non-Russian nationalities (seven) block, which had been formed at Paris last month, had delegated to CAMBISTA 4 authority to conduct further discussions with AMCOHLIB in New York since, in the opinion of the various nationalities, the basis (Admiral STEVEN's three points) for active and direct cooperation with AMCOHLIB now exists. CAMBISTA 4 had several discussions with Mr. KUMHOLM of AMCOHLIB and came away with the feeling that there now existed proper understanding of the non-Russian nationalities' problems, and that the attitude toward the nationalities was quite sympathetic with AMCOHLIB. CAMBISTA 4's first meetings with Americans connected with the Committee revealed to him that they were very cool in their behaviour until they learned that he had not come to make further attacks in the name of the nationalities. Moreover, CAMBISTA 4 has talked with NIKOLAEVSKY and KERENSKY who both seem to realize the necessity for making concessions to the non-Russians (points 2 and 3 of STEVEN's proposal) without whom an effective center could not be organized.

CAMBISTA 4 plans to return to Paris around the first of June to attend conferences to be held there with the Russian groups. According to CAMBISTA 4, it is now only a matter of incorporating the principles of STEVEN's three points into the statutes of the Coordinating Committee. From his talks with Mr. KUMHOLM and with NIKOLAEVSKY and KERENSKY, CAMBISTA 4 feels there will be no over-riding objections on the part of the Great Russians with the possible exception of MELGUNOV. There have been indications that the Committee is willing to sacrifice MELGUNOV should the latter show himself to be recalcitrant. When asked what would be done about the so-called "Federalist" groups like BOGATIRCHIK-GULAY, CAMBISTA 4 replied that since the aforementioned was not a serious (seriously thought-out) venture in the first place, AMCOHLIB would be willing to sacrifice it.

To date the Ukrainians in the new non-Russian block are represented by the UBR only, but CAMBISTA 4 feels that even the BANDERA group (he didn't mention the ZP UBR) will be eventually forced to come around and join up with the nationalities.

5. CAMBISTA 4 then stated that after his arrival in New York he had requested to see [ ] to discuss misunderstandings which have arisen in Munich between CAMBISTA 2 and United States representatives. CAMBISTA 4 made reference to the problems which arose when the PA and Cadre School plans disintegrated. He stated that if we were not completely certain of following through with any of our plans, we should not broach such new ideas since disintegration of plans for new projects caused demoralization among the liaison personnel and the candidates after CAMBISTA's attempt to implement these new projects.

The underigned explained that the commitments made by Henrich were made in good faith since it was also the intention of Washington that these projects be realized. Unfortunately, circumstances beyond our control necessitated arresting the implementation of the two projects in question. Underigned expressed (our official agency) regrets that these unfortunate circumstances had arisen and that they were as painful to us as to the GAMBIRIA's. When GAMBIRIA h further hinted at personalty conflicts between his and our representatives in Henrich, the underigned asked him that the present situation was. When he answered that the present relationship was good, the underigned indicated that he understood that GAMBIRIA h had in mind but there was no advantage in rehearsing the past. Since the present set-up was acceptable to all concerned, we should now exert our energies in maintaining it. This was with GAMBIRIA h's approval.

6. GAMBIRIA h then returned to the possibility of establishing the Cadre School. He feels that it is imperative for us to have on hand trained cadres (at least 50 men), specialists in military and political matters, who could be dropped into the homeland in the event of war. He repeated the well-known argument that the Cadre School could also be an excellent recruiting and training mechanism for current operations. Further, he pointed out that unless we started something which would arouse the interest and enthusiasm of the presently activist-minded youth, they would give up hope in another year or two and adjust themselves to their present environments; get married, settle down, and in general would eliminate themselves as potential candidates for future operations.

The underigned stated that the establishment of the Cadre School was dependent in some degree upon the results of the course which has just been conducted in Europe and the United States. Underigned indicated that there existed the rather considerable problems of the location and the cover for the school. GAMBIRIA h stated that if the Cadre School could not be established in the United States, Belgium would then be the best alternate site. The presence of a student-elite in Belgium, plus the excellent contacts which his organization has with the Belgian government, the press and security services make Belgium an excellent choice for the site.

