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26 February 1965

Office of the DCI

DCI and Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

GUEST: Well, the idea of the thing is to -- this is a letter you wrote to Bobby a year ago, including some of your own thoughts at the time.

DCI: Yes.

GUEST: Now, about the interview -- as you know, it will remain here, be transcribed in your office, and you can edit it in any way that you like and then impose any stipulations you wish on access to it -- I mean, there are undoubtedly parts of it you will want to be classified. Beyond that, it will be absolutely sealed and secure -- and probably you will wish to say that it will be closed for a period, or that no one can consult it without written permission from you, or something like that. But so far as that is concerned, security of the thing is as complete as if it were in the National Archives, because it's part of the National Archives.

Now, as you know, I am doing a book on the Kennedy presidency, but nothing here that you tell me will go into that book -- unless there may be some things which I might check with you as to whether I could use. But I want to assure you completely that this is absolutely

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separate from that.

DCI: Sure, that's all right.

I think that there is only one area in which I think the facts and the responsibilities have been badly distorted and are not understood, and it predates my time -- although I've done a very considerable amount of investigation -- and this is the whole Bay of Pigs effort. And at some point, in fairness to a lot of people that have been very unjustly and unfairly criticized, the record ought to be made straight on this. Now whether this is the way to do it or not, I don't know. What do you think?

GUEST: Well, I think it is. I think it would be a very appropriate way to do it. There is, of course, the Taylor Committee report. No, I think this ought to be aimed--

DCI: Well, that Taylor Committee report was only in one copy, or two, and it wasn't an overly penetrating report at that. It wasn't a very good report.

GUEST: No, it was not. That is absolutely true.

DCI: And it had on it both Allen Dulles and--

GUEST: Admiral Arleigh A. Burke.

DCI: --and Burke, and they didn't get to the bottom of it, for a variety of reasons.

GUEST: And, sir, let me add, too, that my luncheon with

Dick Helms was quite incidental. It wasn't to prepare for this. He's an old friend of mine. We had gotten in touch over the Noel Field incident -- I don't know whether you were out of town -- but there's a new book that has come out called "Red Pond", by (Flora Lewis)--

DCI: Yes, I've heard about it but I haven't read it.

GUEST: And I've done a review of it, and I've been talking to Helms about it -- I talked to Dick about it, and we agreed to have lunch.

Are you ready to go?

DCI: Sure.

GUEST: Where I thought I'd begin would be asking you about your first acquaintance with President Kennedy and the circumstances leading to your appointment.

DCI: All right.

GUEST: This is February 26th, 1965. Interview with Mr. John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. interviewing.

When did you first meet President Kennedy?

DCI: Arthur, I met President Kennedy on two or three occasions between 1958 and January of 1961, when I was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and he was a member of the United States Senate

and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Our meetings were brief -- they were either when the Committee was in session or on a social occasion. I never knew President Kennedy well -- in fact, I exchanged only a very few words with him.

GUEST: Then what were the circumstances, as you understand it, which led to your appointment?

DCI: Well, it's somewhat difficult to say exactly what led to my appointment and to trace the period of time from the date that President Kennedy took office, or shortly before, until he appointed me Director of Central Intelligence.

As you know, I was serving as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Word came to me from sources close to the President concerning my willingness to remain as Chairman of AEC at least for six months or a year. I explained that since I had taken a public position on the highly controversial question of the test moratorium which was in effect at that time, I felt that it would be better, or it would give him more latitude if he had a new Chairman, and one not identified with any position. And therefore, without refusing to serve the balance of my term, I proposed three alternative names -- one of which, incidentally, was Dr. Glenn Seaborg.

During the period from the date of his inauguration

until September, various people suggested that perhaps I should meet President Kennedy -- such men as Senator Clinton Anderson, who was then Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and Senator Jackson. But I felt that such a meeting would be interpreted as an attempt on my part merely to sell President Kennedy on my views on this controversial matter that he was dealing with, and I suggested that since he knew my views, and they hadn't changed, that a meeting would not be -- much as I desired and would be pleased to meet the President, it might possibly be commented upon unfavorably or in a prejudicial manner in the press.

However, if you'll recall, on I think the 3rd or 4th of September the Soviets exploded a nuclear device on Novaya Zemlya, and thus broke the moratorium, and a second device was exploded on September 6th, and on that day or the day following at a National Security Council meeting he asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy -- whom I did not know at that time -- to reach me and arrange for me to come to Washington to meet with the President. This McGeorge Bundy did. I was in Los Angeles, and I flew East that night and met with the President for about three hours on the next day. I think that day was September 7th, although I'm not positive it was that exact date. After a short exchange, he asked me why I had taken the position with respect to the importance of nuclear testing and asked if I would discuss the entire subject with him and give him my views.

This I did in some considerable detail, and there followed a long exchange between the President and me on a number of subjects, many of them relating to the problems of the nuclear age.

Finally, the President said that he had a new problem to deal with since the Soviets had broken the test ban, and that there were conflicting opinions on certain aspects of U.S. policy between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon, and he would like an independent viewpoint from me on areas in which improvements might be made in our nuclear weapon capability, the importance of those improvements, and whether we should, as a matter of policy, engage in further testing, which we were then privileged to do because of the action of the Soviets. I agreed to make the report, and after receiving his permission to discuss the subject with certain specified people in the National Weapons Laboratories, and agreeing on a date when I would submit the report to him, I left.

I returned to Washington on the appointed day about two and a half weeks later, or perhaps three weeks later, and an appointment was made for me to call on the President. Rather unexpectedly the appointment was changed from noon to six o'clock in the evening, and the place of appointment was changed from his office to the residence.

When I reached the residence the President was

there and I handed him my report, and he said that that was not the subject that he was interested in at the moment and that he would like it if I would deliver the report to Mr.. McGeorge Bundy, who would have it reviewed by his staff and would make recommendations to him concerning the subject. He then said that he had been giving a great deal of thought to the appointment of a Director of Central Intelligence, and while he realized that I had served for several years in Government and had only recently returned to private life, he asked if I would consider accepting the post.

This came as a complete surprise to me, because no one had opened up the subject with me, I had had none of the usual feelers, no interviews had been conducted in Los Angeles, which usually preface an invitation to come into the Government, no rumors had appeared in the press -- this in effect came out of the blue, and it was very much of a surprise.

The President then said that he had made the decision to ask me on his own, apparently reaching this conclusion as a result of the discussion we had had two or three weeks earlier. And in retrospect, I imagine that the reason for the long meeting we had had on the 7th of September -- which was far longer than was required to accomplish the purpose of that particular visit -- was that he, covertly and without disclosure to me, was doing a little exploring of my thought processes and mind.

