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INTERVIEW

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT**

**U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations**

**October 28, 1996**

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Madeleine Albright Interview  
October 28, 1996

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT (MA): I think what's important for you to know is where my views came from because of what I was advocating at the time.

DEREK CHOLLET (DC): OK.

MA: My situation was difficult in many ways. Daily, I was put into a context where I saw what the problems were with our policy *vis-à-vis* the British, the French, the Russians and a nonaligned group including a number of Moslem countries. So U.S. policy was under question every single day because the Secretariat in the Security Council would regularly report about whatever had happened on the ground on any given day. Then we would try to get a Security Council resolution or a Presidential statement. As the months progressed, I could see the disconnect between where we were, where the British and French were, and where the Russians were. And at various phases, especially in the early phase -- '93, '94 -- there was a representative from Venezuela whose name was Diego Arias who was an outspoken advocate of the Moslem perspective and very strong in the nonaligned movement, so all the contradictions kept coming together. Whenever I suggested we have the issue of lifting the arms embargo - or whatever suggestions I made -- either the British or the French ambassador would say to me, "You can't say anything; you have no troops on the ground." Every time. So I finally said to David Hannay, the British representative, "As a point of personal

privilege, I would like to ask you not to say this to me every single day." It didn't matter what the issue was, I heard this comment. But it was a sign of the contradiction that existed. So, in terms of real hand-to-hand negotiating, I was doing it every day. Not trying to resolve the problem, but trying to deal with how the problem was viewed by the other players at the UN. And I began to see that we were having a harder and harder time with every resolution because Mo Sacirbey, the Bosnian ambassador, would present his views primarily to the nonaligned nations. And they would bring those views into the Council. An early version of the Contact Group would get together, and the Russians would say, "We object to that." Then we would try to develop a balanced statement. But there was no way to balance genocide with other things so it was hard to get statements. The work got harder and harder. And that is something that I want you to know because I was the one that increasingly saw the contradictions inherent in our policy. That is, putting pressure on the Serbs; dealing primarily with the British and French; dealing with the issue of how UNPROFOR functioned; what the rules of engagement were; and the UN humanitarian mission. These elements were constantly in play and, increasingly, the contradictions appeared. That is definitely the context in which I saw the decision to pursue peace in the summer of '95.

DC: I think we can use that context. In the spring of '95, this disconnect among the Allies came to a head when a cease-fire brokered in part by former President Carter ended in early May and violence began again. There was renewed talk of UNPROFOR withdrawal. What was your thought at the time about that prospect?

MA: I saw this process taking place in New York: in the Principals' meetings I attended, the only thing discussed was the policy as it was. And so, I have to say -- there's no other way to put it -- I started agitating about the need for a review because there seemed such a disconnect between what was happening in Washington and what I was facing in New York -- probably as a mirror of what was happening on the ground. I was more aware than Washington of that reflection of the ground situation. For whatever reason, I saw a need for us to review our policy. That's when it really started for me.

DC: I see. This is a memo that you presented at a June 21st Principals' meeting.

MA: Right. I sat there listening in that meeting and decided that this memo was a good way to begin to change the policy. The memo basically outlined a few points about what could be done while trying to be fair in terms of pluses and minuses. But, whereas we kept talking about UNPROFOR staying, it became evident to me in listening to my colleagues that UNPROFOR was going to leave and that we had to figure out a way to use that fact as something to be used to pressure the Serbs rather than seeing it as a gift to the Serbs. That is where we turned it around and started letting it be known that if UNPROFOR left, the situation for the Serbs would be worse, not better. That's what I brought to the table. My memo was circulated. It became evident that Tony Lake was also dissatisfied with the *status quo*. This memo, then, was read by NSC people and, ultimately, I wrote the longer memo that went to the President.

DAVID GOLDMAN (DG): Do you know if that June 21st meeting was the first presentation of these new ideas you were agitating for?