The Belgian student and GAMBIRIA h, who are all located in Louvain, have been befriended by a Benedictine Monk, Don Robert von GAMBIRIAER, who is the Belgian government representative for Belgian student affairs. Don Robert's uncle (and father through adoption) is the president of the Belgian Parliament, a post which he has held for over thirty years. In addition, the GAMBIRIAER family has important connections in

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the Belgian press and the Belgian security services. According to CAMBISTA 4, Dom Robert, who is an idealist and a romanticist, has been captivated by the aims and ideals of the Byelorussian students at Louvain and is willing to go to any lengths to assist them. In the past he has interceded with government agencies when problems affecting Byelorussian students arose.

7. CAMBISTA 4 then asked about the future of the military units (guard companies) which had been considered some time ago. The undersigned stated that very recently our highest government authorities had expressed interest in the formation of national units which might possibly be placed within the NATO framework. However, since the establishment of national units involved political implications, and by extension our allies, the whole affair was extremely complicated. CAMBISTA 4 assented and discreetly censured our allies, Britain in particular. This subject was dropped.

8. CAMBISTA 4 then brought up the matter of [ ] conference with CAMBISTA 10 during the Fall of 1952. At that conference there was some discussion concerning the possibility of arranging a program whereby Byelorussian scholars would be enabled to prepare studies and analyses on the Byelorussian question and approaches to the Byelorussian problem. Although the results of the talks with CAMBISTA 10 were inconclusive, CAMBISTA 10 received the impression that the matter would be raised again on CAMBISTA 4's arrival in the United States, at which time a final decision would be reached. The undersigned declared that he was not completely au courant on this matter, but would look into it and discuss it with CAMBISTA 4 at the next meeting.

9. CAMBISTA 4 then turned to matters dealing with current operations. He eulogized [ ] whom he knew personally, saying what an intelligent, patriotic, and idealistic chap the latter was. He recalled how [ ] begged CAMBISTA 4 to make it possible for him to return to the homeland on a mission, how on his own initiative he trained for the ordeal while still studying in Paris, and how he even went to Spain in an attempt to get support from the Franco government to prepare him for the mission.

CAMBISTA 4 then turned to the team presently in the inside and made mention of the difficulties the team was experiencing, i.e., death of [ ] difficulties of movement, etc. The undersigned then brought up the fact that we had no reinforcements on hand to send in should it be deemed advisable to support the present team personnel-wise. CAMBISTA 4 made some vague statement to the effect that he was not for sending people in

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merely for the sending's sake.

The undersigned pointed out that our agency had as its primary responsibility the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Union and that we were obliged to continue every effort to perform successful operations within the USSR. Since we had established a cooperative venture with the CAMBISTA organization we were desirous of continuing it. Moreover, certain aims of the organization, e.g., the Cadre School and the Study Group, become more likely of realization when our organization can use the lever of current intelligence operations to push through projects based on a long-range principle. Four or five new high-level types, if located for training late this Summer or early Fall, would be a considerable catalyst for the development of other projects which, though in the long run valuable for both the CAMBISTA's and the United States, were not the primary responsibility of our agency. CAMBISTA 4 agreed to the logic of the argument and stated that he would convey these ideas to CAMBISTA 2 upon his return to Europe.

The undersigned then pointed out that there was a possibility that training of agents for current operations might be moved to the United States in the near future; that without taking any action on this matter he and CAMBISTA 2 should consider the implications of such a move as it would affect the CAMBISTA's and be prepared with their recommendations as soon as a decision was reached by us.

10. CAMBISTA 4 stated that discussions with [ ] regarding the census of Byelorussians in the United States revealed that it would be a good idea for us to select some-one from the emigration in the United States to perform liaison duties between AIS and the Byelorussian youth in the United States. CAMBISTA 4 felt that there should be a follow-up on the census in order that the contacts made by [ ] would be kept alive and the census kept current.