GUEST: So you think he probably had this in mind before the first meeting, rather than its coming to his mind after, as a consequence of that meeting?

DCI: Yes, I think -- well, I'm sure of that because there had been a period of months in which several of his advisors had been searching for a replacement for Allen Dulles, and I know that my name had appeared as one of several names proposed by groups that had concerned themselves with that appointment. So he had something in his mind when he was talking with me -- although I don't think that the real purpose of having me come back was for this exploration, but I think having a purpose to get in touch with me, then it led him down this other line.

He said that he had discussed the subject with McNamara and Gilpatric, then Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, with Secretary Rusk, with Senator Clinton Anderson - as he wished to find out from him what the probable reaction on the Hill would be, and finally with Allen Dulles, whom he felt obligated to talk with since I would be following in Allen's footsteps. He engaged in a very considerable persuasion because he had been told by McNamara and Gilpatric that I was in the middle of a business transaction that was of considerable importance to me financially, and they had told him earlier in the day that this was a good idea but he didn't have a good chance of getting me because they knew that I had a

business matter that was of such importance that I couldn't do other than accept it. But I disabused his mind of this, telling him that Mrs. McCone - Rosemary - and I had reached a conclusion only two days before, despite the fact that the business proposition was inviting and exceedingly profitable, that there were reasons why we weren't going to accept it anyway, so he didn't have to worry about or concern himself with that.

We spent about an hour and a half together, and he discussed, with the greatest persuasion -- and he was a very persuasive man -- the importance of the work of the Director of Central Intelligence and his need for someone in whom he had confidence to take the job, and he reached the conclusion that he had that confidence in me, and therefore he wanted me to accept the post. I said, quite naturally, that his suggestion came as a complete surprise to me and I would have to give consideration to how I could handle my private affairs, and I would also have to talk to Rosemary to find out whether returning to Washington would be acceptable to her, and then I would let him know. He asked me to let him know within a week -- which I did.

GUEST: This really came as a complete surprise?

DCI: Yes. I didn't know a damn thing about it.

GUEST: You then returned to the Coast and--

DCI: Yes. What I did was I met with Allen Dulles. I

went to New York and talked with my business associates, and without revealing the nature of the job told them about this proposal that I accept an assignment of such importance that I'd have to give it serious consideration. They readily agreed to take care of such responsibilities as I had - that I was carrying, and said not to let business considerations stand in the way, that they had handled our mutual affairs during my term of office as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and they would continue -- in other words, they more or less said: you don't amount to very much around here (laughing) and we get along well without you.

I then went back and talked to Rosemary at some considerable length, and she felt that the post was of such importance that we couldn't very well do anything other than accept it. We reached that conclusion on Saturday morning, although the week would not have been up until the following Tuesday night. She urged that I call the President and tell him. I called him -- he was at Hyannis Port -- and talked to him on the telephone, and made arrangements to meet with him at Newport the following Wednesday, I believe. That was the sequence of that contact.

One very interesting point that he made in his very persuasive argument to me -- which has weighed heavily in my mind ever since -- was that in emphasizing the importance of intelligence, and the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, he said repeatedly that what concerned him most and what he could only learn through intelligence finding

was the real and true role and purpose of Moscow and of the Communists, that he was continually plagued with concern as to whether their purposes were truly belligerent, whether their threats were meaningful or a bluff, whether there was any sincerity in the gestures of coexistence, and just what could be expected both in the short term and in the long term -- and he placed that series of questions as of the greatest importance and probably the highest priority of intelligence objectives from his point of view. It always interested me that he seemed to be more preoccupied by that one question than any other.

GUEST: Did he recur to these questions in the next years?

DCI: Oh yes, and he brought that question up time and again in the next two years that we worked rather closely together.

GUEST: It's not a question to which it's easy to produce a very definitive answer.

DCI: No, you can't produce a very definitive answer. I've come to the conclusion that the leaders in Moscow themselves don't quite know what the answer is. If they knew the answer and if they had a well-defined pattern laid out they would not engage in such activities - from which they would have to retract - as the Berlin blockade, and more significantly, the introduction of missiles in Cuba.

GUEST: Their answer is dependent apparently on what we do.

DCI: Yes, their answer is dependent, I think, Arthur, on what we do, on their measure of our will, and the internal pressures and the pressures that are exerted from within on the policymakers and leaders of the Soviet Union itself.

GUEST: Now your experience in the AEC had given you considerable acquaintance with CIA, I imagine, and the intelligence community in general.

DCI: Yes, to an extent. Not as much as one would think, however. But my experience in AEC and elsewhere has been invaluable, and I would hate to have undertaken this job without the background of experience that I had. In the first place, I was Acting Deputy to James Forrestal in 1948 when CIA was just being created. As you know, it was established by the National Security Act in September 1947. And at that time Forrestal had no Deputy, so I served for a year acting as his Deputy, and spent a great deal of time on the organization of CIA during that year, and that gave me some knowledge of it. Then in '50 and '51 as Under Secretary of the Air Force I served on a committee in the Defense Department that had to do with intelligence, and I leaned very heavily on CIA -- then directed by General Bedell Smith -- because I always wanted to check the intelligence estimates of the Air Force itself. In this way I got a little look through the side door of CIA -- I knew Bedell and Allen Dulles

personally, and I used to see them often. I got a little feel. When I was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission the President made me a member of the National Security Council and also of the Operating Coordinating Board and the Planning Board, so in that role I got quite an insight into CIA. So I didn't come in totally ignorant of it. But no man in Government, irrespective of what he does, knows CIA until he is part of CIA, because it's a vast organization, it's a professional organization, and it is not visible to very many people.

GUEST: You took it over at a time when it was in a considerable state of shock and demoralization, wasn't it?

DCI: Well, it had gone through the traumatic experience of the Bay of Pigs, and then, if you will remember, the summer of 1961 was the period of the reorganization of the CIA, and everybody had a plan. The organization was in a state of shock, as you say, and a great many people were very discouraged, and I would say that the spirit of the organization was at an all time low when I took it over -- not due to any internal discord but because of the disappointing experience of the Bay of Pigs and the criticism that was heaped on CIA as a result of that failure.

GUEST: This would be a good time to talk about that, if you would like to.

DCI: Well, of course, that all happened before my time.

But I have tried to reconstruct the thought processes within CIA and within this new Government, in retrospect, as one who had no responsibility either as part of the Government or as part of the Agency. In this regard I think that the investigation that was made by General Taylor, who was then Special Assistant to President Kennedy, and the Attorney General, and Mr. Dulles, and Admiral Burke, was not as penetrating an investigation and not as useful a report as might have been produced by a group of equally able men but who were not associated with the endeavor. This is not to criticize the report, but this is just to express the feeling that the report was not quite as comprehensive as it should have been.

