

11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
 Executive Secretary
 CIA Management Committee

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)

SUBJECT : 21 October 1971 Request from
 Mr. Ehrlichman

1. On your behalf, recently called my attention to a cryptic entry in Colonel White's official minutes of the 11 November 1971 Executive Committee meeting. This entry noted that I had reported that work on the "Ehrlichman request" was in train and would discuss the details of this sensitive matter privately with Mr. Helms. In light of recent events, it was obviously desirable to check the record and ascertain precisely what request was being referred to.

2. The matter in question deals with work stimulated by a 21 October 1971 memorandum to Mr. Helms (as DCI) signed by Mr. Ehrlichman. In this memo Mr. Ehrlichman asked that the DCI furnish copies of the actual documents cited in a 19 March 1970 memorandum from the DCI to Dr. Kissinger forwarding (at the latter's request) a list of intelligence reports bearing on the November 1968 Vietnam bombing halt which were affected by President Johnson's "freeze" imposed in early October 1968.

3. There were two responses to Mr. Ehrlichman's 21 October 1971 request. These were made in our memoranda of (respectively) 16 November and 19 November 1971. (Both of these memoranda were drafted by me and signed by Mr. Helms.)

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4. Copies of the Ehrlichman request and our two responses are appended hereto. Our responses forwarded the full texts of the actual documents enumerated therein. I am not appending separate copies of these full texts with this note but complete lists of the documents that were forwarded are attached to the copies of our replies to Mr. Ehrlichman.

5. Even scrutinizing this matter with 20-20 hindsight in the climate of May 1973, I still regard this particular request of Mr. Ehrlichman as having been perfectly proper and consider our responses to it both correct and legitimate.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

cc:

[redacted]

Mr. Houston

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1971

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: October-November 1968 Vietnam Intelligence Data

On 19 March 1970 you forwarded a memorandum to Henry Kissinger containing lists of material bearing on the November 1968 halt of the bombing of North Vietnam. At that time, you indicated that much of this material was not available for distribution because of a "freeze" imposed on the circulation of intelligence reports and preparation of analytic studies by President Johnson during the month of October 1968.


It has been requested that these documents (lists attached at Tabs A-D) be obtained despite prior restrictions on their distribution. Would you please forward copies of the requested documents?


John D. Ehrlichman

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR


16 NOV 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John D. Ehrlichman
Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs

SUBJECT : October - November 1968 Vietnam
Intelligence Data

1. Attached hereto are the documents requested in your memorandum of 21 October, arranged in four attachments paralleling the format of the attachments to your request.

2. Your Attachment 2 lists a document that is also listed in your Attachment 3: "29 Oct 68 -- Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks." Since the document in question deals with President Thieu's views, it belongs (and is here included) with Attachment 3.



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4. All of the documents forwarded in this memorandum's four attachments are based on sensitive sources and methods. The last document in Attachment 2 (the 9 Nov 68 Ky report) and all of the reports here forwarded under Attachment 3 are based on a source of particular sensitivity which is still producing valuable intelligence on matters of great interest. We would appreciate your ensuring that these documents are properly protected and do not get involved in any declassification exercise.

5. It may interest you to know that Senator Fulbright, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has written me a letter requesting a full set of documents, such as those appended hereto, which the Agency has produced on Indochinese matters from 1947 to the present. This request was levied in the context of the study commissioned on July 4 of this year (1971) by Senate Resolution 140. Obviously we cannot make such documents available to the Senator or to the Foreign Relations Committee. We are searching for ways to handle this request without giving direct affront but have not yet been able to devise a method for dealing satisfactorily with the overall problem it poses.

6. I mention the above matter because, as you are well aware, the declassification of the bulk of the 47-volume Pentagon study entitled, "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967" has clearly set the stage for this additional request from Senator Fulbright and given him a precedent to cite in making it. I believe Secretary Laird has also been asked for certain intelligence documents produced by the Defense Department on Indochina during the same 1947-1971 period. What we have, thus, is a continuing problem that in my opinion needs to be addressed as such. I would not want to see responses made to individual queries that could lead to any further general declassification of broad categories of sensitive intelligence documents.

15/
Richard Helms
Director

Attachments

- 2 -

"October - November 1968 Vietnam Intelligence Data"

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee

Copy No. 1 - Addressee w/atts

Copy No. 2 - DDCI/ER w/o atts

Copy No. 3 - DDP w/o atts

Copy No. 4 - C/FE w/o atts

Copy No. 5 - SAVAV *w/ H Spec Proj*

Copy No. 6 - SAVA *Spec Chono*

Copy No. 7 - SAVA *V AS/ Chono*

Copy No. 8 - Mr. Colby

Attachment 1

"TUESDAY LUNCH" STUDIES

<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>
1 October 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam (23-29 September 1968)
8 October 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam South of the 20th Parallel (30 September-6 October 1968)
October 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam (7-13 October 1968)
22 October 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam South of the 20th Parallel (14-20 October 1968)
October 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam (21-27 October 1968)
November 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam South of the 20th Parallel (28 October-3 November 1968)
November 1968	Recent Activities in North Vietnam (4-10 November 1968)

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Attachment 2

KY REPORTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>
18 Oct 68	Reactions of the GVN and Vice President Ky Concerning the Proposed Bombing Halt
19 Oct 68	Special South Vietnamese Cabinet Meeting of 16 Oct 1968 and Vice President Ky's Reaction to the Bombing Halt Proposal
21 Oct 68	Views of Vice President Ky on the Proposed Bombing Halt
23 Oct 68	Further Views of Vice President Ky on the Present Bombing Halt Negotiations
24 Oct 68	Views of Vice President Ky on the Proposed Bombing Halt as of 23 October 1968
28 Oct 68	Views of President Thieu and Vice President Ky on the Proposed Bombing Halt
28 Oct 68	Views of Vice President Ky as of 27 Oct 1968 on the Proposed Bombing Halt
29 Oct 68*	Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks

9 Nov 68

Vice President Ky's Views Concerning the Stalemated Paris Talks and the GVN Position

*Belongs in Attachment 3, not Attachment 2.