MA: Yes. We had so many meetings on this issue and there was never anything *de novo*. I mean, different elements from a variety of places were discussed. I think you probably know that I had a different view of this conflict from the very beginning. I really did feel very strongly that some strong action needed to have been taken earlier. You are familiar with my views about the use of force. They've been documented by General Colin Powell, to whom I practically gave an aneurysm when I mentioned them. I continue to believe that had we done something earlier in terms of some bombing this situation would have been on its way to resolution earlier. Not to speak of what should have happened in the previous Administration. Nevertheless, I was the one in this Administration that kept thinking we were muddling through at certain times, and I must say that I was reinforced by what I was seeing in New York. I mean, even when I considered that maybe the U.S. shouldn't have an active role, the inherent contradictions in our policy were so evident in New York that it was clear to me that we were stuck. When we went through the Bihac episodes, I thought we would have pretty definitive bombing, but it turned out it wasn't definitive bombing at all. I was occasionally disgusted with the fact that our process to begin bombing was so cumbersome, and then when it happened, the bombing was so "pot-hole." So that became an issue. But when we finally did begin to bomb, and we ended up with the peacekeepers chained to the fences there were some dreadful moments for me. I will never forget. After the mortar hit the Tuzla nightclub, the press said to me, "So now do you feel better? This is what happened because you kept insisting on bombing." It was perfectly dreadful, especially since the bombing hadn't done what it was supposed to do. And the reason it hadn't

done what it was supposed to do was that the British and French had forces on the ground, and we didn't. That theme kept repeating itself. But, at one stage, Boutros-Ghali, who had been doing so much arguing as to who had the "key" and who was in charge, came to consult with the Council after President Chirac had come into office and had said either something had to be done or he was going to pull the French forces out. Boutros-Ghali came into the Council asking what to do, after we had had extensive discussions about him wanting all the power, and he said, "This is so big I can't figure out. This is a decision for the P-5." All the P-5 -- including the Russians, who had objected to the fact that Boutros-Ghali had the key in the first place -- said was, "This is your decision." But Boutros-Ghali had not wanted to take the decision, even after all the discussion of his powers.

DC: This would have been in July?

DG: When was Chirac's proposal?

DC: It wasn't during Srebrenica?

JIM O'BRIEN (JO): It was before.

MA: Before Srebrenica.

DC: Oh, I see. OK.

DG: When was Chirac's original proposal? It was June, right?

DC: Well, yes. He proposed it several times.

MA: Jamie Rubin, who worked on this issue with me, can fill you in on the dates. The reason that I got exercised about this was, as I said, because I had to deal with the British and French every single day on the subject. And, in the middle of all this, the

U.S. tried to lift the arms embargo, and we were defeated. Constantly the British and the French would say, "Why are you so crazy, pushing the arms embargo when our troops are on the ground and yours are not?" And so, as I keep saying, I was in the line of fire in terms of the contradictions.

JO: The other new element in the spring of '95 was the Croatian offensive.

MA: Yes. The Croatian military was empowered and the question then was what role they would play in the regional conflict. When we discussed this with the President, I thought that the Croats were doing what they wanted to do. They could not be stopped. There were those who were very nervous about the fact that the Croats and Serbs might fight and we would have the beginning of World War III. I didn't think that was going to happen. I thought that the risk was worth taking, especially since we were not in a position to stop them. I was concerned about how they would approach the humanitarian and human rights aspects, and it was all right to be concerned about that. But I didn't see it quite as apocalyptically.

DC: During the summer, though, your role as agitator began to get some traction, it seemed. Lake clearly agreed. The President, apparently, was also becoming convinced that a change in policy was necessary.

MA: Yes, my views gained some weight because I think the President liked them. Tony Lake, I think, had been in the difficult position of trying to be the honest broker, yet he and I had agreed on a lot of these issues for some time. I think we had probably disagreed on some of the early use of force because he didn't see where I had an exit strategy. But I think that we were on the same track on this. Then my memo went into the President.



I think it resonated because I said that Bosnia was going to overshadow everything the Clinton Administration did.