However, going back-- First, CIA must assume a large measure of responsibility for what happened -- perhaps a larger share of the responsibility than even their authority and their actions might dictate, because of all the organizations in Washington having to do with international affairs the only two that had complete continuity at the time of the change of Administration were the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was a complete turnover in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the Deputy and the Under Secretaries, and the Service Secretaries, and so on and so forth -- and their advisors. There was a complete turnover in the State Department, there was a complete turnover in the National Security Council, and in the

White House with the Presidential advisors who concerned themselves with National security affairs. Therefore, the only two that had continuity and therefore should have carried the experiences of the previous Administration into the new Administration, were CIA and the Joint Chiefs. For that reason both of them probably must shoulder a larger share of responsibility than their voice in the decisions might dictate. Do you understand the point I'm making?

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: That's my first point.

The second point is why the brigade was permitted to build up from the 500 level, where it was at the end of the Eisenhower Administration, to the 15 hundred or 18 hundred a few months later, I have never gotten a satisfactory answer. In the latter months of the Eisenhower Administration the training of the Cuban exiles had been authorized and was going forward, but the concept was not, as I remember it -- and it was only spoken of in the most hushed way, and very compartmented -- was not an all-out invasion but it was the introduction of a guerilla capability in the Escambray.

GUEST: That's right -- multiple guerilla infiltration.

DCI: Multiple guerilla infiltration.

However, it grew, and by two months after this new and untried Administration had been in office they were faced with the

problem of what to do with this thing. And the problem, as I get it in retrospect, looking back, is that the brigade that was trained was getting restless, the Cuban exiles were exerting a good deal of pressure -- it was either to move forward and make the attempt or to abandon the effort.

GUEST: Yes, there were a number of things contributing to that. The Guatemalans wanted the exiles out -- the Russians were arming the Cubans, which would make it progressively harder--

DCI: That's right. And furthermore, there were some members of that brigade, and of the Cuban exile community that was familiar with it, who were pretty talkative. So if we hadn't gone ahead there would have been a frightful to-do about it, which would have had its political consequences.

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: So all of these forces were brought to bear on the President and his as yet unseasoned advisors, to go forward. Then, having reached the decision to go forward, the dangers began to appear and be brought to him -- the danger of Russian retaliation in Berlin, in Iran, and so forth, the prospect of failure, the consequences in the United Nations, and all the rest. So this caused quite a dilemma for the President, as I reconstruct his thoughts -- and I never discussed this with him--

GUEST: Oh really? Even at the beginning, he didn't go into this--

DCI: No, he didn't go into it -- not in any depth.

But I can see, looking back, the dilemma that he was in. Nevertheless, he made the decision and it did go forward, and of course with tragic results. It was a mistake to go forward, because it was too thin in its plan. But once the decision was made to go forward, then it was a mistake to dismember the effort, particularly by the standing down of the air strikes. Had the air strikes not been stood down, and had they been successful -- and there's every reason to believe that they would have been successful -- they would have destroyed Castro's remaining few airplanes. Photography taken the afternoon before proves conclusively that these aircraft were located on airfields which were the targets of the B-26's, and the weather was good, and therefore the mission probably would have been successful and the brigade would have gotten ashore with all of its complement and equipment, and tanks and guns, and so forth, and would have secured the airstrip nearby, and the battle would have taken on a different character entirely. That doesn't mean that it would have been successful, and I think--

GUEST: Yes, it still would have been 15 hundred against 200 thousand.

DCI: That's right, it still would have been 15 hundred against 200 thousand.

We believe - our estimators believe, at this point -- and expressed themselves orally, and we've never made any deep studies of this -- we believe that in all probability the brigade would have been overcome and would have been driven back into the Escambray, and then they would either have been obliterated or would have continued as guerillas and gradually would have been ex-filtrated. I do not think the temper of the Cuban/Castro military at that time was such that they would have come over in hordes defecting from Castro, nor do I think that the Cuban public, which were under police surveillance, security surveillance, could have given much covert support to the Cuban brigade.

GUEST: Particularly in view of the fact that the first air strike alerted Castro and caused him to arrest a large number of people who were interested in--

DCI: He arrested a large number of people.

However, it didn't cause him to deploy his aircraft -- which was a strange thing--

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: --because photography taken the afternoon before the strike indicates the planes were there -- and there was no reason to believe that he moved them from late afternoon until dark -- we don't think that.

So it would have been a different type of battle, and a different type of history, had that decision -- which I consider a very unfortunate decision -- not been made. Now I think that CIA should have appealed that decision directly to the President -- which they did not do. And the brigade might have put up quite a fight -- because they would have had an airstrip right there, so they would have had some air cover. But the odds were heavily weighted against them.

However, there are lessons to be learned, and the lesson to be learned from that is you have to think through the scenario of an operation of that kind very carefully before you start it, and then not deviate from that scenario, even though it becomes exceedingly difficult to follow the scenario. This is the reason why, for instance, the United States action in the missile crisis was a success where the Bay of Pigs was a failure, because in the missile crisis -- which came a couple of years later, and here was a seasoned organization -- the greatest of care was exercised in developing the scenario all the way through to the end, decisions were made to follow the scenario, the steps were taken one after another, and then about the 4th or 5th step we found that we had succeeded in what we had set out to do, you see. It's an interesting comparison to make.

GUEST: Yes. And probably the failure in the first case

made possible the success in the other, in a certain sense -- experience, the lessons learned from the first--

DCI: Yes.

I have always felt, Arthur -- although the President himself said there was room for blame for everybody in the episode, I have always felt and I have always resented the fact that a great many people who should have shared in the responsibility for the failure ducked it and left the responsibility on the shoulders of CIA -- and this, I think, has been one of the difficult things for me to overcome from the standpoint of morale in this building.

GUEST: Was there a CIA intelligence failure in the sense of overestimating the possibility of defections from the militia and uprisings behind the line?

DCI: No, there was never such an estimate made. There was a CIA failure in the whole estimating process with respect to probability of success. And I'll tell you how that happened -- and it's one of the changes that I've made in CIA, which has been subtle -- and not people outside of this building - not ..... would it be of very great importance -- but is an exceedingly important change.

The Bay of Pigs operation was compartmented in this building. Very few people outside of the rather small special group

set up to run the operation knew anything about it. In the general staff meeting that was held then twice a week, it was never discussed. The handling of correspondence and memoranda was highly compartmented -- and only special people. The Deputy Director for Intelligence and his whole estimating organization, including the Board of National Estimates, were not witting at all of the operation. It was handled by the operating side of the house and the estimates of the probable successes or failures were made by the operators themselves.