[ ] could, if deemed necessary, also act as spotter or recruiter in the United States. CAMBISTA 4 suggested one Michas TULEJKA of New York as the liaison man. TULEJKA is a relatively young man, very active in the CAMBISTA 1, and as head of the Byelorussian youth in the New York area possesses excellent cover for the type of activities he would perform for us.

The undersigned stated that he personally thought the suggestion was an excellent one, that he would discuss the matter with his colleagues and superiors, and give CAMBISTA 4 an answer in a few weeks.

11. CAMBISTA 4 then brought up the matter of the \$10,000 death-benefit payment for [ ] and asked if the money had

been deposited. The undersigned queried CAMBISTA 4 as to whether he had checked his account recently and was told that approximately \$3,000 had been credited to the account as of the last check. CAMBISTA 4 was told that another payment had been made since that time and that to date \$4,975.50 had been deposited. CAMBISTA 4 was informed that certain bureaucratic and security procedures made it unwise to deposit the entire sum at one time. CAMBISTA 4 said that the death-benefit payment money would not be used for organizational work, but to pay for the publication of some scholarly study or book on some aspect of the Byelorussian problem. This work would be dedicated to [ ]

CAMBISTA 4 then asked if the remaining amount could be paid to him in cash. He desires to transmit the money via international banking channels to an account in Brussels. The account is under the cover of Oeuvre Social and in the name of three Byelorussians living in Belgium. Since the account is under the name of a social organization and since CAMBISTA 4 is presently in the United States with the collection of funds as one of his objectives, the transmission of funds at this time should not arouse undue interest or suspicion. CAMBISTA 4 stated that he intends to withdraw the four-odd thousand dollars presently deposited and forward it to Belgium prior to his return to Paris before the end of this month. He requested that authority be obtained to grant him the remainder of the money in one lump sum when he returns to the United States late in June so that he can forward it at intervals to Belgium.

The undersigned stated he would convey this request to the sections of our organization concerned with such matters and an attempt would be made to obtain an answer within a few weeks.

12. During the course of the discussion on the Cadre School (see Para 6), CAMBISTA 4 stated that as Germany regains its sovereignty, it becomes less and less suitable as a likely location for the projected Cadre School. CAMBISTA 4 went on to say that the Byelorussians were, in general, desirous of keeping official contacts with the Germans to a minimum. In view of the compromising situations which have arisen as a result of Byelorussian collaboration with the Germans during the First and Second World Wars, the Byelorussians have found that any official contact with the Germans could be exploited now or in the future by the Soviets, who would then misrepresent these contacts to the Byelorussian people in the Byelorussian SSR.

CAMBISTA 4 went on to say that in the event of war, German soldiers should not be allowed to enter Byelorussia or the Ukraine or, if they were permitted, they should go only in American uniforms. Otherwise, the Soviets could once again capitalize on the extremely bad reputation of the Germans in those two countries

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and arouse the people against the West, whenever the Western soldiers were to invade and occupy the border republics of the USSR.

The undersigned pointed out that though this particular idea was not unknown to the United States planning authorities, CAMBISTA 4 and his colleagues must have many other original ideas relative to such matters and to psychological warfare in general, and that it would be worthwhile from the CAMBISTA point of view as well as the American, if these ideas were noted down in short memoranda and forwarded through our established channels. CAMBISTA 4 agreed to the ostensible value of such reports and stated that as soon as he had concluded the pressing problems raised by non-Russians participating in ANCOMLIB he would devote his attention to the compilation of psychological warfare ideas.

13. In conclusion, the conference with CAMBISTA 4 was conducted in a very amiable atmosphere. CAMBISTA 4 was very pleasant and cooperative and extremely diplomatic throughout, including discussions on the delicate and controversial points like the Cadre School and the past friction between CAMBISTA and United States personnel in Munich.

Based exclusively on the four-hour conference, the undersigned has the impression that CAMBISTA 4 is a seasoned diplomat and basically a political type who is interested in operational matters only insofar as they reflect on political developments.

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