Attachment 3

THIEU REPORTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>
19 October 1968	President Thieu's Concern Over Certain Points Under Discussion Preparatory to a Bombing Halt
25 October 1968*	Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's 21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon
26 October 1968	President Thieu's Views Regarding the Issues Involved in Agreeing to a Bombing Halt
29 October 1968	Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks
7 November 1968	Presidential and Vice Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks
16 November 1968	Views of the Vietnamese President and Vice President Concerning the Paris Talks

*See cover memorandum.

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Attachment 4

THIEU AND KY REPORTS - POST 1 NOVEMBER

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
<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>
2 Nov 68	Vice President Ky's Reaction to President Johnson's Bombing Halt Speech
4 Nov 68	
5 Nov 68	
6 Nov 68	
8 Nov 68	Vietnam Press Director's Claim that President Thieu's Initial Refusal to Join the Paris Talks Has Indirectly Increased His Freedom of Action and That the Government is Now Preparing a New Peace Proposal
9 Nov 68	Vice President Ky's Surprise at President Thieu's Proposing the "Our Side, Your Side" Formula at His 8 November Press Conference
11 Nov 68	Remarks of Vice President Ky on the Paris Talks Impasse and Suggestions on Resolving It

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19 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John D. Ehrlichman
Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs

SUBJECT : October - November 1968 Vietnam
Intelligence Data

REFERENCE : My memorandum on this subject
of 16 November 1971

Appended hereto is a copy of the memorandum entitled
"Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's 21 October 1968 Visit to
Saigon" that was sent to Mr. Rostow and Secretary Rusk on
25 October 1968. This is the temporarily missing document
that should have been included in Attachment 3 of our
16 November response to your 21 October request. You now
have complete versions of all of the documents that you asked
for on 21 October.

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/jes

Copy No. 1 - Addressee w/att

Copy No. 2 - DDCI/ER w/att

Copy No. 3 - DDP w/att

Copy No. 4 - C/FE w/att

Copy No. 5 - SAVA *W.H. Spec Proj*

Copy No. 6 - SAVA *Mac Chirod*

Copy No. 7 - SAVA *VAS Chano*

Copy No. 8 - Mr. Colby (FBI) ~~TOP SECRET~~

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25 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's
21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon

1.

[Redacted]

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2. [Redacted] Nguyen Phong Thiep, member of the South Vietnamese observer delegation to the Paris talks, [Redacted] returned to Paris on 22 October 1968 from a one day visit to Saigon, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Chanh Thanh instructed Phong to tell South Vietnamese Consul General and observer delegation chief Phan Dang Lam that, until the commencement of second stage talks, substantive discussions between the Americans and the South Vietnamese would take place solely in Saigon and Lam thus bore no responsibilities in this area. This was in response to Lam's complaint that he was not being kept fully informed about talks in Saigon. [Redacted] Thanh promised to keep Lam better informed, and this has been borne out by an increase in reporting from Saigon to Paris. [Redacted]

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3. On the composition of the South Vietnamese delegation, Thanh told Thiep that Pham Van Thinh, South Vietnamese Ambassador in Bern, and Le Van Li, Vietnamese delegate to the United Nations Organizations in Geneva, were being added to the South Vietnamese

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delegation and would be arriving soon in Paris. Vu Vuong Bac, prominent Saigon lawyer, probably will not join the delegation because of the press of personal business in Saigon. Nguyen Ngoc Linh, Director of Vietnam Presse, has insisted that he be given the personal rank of Ambassador as a precondition for his joining the delegation as spokesman. [REDACTED] Linh bases this demand on his belief that Mr. William Jordan, U. S. Mission spokesman, has the same rank. Thanh told Thiep that he doubted that he could agree to this condition. For the job of military delegate, Thanh said that former IV Corps Commander and Revolutionary Development Chief General Nguyen Duc Thang was being actively considered but that no decision has been made.

4. During his visit to Saigon, Thiep had a private talk with President Nguyen Van Thieu. [REDACTED] Thieu said that there was no fundamental disagreement between himself and the Americans on the question of ultimately permitting the National Liberation Front to participate in the political life of South Vietnam by standing for public office in free elections. The main difference was rather the point of permitting the Liberation Front to take part in the negotiations without first having established their right to do so in this way. President Thieu said that he was afraid that chaos would result in Saigon if the Liberation Front joined the negotiations as a separate entity. He said that he expected trouble from the military, the Catholics and the militant Buddhists. Among the military, he believed the main trouble would come from company grade officers and lower ranks since the general officers were fairly well under control and the field grade officers could understand why it might be necessary to make concessions to the Liberation Front. He said that he was less confident of the ability of the Catholic hierarchy to control the Catholics, particularly if the militant Buddhists began causing trouble.