Now had this compartmentation not existed and had the estimators been brought in, the plan laid out before them, and charged with the responsibility of making an estimate of the probable consequences, successes or failures, you would have had a far different answer -- because they would have come up and said, just as you said - after all, you've got 15 hundred against 200 thousand -- what are the odds? You see?

Now this is one change that I have made. Any operation of any kind, large or small, of any consequence at all, is discussed on both sides of the table here. And one thing I will not do is permit the operators, who become a protagonist of a plan, to become the estimators and the analysts of the success or the failure of the plan -- anymore than in business you don't let your sales department make the cost

estimates on which they set their price, you see -- you have an estimating department that operates independent of them to make their estimate and establish the price, and that's what the sales department has to refer to, you see.

So, people ask me what changes I have made in CIA. This is the most fundamental one that I have made. But it's one that you can't mention outside of this building, you see. But it's a very important one.

GUEST: Terribly fundamental.

DCI: Terribly fundamental.

With every failure -- and this was a failure -- it has some benefits, because you can reappraise things -- and I think it has caused CIA to take inventory of their activities and to take a more cautious approach to some problems than was the case say in the late '50's. We had the success in Guatemala, which was a very fortunate and a very great success -- it was more luck than anything else when ..... took over. This was followed by a number of courageous things that were attempted, some of which went well and some of which didn't go so well. But it cast a kind of a feeling of subservience on ..... it had a very unusual clandestine, covert, paramilitary capability, and I think there is now a realization that except when this capability is used in a most modest and careful manner,

it is impossible to keep it invisible.

GUEST: That's right -- we can't conceal our hand.

DCI: We can't conceal our hand, no.

GUEST: That was a great basic flaw. An operation of the size, scope, and visibility of the Cuban thing was bound to --

DCI: Sure -- bound to be--

GUEST: --to be blown.

DCI: --to be blown, yes.

GUEST: How would you describe the way you worked with President Kennedy?

DCI: Well, I found that President Kennedy absorbed a great deal of the product of the Agency. He read a great deal, he read very rapidly, and he retained a great deal. Consequently, the majority of reports that are produced here - analyses and estimates - I found that he absorbed and digested. He was exceedingly interested in the work of CIA and the intelligence community, and he used to insist that I arrange with his appointment secretaries for an hour every week so that we could sit down and talk over matters of interest which were not fully reflected in our daily reports. And there were very few weeks in which we didn't have that hour together, even though his days sometimes got very compressed, as you know. I found him a very inquisitive and penetrating mind, interested

in all aspects of our work - the estimative and academic side as well as the operational side. He was always searching -- I think one of the great characteristics of his mind and his personality is that he was everlastingly searching to ferret out problems that were quite far down the road, and thus trying to conceive actions which might prevent them from becoming serious problems. Hence, he would take at times an inordinately lot of time on the Cyprus issue when it wasn't a problem, in order to try and conceive policies and courses of action that would prevent the problem from arising. The same is true of the Congo, and South Vietnam, and elsewhere. I think this was a very interesting facet of his mind.

GUEST: You've worked closely with four Presidents. I've heard it said that President Kennedy was more interested in the intelligence than Presidents ordinarily are -- in intelligence per se. Is that your impression?

DCI: Well, they were interested in a different way. Now I've explained to you how Kennedy was interested.

President Truman was very interested, and he had on his staff Sidney Souers, who at one time was Director of the predecessor of CIA, but when on his staff was kept close to intelligence. And he would hold a staff meeting every morning and after that morning meeting he would have Sidney Souers stay behind and in five or ten minutes

run over the important intelligence reports of the day. So he kept in close touch with current intelligence. I don't think that he spent much time on these penetrating studies and analyses and estimates that are produced in this organization.

Eisenhower was interested in intelligence as a military man is -- he has his G-2, he expects his G-2 to sit there, and to bring in the intelligence, and keep him informed, and he doesn't want to be surprised about anything -- and no commanding general does. He dealt with long-range intelligence that was reflected in these long-range estimates through having them reflected in papers produced by the Planning Board, which he studied carefully and insisted that the NSC concern themselves with them regularly. Eisenhower was very orderly in that regard, and this was a result of his training as a military man. He sat down with the NSC at ten o'clock every Thursday morning and he didn't get up until noon every Thursday morning -- and if he was out of town he insisted that the Vice President do it. And he insisted that an agenda be prepared, and the papers be submitted, and that he be briefed in advance, and so forth. Now early on it was very good, but it got a little ponderous toward the end of his career, and I used to tell him at times that we were spending more time on nit-picks and trying to adjust wording to satisfy the Director of the Budget on the one hand, and the Secretary of State on the other, than we were thinking about

policy. But in the early days, the first few years of his Administration, when these papers were coming up for the first time, the discussions were very fruitful from a policy point of view. But with respect to intelligence, he dealt with intelligence as any senior military officer does -- he's got a G-2 and it's the G-2's responsibility to keep him informed any hour, day or night -- that's the orders. And you'll find that General Wheeler is the same way, and so is General Taylor.

Kennedy I have expressed.

President Johnson is entirely different. He wants his current intelligence report delivered to him in the evening so that he can read it at night. He doesn't want to talk about it. And he does read it, and quite frequently he calls up on the telephone about it. He doesn't concern himself with the estimates. President Johnson deals with the problem at hand. The problems that are on down the road he will deal with as they arise. This is a result of his long years of legislative training -- because when you're in the Legislative Branch of the Government that's what you have to do, you have to deal with the problem that's on the floor today, and only after that is disposed of can you think about what's coming up 30 days from now. But I check with him regularly, and of course any particular issue or any particular matter that I want to expand on past the reporting, he's very anxious to sit down and talk about it. He

leaves it to me what to bring to him.

GUEST: Kennedy had more intellectual curiosity--

DCI: More intellectual curiosity--

GUEST: --than the others.

DCI: --than any of the others. This I think is true.

GUEST: Some people have felt that President Kennedy would get too involved in the details of a question. Others have felt that this was what sort of made it possible for him to make better decisions.

DCI: Yes, I never thought that he got too involved in details. I didn't have that impression at all.

GUEST: It always seemed to me it strengthened him to make a decision by doing that.

DCI: Yes. I advocated a different concept of staff work. I thought that he could have saved himself a lot of time had staff work come up to him a little differently.