DC: You do say that in your June 21 memo.

MA: I do say it flat out. Yes.

DC: I mean, you say it in both memos.

MA: Well, I really believed it. One thing I say about myself is that I see more different kinds of foreigners than any other American official on a day-to-day basis. I mean, obviously, somebody like Ambassador Pamela Harriman sees more Frenchmen everyday, but I see the complete mix of foreigners everyday. So I see what effect we're having across the board everyday. And I could see that it didn't matter what the subject was we were talking about in New York, somehow the U.S. position on Bosnia affected it. I could just feel it. Also, I sit on the Security Council with the same fourteen people day after day -- breakfast, lunch and dinner. So when U.S. leadership is being questioned in one area, it affects our leadership in others. And so I could feel it; I could feel it with the Russians. So it was important for President Clinton to understand how this subject affected so many other subjects that we were dealing with. That's why the combination of contradictions and the necessity for showing how this was affecting other countries' views of the U.S. made a difference to me. I also had a sense of the calendar moving whether we wanted it or not, and UNPROFOR was going to end. I said this in the memo: *this situation is going to become an American problem one way or another.* Either because we had to extract UNPROFOR or because we would have to be there in some kind of follow-on force. So why not do it on our schedule rather than on

somebody else's schedule? And so I agitated for that. And it worked because I think the President and Tony were also seeing problems with our lack of policy. The President saw that it wasn't going anywhere. He said in our meeting that he didn't agree with everything in the memo -- he didn't say what it was he didn't agree with -- but he did say that he liked the thrust of it and he thought that was the right direction to go.

DG: This is the June memo?

DC: August 7.

MA: August, yes. He didn't see the June memo, I don't think.

DC: Right.

MA: The June memo provided a type of background for the larger Tony Lake memo. Although some of it was changed, it gave them something to chew on.

DC: Right. So between the June 21 memo and this memo that went inter-agency, had you been in touch with Lake at all, with what the NSC was doing?

MA: Yes. I spent some time talking with Tony, and Jamie Rubin spent some time talking with Sandy Vershbow.

DC: Just coordinating approaches, in a sense?

MA: You seek your allies, that's what was going on.

DC: Right.

DG: Where was State at this time?

MA: Not as interested in this.

DC: When you left the August 7th meeting, did you then participate in drafting the Lake script at all?

- MA: No. Because in the meeting with the President the decision was made that Tony Lake ought to go to London. In fact, I suggested it. I was sitting next to Tony and I said, "Somebody needs to go to Europe and present this case, and Tony would be a good person to go." Some of the script then became evident from the way the memo was written, but I did not collaborate.
- DC: Was it decided at that meeting that Holbrooke would lead the follow-on shuttle to the region?
- MA: The truth is I can't remember exactly when and how that was decided. I think Holbrooke was on vacation.
- DC: Yes. He was in Colorado.
- MA: I think the decision was that Holbrooke would have to do the actual hand-to-hand combat on the negotiations and that Tony would start it out. But I don't remember a discussion as to whether there was going to be a hand-off in London.
- DC: Let's backtrack about a month to the background for the London Conference. Starting in early July, when the safe areas started to come under siege, what was your view from the UN? What were you hearing from other UN leaders and cabling back to Washington about what we should do in response?
- MA: Part of the problem of the safe areas was that there was much second-guessing as to how they were set up in the first place. Were they viable? What have they shown? The person who had been very instrumental in setting up the safe areas was Diego Arias, the Venezuelan, who was no longer on the Council. But there were many questions such as why had we set up safe areas and what were we going to do with them. Also comments