GUEST: You mean within the White House, or--

DCI: Well, throughout the Government. I think one of the great problems that you have, as you know so well, is you get called into a meeting on a very important subject and in comes somebody with an 18 page paper, and it's distributed at the table, and then you start to discuss the

paper, and you've never seen it before. You know, you've had that experience. (Laughing)

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: And there are a lot of men around Washington that are remarkable, they can read papers and digest them and talk about them at the same time -- and have somebody across the table talking about something else -- but I can't do that. And I thought that there had been a deficiency in staff work. But everybody has to organize their office to suit their own desires. I have to organize mine that way. You have to organize yours that way. The way you run your office may not suit me, and the way I run my office may not suit you, and Bobby Kennedy has to do it still another way, and Lyndon Johnson operates differently than Kennedy, and both of them differently from Eisenhower.

GUEST: Absolutely--

DCI: But that doesn't make any of them wrong or any of them right.

GUEST: It has to meet your own needs.

DCI: That's right, that's right.

GUEST: Apart from the President's direct relationship to you, was he kept in touch with CIA mostly through Bobby?

DCI: Through Bobby?

GUEST: Yes. The President?

DCI: President Kennedy?

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: Yes--

GUEST: Or what was Bobby's -- how would you define Bobby's relationship?

DCI: Well, Bobby's relationship with CIA was rather a strange one. He was brought very close because of the Bay of Pigs incident and the investigation, and the fact that CIA then became an organizational problem for the President and he looked to Bobby for advice and counsel and suggestions as to what to do about it. I never laid my eyes on Bobby Kennedy until after I had accepted this position.

GUEST: Oh really?

DCI: I never laid my eyes on him once -- never knew him. The fact is the President himself introduced me to Bobby Kennedy after I had agreed to take office and had come back and was going through the indoctrination period -- the President called me over one evening and introduced me to Bobby Kennedy -- that was the first time I met him. Now, then Bobby and I got to be great friends, as you know, have been great friends, have been drawn very close together. And I encouraged Bobby's continuing interest in CIA. He was always most helpful. I never thought that Bobby intruded, nor did I feel that he was

trying to exert a position as an intelligence supervisor. I used to talk things over with him because I enjoyed it, and still do -- not so much recently because he's been busy on a number of things. But he always had a very great interest in this area--

GUEST: In the Counterinsurgency Committee also--

DCI: Well, the Counterinsurgency Committee, in which CIA plays a part, is a little bit broader than intelligence. So I thought that Bobby always made a great contribution. And I think unquestionably he was a leavening influence with the President when the President was beset by proposals of one sort or another of a radical nature with respect to CIA and the intelligence community. As you know, there were those who were advocating doing away with the whole business and we really didn't need intelligence, that in fact there was something immoral about it, you know. And I think Bobby was very useful in that.

GUEST: How did the President conceive the relationship among the various elements in the intelligence community?

DCI: Well, what he asked me to do when he asked me to take the job was to serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as his principal intelligence officer to direct the intelligence community. Now I didn't like the word "direct," because in the parlance of the military

"direct" is command and control, and I don't think anybody outside of the military can take command and control of the intelligence units in the Department of Defense. So we conceived a letter in which the President directed me to serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and to coordinate and give guidance to the intelligence community as a whole.

GUEST: Then this confirmed the authority that Allen Dulles had had, or did this represent a change in management?

DCI: Well, it confirmed the authority that Allen Dulles had by statute but really never exercised, and it (collated) the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for community affairs. He asked in that letter that I select a Deputy and have that Deputy really manage the Agency. He relieved me, myself, of the operational responsibilities so that I could give more time and thought to community problems, and to see, one, that there were no gaps in our intelligence, and secondly, no overlaps. As you know, CIA, while it's a big organization, is only a small segment of the intelligence community -- because the cryptological services are very large, the national reconnaissance organization is very large, DIA has grown now, and the intelligence units, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. When you add that all together you've got a pretty big package. The fact is you've got a package of about 150,000 people, of which [redacted] are in CIA, and (b)(1) (b)(3)

about three billion dollars, of which [redacted] is in CIA. But CIA (b)(1) (b)(3)
is the focal point to which all of this intelligence flows and from which the analysis, the reporting, and the estimates come.

So what concerned the President were two things -- one, by preoccupation with CIA, the Director -- which was his Director -- didn't concern himself with this broad field; and as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, the Director -- which was his Director -- also representing CIA, became the judge of his own arguments when an issue arose within the community. I corrected that partially by placing as the CIA member of the Board, my Deputy, and as Chairman of the Board I do not represent CIA, I represent the President. And the record is very interesting -- there are more times on the Board where I have overruled CIA and decided in favor of State, or Defense, or DIA, or somebody, than when I have overruled others in favor of the CIA.

GUEST: Oh really?

DCI: Yes -- which is quite interesting, you know -- much to the annoyance of some of the fellows around here. (Laughter)

So this was more or less his concept.

We had a very interesting talk at Newport before the appointment was finally announced, and we sat out there on the porch of his house,

and he said - "Well, have you anything that you want to raise before we make this announcement?" And I said yes, there's two. I said - in the first place, as you know, I have been identified as a rather strong position on certain matters, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union and their conduct and the manner in which they have been totally oblivious to the truth, and have misled us in some instances and the world in other instances -- and I have rather strong feelings and they're pretty well known, and I just want you to know I haven't changed any of them, and while I don't think they affect my (productivity), if you have any feeling that I can in any way change the opinions with which I have been identified through the years, I want you to know I haven't. He said he understood that.

Now, I said, the second thing is that I've heard a great deal about the organization of the intelligence community and Central Intelligence Agency, and among other things the idea of creating in the White House kind of a super-special assistant to the President on intelligence. Now I don't think that that's necessary, and, I said, I feel about that just as I felt when President Eisenhower asked me to be Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission -- after I had agreed, he said, "Now, I would also like you to be Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Affairs." Well, I said, I don't want to be Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Affairs, because I

can do everything for you that should be done, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. But I'll tell you one thing, President Eisenhower, I don't want any other S. O. B. Special Assistant for Atomic Affairs." (Laughter) So, I said, I want you to know that as Director of Central Intelligence I can do everything that I think has to be done for you in the field of intelligence, and I don't want to be your Special Assistant, but I don't want anybody else to be your Special Assistant. (Laughter) Well, he said, all right, I understand that. Those were the two problems. (Laughter)

GUEST: Both you and he had taken the situation of having really CIA, State, and Defense all in the business and inevitably competing as a healthy situation?

DCI: Yes, I think competition is good, but "competition" is really not quite the word for it. I think there should be areas of activity in which various departments can carry them out aggressively and compliment others. When you get departments competing, then even though competition is healthy -- and it has been my observation that competition among Government bureaucracies and departments has a very corrosive effect, particularly at the lower levels -- hence I think that it's exceedingly important to carefully define the lines of authority, and responsibility, and activity, at the top so that those on down the line know what's expected of them and their counterparts

in the other departments. In other words, I think that in a big embassy there are areas of intelligence or related to intelligence which are the proper responsibility of the Political Officers, and other areas that are the proper responsibility of the Attaches, and still other areas that are the proper responsibility of the Station. Now when the Attaches start to fiddle around in areas of proper concern to the Political Officers, and when they start to run clandestine agents, which is the area of concern of the Station, then you run into great trouble. And likewise, when the Station, for instance, starts to develop covert contacts with high political officials, thus going around the Ambassador, without the Ambassador's knowledge, then that creates problems. On the other hand, there are countless places around the world where the covert contact of a member of the Station with an official of the host government can produce the most valuable information -- and a broadminded Ambassador welcomes it and considers it a real asset for his mission, and a broadminded Station Chief will assiduously and carefully report to his Ambassador, and then the team works fine -- but when these things aren't understood, you have trouble.

When I took over in the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration, there was a frightful problem between CIA and State. It grew up from the fact that the Brothers Dulles would work out understandings that would cut

across all organizational lines, you see, and hence, when Foster died and Herter took over there were two or three years of extreme difficulty. And when I came in there were a number of places where serious tensions existed between Station Chiefs and Ambassadors -- [redacted] being one of them. And (b)(1) (b)(3) I made a point to go around to each one of those places all over the world and to sit down and straighten the situation out. And today I don't know of a single place throughout the world where there is any friction existing at all between the Station and the Ambassador in the Embassy. And this was an important change of attitude.

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: There's hardly an Ambassador that comes to town that doesn't either come out here or call me up, if for no other reason than to comment on that -- and this is a good thing.

GUEST: The President's letter to the Ambassadors in the spring of '61 conferring authority to control--

DCI: Everybody.

GUEST: --everybody -- so far as CIA was concerned, did that mean that for the first time Ambassadors could know everything that the Agency was doing in the country?

DCI: No, it didn't go quite that far. It gave the Ambassadors control over the Agency, over the Station, which they always had, but it

didn't go so far as to direct the Stations to reveal all sources and methods to the Ambassador.

GUEST: Operations?

DCI: Yes. And it's very infrequently that we do that -- and with a great many Ambassadors you can't do it because they don't understand it. But others [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) why you don't have any problem at all, you see. And a lot of them don't want to know, you know. I've had any number of them say, "Now look, all I want to know is that you're not cutting across any political lines and (b)(1) (b)(3) that you're giving me everything I should know, and that's all I want to know."

And it has worked out really very well -- it has worked out really very, very well. I'm very happy with the relationship between State and CIA, and Dean Rusk has told me a number of times that he has never known a time in his long years of connection, really, where the relationship has been as good as it is.

GUEST: Yes, I agree with that. I think it's much more satisfactory than it was back in '61.

DCI: Yes.

Well, this was a cycle it went through, you see. You know, Foster Dulles was a great fellow, you know, but he wasn't the greatest

fellow in the world to run an organization, you see, and he'd get an idea to do something and pull his brother in, and then get the thing all going, and the first thing you know the Bureau Chief or the Assistant Secretaries would hear about it, and some fellow downstairs would hear about it, and they wouldn't know what was going on. (Laughing) Well, after Foster died in '59 there were a couple of years there that it took to distill that out, you see, and straighten up lines of authority and communication. And I came in right at the tail end of it -- because it was not nearly as bad in '61 as it was in '59 and '60.

GUEST: But still, in the spring of '61 when CIA was in disgrace, the knives were out in the State Department and they had quite drastic surgical proposals, as you remember.

DCI: Oh yes, sure.

GUEST: We're nearly through. How are you holding up?

DCI: I'm holding up all right. I don't know whether I'm giving you any--

GUEST: Oh, you're a marvelous witness.

Having talked about the relationship with State, do you want to talk about the relationship with Defense?

DCI: Yes.

GUEST: Having talked about the State Department relationship, how about the relationship with Defense?

DCI: Well, our relationship with Defense is excellent in some areas and not good in others. There has been a wide circulation of gossip and several articles published to the effect that the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency in effect created a big and powerful competitor to the Central Intelligence Agency, and also that the action of Secretary McNamara in building up the DIA was evidence of a competition between McNamara and myself. And you've read all about this.

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: Now this isn't true at all. DIA is a logical organization. When responsibility for command of the theaters was transferred from the Chiefs of the respective Services to the theater commanders reporting to the Joint Chiefs, then it was essential that the Joint Chiefs have an intelligence unit so that they could properly direct the commanders who were responsible to them, and the importance of the intelligence units in the Services was correspondingly diminished. Actually, DIA was created as a result of recommendations made and adopted in January of 1961, just before the inauguration of President Kennedy, by an interdepartmental committee which was chaired by CIA.

GUEST: Oh really?

DCI: Yes.

GUEST: So it was a pre-McNamara project.

DCI: That's right. But it was adopted by the President on the recommendation of the NSC in a meeting on the 18th of January, at which I sat in as a member of the NSC -- which is quite interesting. Now we have had no trouble with DIA. The working arrangements between DIA and CIA couldn't be better. We meet regularly at the Intelligence Board, but, more than that, there is a continual flow of information and contact between the two organizations, and the problems are minimal. Now to be sure, there may be a difference in evaluation of a report on an event, and the Central Intelligence morning bulletin may have to put a star that the views expressed are not coordinated because DIA may have a different view -- but these are minimal. I could go on for a long, long time about the satisfactory relationship. When I go up and appear before Committees of Congress I always insist that one of General Carroll's senior people be there, and whenever they go up they insist that one of our senior people be there, so that there can be no conflict. And none of these horrible things that were pointed out is valid. Now I must say that this is largely due to thoughtful and considered work on the part of both CIA and General Carroll and General (Fitch) and his

organization, because there were lots of opportunities for trouble. They haven't developed. And every two or three months we have a course over here of three days, and 50 general officers -- Colonels or Navy Captains -- that are either in DIA or in the intelligence units, come over here and spend three days being briefed on CIA and what it does, so that they can utilize what we have, you see, and not duplicate it. And we go over there and do the same thing. And this works out fine. And I see no reason why, with this pattern set, there's going to be any trouble there at all.