that they didn't work anyway. It used to drive me crazy that there was a combination of the British, French and Russians that suspected that the Bosnians had lured them into the safe areas in the first place. So, for me, it was a matter of trying to defend the Bosnians, who were being slaughtered. It's very hard to describe the dynamics of the Security Council. It meets in little groups as either the P-5 or the P-3 or the Contact Group. One is always caucusing with best friends and then going into the next meeting and telling them what you said in the previous meeting. Everybody knows you're doing it, but it is a strange way of doing things. When I arrived there, the non-aligned countries had a caucus and most of the other permanent members treated it with disdain. I felt that one of the best things that I ought to be doing at the UN was to reach out to the non-aligned caucus. When I first went to the UN, the representative from Morocco was President of the Council and he was very helpful to us. So I became friends with him and I offered to start going to the non-aligned caucus once a month to brief them on our agenda -- or whenever they wanted anything. I still do it. It has helped all the issues that we deal with. But the biggest issue we were dealing with when I first arrived there was Bosnia. At that stage we had Morocco, Pakistan, and Djibouti -- Moslem countries -- and Diego Arias from Venezuela on the Council; thus, four out of six countries, at that stage, were dedicated to the Bosnians. My views were known, so I would talk to them. I tried to be a bridge between what was viewed as a very hard-line view -- the Russians -- and a *noblesse oblige* view -- the British and French. There wasn't a lot of blood-and-guts going on, in terms of the way the British and French felt about what was going on. It was a bloodless approach to the fact that this conflagration was going on,

so I was able to bridge that. So the non-aligned caucus -- even as membership shifted to other countries -- saw the safe areas as the only positive thing we had done. Whereas the British, the French, and the Russians clearly did not see the safe areas in that way. The discussion was carried on in that context.

DC: Were you familiar with the Chirac proposal to President Clinton to retake Srebrenica?

MA: I was familiar with it, but I don't think we ever took it seriously.

DC: On the lead-up to the July 21 London Conference, were you involved at all in the decision as to what the U.S. strategy should be?

MA: I was involved to the extent these issues came up in the Principals' meetings, which we had a couple of times a week. But, for the most part, I can't say that this was the only thing that I was doing. Did I have a view on certain things? Yes, I probably expressed it in the Principals' meetings, as my staff also did at lower level meetings. My staff would always sign off on strategy for their meetings.

DC: The challenge of implementing London was getting the Secretary General to agree to delegate his key, so to speak, to Janvier. There's been some question as to whether or not Boutros-Ghali was reluctant to turn over the key; there was some argument about what had been decided at London. Do you recall?

MA: *First of all, regarding the issue of the key: I cannot begin to tell you how many thousands of hours I spent talking to Boutros-Ghali about this. He would always say to me, "This is moot point. You know very well, Madeleine, I'm exhaust (sic) from all this. I am not a military leader. You know perfectly well that I don't make these things up by myself." And this is where I would go crazy because he would say, "Who are the*

military leaders? They are the French and the British. This is where I get my advice, from these military leaders." So the reason, then, that I was going crazy was that I could see the British and French saying one thing in the Contact Group, saying another in NATO, and blowing another thing into Boutros' ear. And Boutros still, to this day, says that the mistake that he made was that when he was in Paris asking for help with the number of troops, the French said that they could not give more troops unless they had command, and so he gave them the command. His story to me always was, "I am being told; I don't have the key anyway. I'm just holding the key but I am not the military person. I don't really make these decisions but I have to maintain the good name of the house. I have to protect the United Nations institution. So I have to keep the key." We would go through this hour after hour. He wasn't in New York during some of these discussions. He would always say he'd have to turn the key himself. Then he had an additional problem because the Russians were absolutely furious that we had made this decision; they were furious with Boutros-Ghali for having, in fact, let it be a decision that didn't have to go back to the Security Council. So while I was pressing him to keep the key open, the Russians were calling him up and saying, "Why did you do this in the first place?" Then the British and French were telling him what to do. His position, genuinely, was very complicated. He was also hearing from Akashi on the ground, who, really, I think, history will show did not want Boutros-Ghali to do anything anti-Serb because he basically had a different mentality about what was going on. But, finally, at one of these crucial phases, Boutros-Ghali was gone, and it was really Kofi Annan who was persuaded to leave the key open.

DC: I think that was the bombing in response to the Sarajevo marketplace massacre.

MA: Right. That was the second time.