There is trouble in the reconnaissance business, and this is due to the fact that there are two competing organizations in the field of reconnaissance with manned aircraft, U-2's, and so forth, and with satellites. And we have attempted to bring this problem together through the creation of the National Reconnaissance Organization. But it hasn't worked, and the reason it hasn't worked is bureaucratic. The Air Force resent the fact that CIA are in the reconnaissance business -- and this is understandable, and I think if I was over there in the Air Force I'd resent it too. They got into it because the Air Force refused to develop the U-2 and (RD24) -- and you know that story. And then the satellite came along, and the Air Force insisted that they should develop what was known as the Samos, which was a read-out system so that every General could sit and switch on the television and find out what was going on as these birds would fly overhead. Well, they were

out a decade or two ahead of the state of the art, and CIA picked up a simple system and developed it, and it worked, and those were the only satellite photographs that came back. So the Air Force would like to have all of this, you see. Well, the CIA would like to have their share of this, you see. And to be frank with you, Bob McNamara and I have never settled on a proper and reasonable allocation of responsibilities, and as a result there has been a good deal of tension at the working level. And it was sort of because of that experience that I said that competition between bureaucracies is not always as healthy as you think, you see. Because this unfortunate lack of understanding has not only hurt individuals -- subordinates here and in the Defense Department, from the standpoint of their satisfaction of working, and their careers as well -- but it seeped out into the contractors and the producers of these very sophisticated devices, and caused them to take sides, and so forth, and it isn't very good. In fact this appointment that I just called about, to see McNamara and Vance, which I'm going to do at two o'clock tomorrow, is for the purpose of trying to settle this thing and get it straightened out. And this is one of the things I want to do. If that can be straightened out -- and I'm sure it can be straightened out -- then I would think that the relationship between CIA and Defense would be most satisfactory.

I'm sure Defense, and particularly Secretary McNamara, lean much more heavily on CIA for estimates and analyses than they did

three years ago. The fact is they tell me this all the time. And it's rarely that McNamara and Wheeler go to an important meeting at the level of the NSC or the Executive Committee, when we're dealing with a problem, that they don't have with them their most recent estimates and reports -- which is quite significant, because this wasn't true, you know, before.

GUEST: No, it wasn't.

There were problems, weren't there, after the nuclear missile crisis?

DCI: Yes, there was a problem there over the disclosures -- you remember?

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: You remember that television show that McNamara was on?

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: That created some very serious problems with me, and very serious problems with my Special Committees on the Hill, because it was a revelation of intelligence methods and findings, and by statute I have a statutory responsibility to protect intelligence methods and resources. And it just happened that at the very moment that he was making the disclosures -- and I didn't know it -- I was testifying before the Stennis Preparedness Committee of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, in closed session, and telling them exactly what he was telling on public television at the same moment, and I didn't know he was doing it.

GUEST: Really? And this was not cleared or discussed in advance with--

DCI: It wasn't cleared at all -- I didn't know it at all. And this is why you get frequent references to the fact that that particular incident caused me some pain. Well it did cause me some pain. Now if I had known about it, it would have been all right -- I could have handled it differently. Well, actually, we discussed it the night before and decided not to do it, and then the next day it was decided to do it, and I was up on the Hill, you see, and wasn't read in on it -- so it was a little awkward. Well, we lived through that one -- and it didn't make any difference -- hell, it was all in the newspapers anyway.

GUEST: Well this has been marvelous. I think it's very good. If I could come once more and--

DCI: Sure.

GUEST: --and deal with some of the problems like -- I don't know - you came in after the Berlin wall, for example, but Berlin must have been the big issue when you arrived.

DCI: Yes. You see, the Berlin wall happened on the 13th or 14th of August, but I was here during the post-mortem as to why we didn't know about the Berlin wall.

GUEST: I think that would be interesting.

DCI: And there was also a Syrian coup, remember, at that time, and there was a post-mortem over that. Then it might be another interesting area that we could go into is the President's Board, you know, and the Joint Committee.

GUEST: Yes. Fine. I will check with your office and set up a time.

DCI: Yes. I'll be away next week, but I'll be here after that.

GUEST: You're not planning an imminent final departure?

DCI: No. I talked to the President about that last night and told him that my time was getting a little short. He said he was working on my replacement, and working very hard at it. And I know he hasn't done a damn thing about it -- except he talks to Clark Clifford during lunch some days -- and according to Clark he's not doing very much about it. But he asked me if I could stay until the 1st of May. I said the 1st of April would be better, but the 1st of May would be the absolutely last day. So I guess I'm here until the 1st of May -- that's 60 days. In the meantime, hopefully, he will appoint a successor and we can get him confirmed, and I can spend a little time--

GUEST: Breaking him in.

DCI: Breaking him in. But I have delayed a necessary trip to Europe on our liaison business because I thought if he would appoint a successor I could take him with me and introduce him [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) And, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) hopefully, he'll do that, and then I can take him there, and then take him out to the Far East, and get that very important part of it done, you see. Because those liaison arrangements are invaluable -- they're invaluable -- because you work on operational matters and you join hands in common targets in things that you're really trying to gain information ..... etc.

But I think it will probably be the end of April before I'll finally get signed off. I've agreed to be available on a consulting basis after I leave, if he wants me to do that.

Unfortunately I have to be away next week because I have an older sister who's going under some extremely serious open heart surgery. The doctors only give her an even chance of getting off the operating table, but she has decided she wants to do it. And I want to have her do it, since she wants to do it, even though there is a risk, but I don't want the burden of it to be carried by my other sister, who's not well either. So I just told the President I had to go out there and look after her. Fortunately he feels that the organization is running well, and he likes Carter, so he's not concerned

about my going away for a few days, and that makes it possible for me to handle some of these personal things and still carry on. You see, I told him last June that I wanted to -- so he's had a lot of notice.

GUEST: The thing is, he hates making appointments.

DCI: He just hates it, doesn't he.

GUEST: His acquaintance isn't terribly wide, in the first place. He lacks confidence -- he's been burned badly a couple of times -- he lacks confidence in his judgment of people, and is always slightly fearful that someone is trying to put something over on him, and therefore the people he's worked with he wants to stay, whether or not--

DCI: Hell, he would like to run the whole damn Government with about six fellows that he's known for a long time and likes, you know -- that's what he would like to do -- and not pay any attention to anybody else. (Laughing)

GUEST: That's right, yes -- wrapped around him like a Senator and his staff.

DCI: That's exactly right, you know. Well, Kennedy was a little that way himself, you know.

GUEST: Yes. In fact, I imagine that with Johnson more is returned from the White House to the machinery of Government than under Kennedy. But Kennedy had this marvelous thing about appointments -- here he appointed you, McNamara, Rusk, in all these absolutely critical jobs, on the basis of

a couple of hours of conversation -- and of course a lot of checking, and so on.

DCI: Yes, did a lot of checking. And then of course he had a great team going for him in Bobby and Sarge Shriver, you know, and others -- there was you, and there was Ken O'Donnell, and others, that were talent scouts for him. President Johnson hasn't got that, you see.

GUEST: No.

DCI: What the hell, he talks to Clark Clifford and this other lawyer -- what's his name?

GUEST: Abe Fortas.

DCI: --Abe Fortas. Well, hell, Clark hasn't got the widest acquaintances in the world, you know.

GUEST: It's in Washington -- he's got a great set of acquaintances in Washington -- and after all, nobody has even been through Washington.

DCI: That's right.

GUEST: --and St. Louis.

DCI: He talks a little bit to Tommy Corcoran. I told him last October -- I said, "Now get a team together, get four or five fellows to take six months" -- and I told him the story of when Paul Hoffman came down in 1948 to organize the Foreign Aid Program he was immediately

beset with speeches at rotary clubs and hearings on the Hill. So he got (Tex Moore) down and he said - now I want you to just recruit my organization. He needed a hell of a lot of people, you see, because he had to have these missions all over the world. And Tex Moore got about five or six fellows down here and they worked at it for six months. And he didn't do anything but screen these people, and ferret them out, and determine their availability and appreciation of their capabilities, and then laid them in front of Paul, you see. This was how he got Dave (Zeller) back, and how he got Averell Harriman, and how he got all these guys around him, you see. Well I told this to the President -- I said, "This is what you ought to do now, because you're going to have to select from a lot of fellows." Oh, he said, I'm doing it -- I'm doing it. Well he doesn't do it at all. He gets Clark Clifford over for lunch and they talk about every damn thing, and when Clark leaves at half past three he has done almost nothing, you know.

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: I mean, it isn't a business.

GUEST: Well, he has John Macy trying to do that, but John Macy has no access to him--

DCI: No. Now I talked to John this morning. John has very little

access to him -- and John knows a lot of fellows at a certain level, you see, but above that level -- John can't reach out for a Bob McNamara--

GUEST: No.

DCI: --you know, he can't do it. He's got quite a problem with my successor, and I'm urging him -- in the first place, I wanted Nick Katzenbach.

GUEST: Yes, he would have been great.

DCI: Yes, he would have been great. He's gone. Now I have come to the conclusion that unless he's willing to take one of these very able fellows out of a very important post and put him over here -- such as Cy Vance or Dave Bell -- that we better look right in this building, because you've got more good people right in this building -- I want to just show you something. Have you got a minute?

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: I want to show you something here. This is damned interesting. Now starting here, here's this organization .....

Here's the Executive Director, (who is kind of a controller) -- Kirkpatrick has 16 years in the Agency and 21 years in the Government. His Deputy has 17 years in the Agency and 21 years in the Government. Here's the Office of Budget and Program Analysis, 13 years. Here's the Inspector General, 17 years. And here's the General Counsel, 16 years. Now, pretty good degrees -- here's a Ph. D. here, a Doctor of Law here. Then you come over

to Ray Cline, the DDI, a Ph. D., 14 years, 18 years in intelligence. Here's his Research Staff Director, 16 years, Ph. D. Here's his Collection Staff Director, 17 years. Here's his Office of Central Reference, 17 years, 19 years in intelligence. Here's his Office of Basic Intelligence, 12 years; Office of Current Intelligence, Ph. D., 16 years; Board of National Estimates ..... Board of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, 14 years, Ph. D.; Abbot Smith, 16 years, Lt. General Barnes, 7 years, Jim Cooley, a Doctor of Law, 12 years, [redacted] a Ph. D., 12 years. Now you come over (b)(3) (b)(6)
to Dick Helms, and Helms 16 years, 21 years in intelligence, Karamessines 16 years, 21 years. Here's Jim Angleton, 16 years. Here's Lloyd George who just retired, 16 years; Cord Myer, 15 years -- Gerald Miller [redacted] (b)(3)
[redacted] -- 15 years. All of (b)(3)
these guys. You come over here to the technical side. This is a new Division that I built up. Bud Wheelon, a Ph. D. from MIT has two years, but for 10 years prior to that time with the Space Technology Laboratory he was on a full-time basis on our projects, so he was pretty close, you see. Here's (Jim Reber) on the COMOR Staff, 15 years, a Ph. D. Here's Ting Sheldon, 12 years. Here's the Deputy Director for Support, 16 years. Now this is a hell of a lot of (depth) there.

GUEST: Really now a professional service.

DCI: Now when I say -- and I was in and talking to John Macy about it -- I say here is a professional service. Now maybe the thing to do is to take a man here -- and God knows there's no organization in the Government that's got the wealth of people, in terms of experience and intellectual training, that is here -- and pick one of them -- and I don't know which one to pick -- and put him right in there. And then take Carter, who is his Deputy -- and that's a four-star job, and he's only got three stars, but give him his fourth star, and have him serve as Deputy, and he's got his fingers on the management. And this whole damn organization would stay right put, right the way it is. And I think the time might come it might be here -- instead of reaching out and trying to get some hotshot businessman or Chairman of the Democratic National Committee in the State of Colorado, or something else, you know, and running the risk of all the hazards that Kennedy took when he asked John McCone to come back here, you know, to get somebody that's right here and knows this organization, that might be the thing to do.

GUEST: Well, this would obviously be a good thing to do, except that the President will wonder how he rates on the Hill, and if something goes terribly wrong wouldn't it be better to have someone who's so publicly respectable and commands such support that it would bear some of the brunt--

DCI: That's just exactly the same -- and I know what you mean --

he called me and asked me who I thought ought to be Ambassador to Saigon and I said there's only one man who could be Ambassador to Saigon and that's Alexis Johnson. He's a trained diplomat, he knows the area, he's got the complete respect of the Department, of the White House, of the Defense Department. He's got your confidence CIA. He said, "He hasn't got the national stature." He said, "Cabot Lodge, you know, he was a candidate for Vice President. I've got to get somebody to match that." I said, "There's only one other fellow that was a candidate for Vice President and (you're it)." (Laughter) But, seriously, you could take Dick Helms and Dick Helms could run this place.

GUEST: To Dick that's what I said -- oh hell, this was two or three weeks ago -- and that's the way he felt -- I thought the time had come for a professional to do it.

DCI: Yes, I know. Well, for your information, I was downtown talking just that way to John Macy and Clark.

If you talk with Mac Bundy -- and you'll be seeing him when he gets back next week--

GUEST: Yes.

DCI: --discuss this with him -- and do that, will you?

GUEST: Yes, I will.

DCI: Because Mac's opinions are very (much respected). Do you want me to transcribe this thing?

GUEST: Yes. If your secretary would do that--

DCI: Then we can take the whiches and thats from this -- as my friend Henry Wriston used to say to his secretary - "Take this and which it and that it for me." (Laughter)

Well, thanks for coming out, Arthur.

GUEST: Thank you very much.