DC: But they actually got him to agree to implement the Gorazde rules. Once, I know, the Secretary had to call him twice before noon.

DG: And supposedly he called a number of world leaders after the London Conference to discuss his concerns about the Secretary General.

MA: Yes, I'm sure he did.

DC: So you do recall that even after London there was a reluctance?

MA: Absolutely. But I don't think we will ever know the absolute truth as to whether Boutros-Ghali was telling the British and French that he was reluctant to do this because Akashi was telling him that it would have a certain effect. Then Boutros-Ghali blamed it on the British and French to me. He is very capable of doing and saying and playing games; this is one of those deals.

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BEGIN SIDE B, TAPE 1

MA: I think, also, in all fairness to everybody, that as the decisions were made -- whatever the decisions were; whether they were about the functional ability of the safe areas to exist, or whether we were, during the winter, trying to canton those heavy weapons in Sarajevo -- the decisions were never quite made by the right people. We were five people -- or whatever number there were at any given time in the Contact Group -- saying, "We should be doing this," without thinking through how difficult it was to

actually move the weapons from here to there, and who were going to be the people to monitor the weapons sites. People writing the resolutions were very concerned about where the commas were, but not so concerned about how things would be carried out on the ground. I remember how in Bihac, when we were looking at how to expand the safe area there and what it meant, people did not have the right amount of knowledge for what they were doing. I really didn't have enough of a sense of whether it was feasible; when they said they wanted the heavy weapons in a certain area by X number of hours, it was not known if it could happen.

DC: When the Lake mission and then the Holbrooke mission started off, what was your role in the process? How did you stay abreast of what was going on in the negotiations? What issues were you most concerned about?

MA: First of all, there was a constant flow back and forth of cable traffic, PCs, etc. Sometimes Dick and I would talk directly. Some of it was *ad hoc* and some of it was systematic. The issue that I was most involved in was the sanctions, and that was because sanctions discussions in the Security Council -- next to peace-keeping mandates -- are the most complicated. The attempt is made to impose sanctions on X country, and then leave yourself some leverage for either removing sanctions or extending them. The largest sanctions discussions in the Security Council have primarily to do with Iraq, and we have learned a lot from these discussions. The Iraqi sanctions are very tough and they don't have a lot of escape hatches to them. The only potential escape hatch is one having to do with weapons of mass destruction and oil. But, for the most part, I could see that we have our strength by the fact that nothing can be done on lifting Iraqi



sanctions unless we agree to it. There have been other sanctions regimes where we don't have that leverage in our hands. So, it was very hard for us to get the sanctions on the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs. It took great pains, because the Russians were not eager to do it. I felt very personally responsible for the sanctions. It was one of the few times we managed to get the upper-hand and it was a lever that we had that I felt was very important. So, my role -- from the time that we were able to get the sanctions imposed and throughout the whole process -- was to try to maintain them so that we would get the most out of them. Our conversations, whether they were with Holbrooke or Frasure, were carried on with me as the keeper of the sanctions. Now, in addition to that, I also had great interest in the War Crimes Tribunal and felt -- and continue to feel -- that it's one of the most important parts of peace, if we ultimately ever get total peace in the Balkans. The war crimes aspect is a very important part of the reconciliation. Not everybody has felt that way. There has been a sense from some that the War Crimes Tribunal got in our way, and yet it became evident, for instance, when people were going to Dayton, that the fact that Karadzic and Mladic didn't go to the talks was thanks to the existence of the War Crimes Tribunal. So you can see, I have been the one who has seen the contradictions of what was going on, on a daily basis, and yet also the one who "sees herself most responsible for two of the biggest barriers to the peace process" (*speaker's quotes*). And yet, as far as I'm concerned, they are the two issues that provide us the most leverage. So that's how I stayed involved in the peace process. After Dayton, or even in the lead-up to Dayton, there was less and less amount of work that the Security Council was doing on Bosnia. It slacked off. We used to meet

frequently; I don't know how many hundreds of pieces of paper there were on this. We had Presidential Statements every other day; we had statements by the Security Council to the press; we worked on resolutions; Sacirbey would come in to complain about something; the Croats would call. It was constant activity. But after a while that began to slack off, and what we really worked on was sanctions and war crimes.

DC: I'd like to ask about an incident during the shuttles that actually occurred in New York, when you were in the final negotiations to get what were called at the time the further agreed principles and we now call the New York principles. There was some serious negotiation in your office with the Secretary, Holbrooke, you, and Sacirbey. Do you recall anything specific that had to do with the Secretary's first intervention into this peace process?

MA: You have to understand my role in this. I was viewed primarily as somebody whom the Bosnians trusted more than they trusted anybody else. When I sent something to the Bosnians, they knew that we were serious. It seemed to carry some additional, different type of weight. My role in New York was basically the fact that we provided the venue. I mean, these people were all smoking all over the place (*laughter*). We had Bosnians in one room and Serbs in the other and everyone was running around; it was pretty crazy. There was a meeting where Christopher became fairly irritated with Sacirbey. Sacirbey used to come into my office all the time before that meeting and feel that he was in a friendly locale. Now, however, he had me sitting there saying to him, "This is unacceptable; you have to go along with it." But I was not involved in these discussions; they were basically Dick Holbrooke's discussions.

DC: Earlier that month NATO had launched the air campaign against Bosnian Serb positions. What was your perspective from the UN in terms of what other representatives were saying about the air campaign and its limits? Particularly the Russians.

MA: I used to constantly go into meetings and say we had to do something. And, again, this is where we got into the business of the U.S. not having troops on the ground; this was the endless discussion. The Russians basically said that NATO had no business in there; this was the time that they wondered why, for instance, this matter was not coming back to the Security Council (after the Secretary General had given up the key). This was the time when the bombing didn't work, when the hostages were taken. I felt bad. We had bombed without really getting any benefit from it. This is when practically on a daily basis I said that we needed to be more forceful about bombing despite what was going on. At one stage, actually, I had a lunch for Admiral Boorda -- who had been in the region before -- and we had a discussion about the time when, as a NATO commander, he felt as much responsibility for other countries' troops as he did for his own and he considered it an insult, basically, that people would think that we would not care about other countries' troops. That was the whole basis of the NATO operation -- that we would have the same regard for other countries' troops as we would for our own. There was a constant discussion about the U.S. saying bombing was needed without putting up anything in terms of equity. "You have no responsibility for this." This would go on daily.

DG: Was the sentiment the same after the shelling of Sarajevo? We've had a sense that there was a consensus at that point that we had to do something.

MA: I think there was more of that. There was that sense but there still was the feeling that we were not doing our share because we had exposed the troops who were now chained to the fences and they were not our peacekeepers. There was a sense that we actually had the easy part of this. Then, when I brought the pictures in from Srebrenica, that was another turning point.

DG: When was this?

MA: August.

DC: Could you briefly describe the background to that?

MA: Obviously, there had been a lot of discussions about Srebrenica. But, first of all, there had been Zepa, a great horror, and then people heard more and more about what had happened in Srebrenica. I finally managed to get the pictures released. Have you ever seen these pictures?

DC: I saw what was in the press.

MA: Well, there were a lot more and many that couldn't be released to the press. They basically showed the people in the stadium; then you see a field undisturbed; then the field where they had begun to dig; then the field with heavy tire tracks. The whole story was there; I was able also tell the story with the pictures. People were genuinely shocked, especially the Germans. It was palpable there that day in terms of seeing the evidence of massacres. There was accumulating evidence of all kinds of horrors that made people face the realities -- even those who were the most dubious.

DC: In an early October PC it was decided that the proximity talks would be held in the U.S.

Do you recall discussion about whether the venue should be in the U.S. or in Europe?

MA: I do. There was some debate about whether we should own them or not. I think the debate went back and forth. The underlying theme had been: why can't the Europeans do this without us? Why do we have to do everything ourselves? Every time we thought they could, they couldn't. So there was a question about bringing the talks to New York, but did we really want the big show in New York? I do remember all that. My line on this had actually been -- and it's a line in this memo -- unless we do it, it doesn't happen. That was my problem from the very beginning; I thought that we needed to lead more.

DC: While Dayton was going on, were you primarily concerned with the sanctions issue? I know that there was a lot of discussion going on at the Security Council at the time about the mechanism for lifting the sanctions even as the parties were negotiating.

MA: First of all, I did not make myself particularly popular because I thought that we had to hold on to the sanctions.

DC: Holbrooke wanted to lift the sanctions as soon as Dayton began, right?

MA: Yes, Holbrooke wanted to lift them **before** Dayton. And there was some discussion about the fact that he might, in fact, have announced that they were to be lifted. I did not think they should be lifted. Holbrooke then said Milosevic wouldn't go to Dayton if sanctions weren't lifted; then he said that Milosevic wouldn't stay. I mean, those were probably some of the most serious discussions we ever had, mainly because I knew how hard it had been to get sanctions in the first place. And that it was so rare that we had

managed to have the sanctions resolution written in such a way that they couldn't move without us. It was so rare that we had the upper hand. It was one of those things where, usually, when one is running out of time, we had to make the deal because it would have gone the other way if we hadn't. This time, I could just sit there and say to the Serbs, "All right, the sanctions will stay if you don't deal." So, part of it was knowing that we all have different jobs in life, and I could see that -- for once -- the lever was fully in our hand and that if we were to give it up, it had to be given up for something good. I still believe this: Milosevic responds to strength. That has been my considered opinion from the very beginning. Whatever the strength is, he needs to see the U.S. as the major power. I thought it didn't make sense to give up that power. It turns out I was right.

DC: Was it difficult to hold that line in the Security Council during Dayton?

MA: In the Security Council? No. Harder in this government.

DC: Really?

DG: Besides Holbrooke, who were you fighting against?

MA: Everybody. Leon Fuerth and I were doing this.

DC: Incidentally, had you coordinated most of your sanctions work with Fuerth throughout the entire period?

MA: Yes. I had some people here from his shop. Some of the discussions that we had in New York were so complicated in terms of the banking sanctions and various other things, that we worked very closely with Fuerth. I think, basically, the bottom line on the sanctions was that they had a short shelf-life, and this is what somebody finally realized. Their shelf-life ran out after holding fair and free elections and we really

didn't finish these arguments until three weeks ago. We debated with the French -- just now -- whether it was the **holding** of the fair and free elections or the **declaration** of them as fair and free that would lift the sanctions. And I think we honestly got as much as we could from those sanctions and, the truth is, so does Dick Holbrooke now. Dick said to me at a certain stage that they were the "crown jewels" and that we had done the right thing to hold on to them.

DG: Do you remember whether they were losing their effectiveness by 1995?

MA: Yes, to some extent, except for their symbolism. Just the way that now the Outer Wall is symbolic. I don't think it's particularly hurting. This is the next fight; I mean I'm here trying to hold on to the Outer Wall.

DC: The reason the question comes up is that Fuerth told us that, in his view, sanctions were going to run out in the summer. It was so difficult to maintain them that eventually they weren't going to work any more. And that it was going to be tough to keep the Allies on board. The shelf-life was coming to an end.

MA: Yes. But part of the problem, too -- and people needed to focus on this -- was that there was a question about our ability to reimpose sanctions. Reimposing is easier said than done. I mean, we could say, "Yes, we'll do it," but there were monitors who had to go along with this. Who were going to be the monitors? Could they be brought back in and out? Who was paying for the monitors? You couldn't keep changing your mind about it. The other part that made the sanctions hard to hold in New York, to a certain extent, was that the people who were with the U.S., such as the Germans -- they were

quite helpful -- were being lobbied by the riparian states that felt they were being hurt by the sanctions. Also, there is a whole theory that people don't like sanctions at all.

END OF INTERVIEW

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