

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21457

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Approved for Release CIA Historical  
Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: December 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:45 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Strobe Talbott

Robert Gallucci

Nancy Ely-Raphel

James Pardew

DEFENSE

John White

Walter Slocombe

USUN

David Scheffer

CIA

Dennis Blair

Norman Schindler

JCS

Michael Byron

John Van Alstyne

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

IFOR Update

1. Deputies agreed that State should: approach the Government of Brunei once again about providing funds to support Pakistani forces previously attached to UNPROFOR and now slated to join IFOR; approach the Government of Pakistan and request that their forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain until funding can be found; and request that the UN provide temporary logistical support to the Pakistani units until donor funding can be found. (Action: State). They further agreed that OSD should continue efforts to obtain funding support for Pakistan from Saudi Arabia (Action: OSD). ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classify by: Andrew Sens

Reason: 1.5(a)(d)

Declassify on: 12/28/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Eastern Slavonia

2. Deputies agreed to recommend to the President that he approve an approach to the North Atlantic Council to extend NATO's in extremis commitment to help withdraw UNCRO forces to forces participating in the new operation in Eastern Slavonia (Action: NSC). They also agreed that appropriate calls should be made to Congress before any public confirmation (Action: OSD/NSC). (Note: On Friday, December 29, the President approved the recommendation). (C)

Military Stabilization: Equip and Train

3. Deputies approved the attached State paper regarding policy, goals, leadership, objectives, concept and next steps on equipping and training for Bosnian Federation forces. They reiterated that no U.S. military personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be involved in the program but agreed that Defense Attaches in third countries could be involved. They agreed that we would channel U.S. assistance through the Federation, that we would encourage the Bosnians to obtain the services of a competent U.S. contractor to coordinate the equip and train effort and that the U.S. would have an "integrator" on the ground representing the U.S. Equip and Train task force. (C)

4. Deputies agreed on the need to continue to press the Bosnians to sever their military supply relationship and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran as the precondition for U.S. assistance and that Lake would spell out the details of our expectations with Foreign Minister Sacirbey on December 29 (Action: NSC/State). (C)

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/28/95 1

## US Policy and Equip and Train

Military stabilization in the Balkans should be achieved through a combination of arms limitations and the provision of equipment and training to the Federation in a manner that creates a military balance conducive to peace in the region.

As significant as the arms control measures are, they will not, in themselves, be sufficient to achieve adequate military stabilization over the short term. Federation armed forces, which have been the most severely constrained by the arms embargo, will need to obtain sufficient military equipment and training to establish an effective self-defense capability, consistent with the weapons ceilings established by the peace agreement.

The US will work with other countries to ensure that Federation armed forces obtain the necessary equipment and training over the coming year. This will be essential to making the peace agreement self-sustaining and to ensuring Bosnia-Herzegovina's right to self-defense. However, it is also important to prevent a situation in which the Federation or its members feel they can resume the war. US civilian contractors are now completing an assessment of the requirements of Federation armed forces.

The conduct of such a program would be contingent on the GOBH ending all military support and assistance relationships with Iran and extremist forces and their withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### US Policy Goals and Equip and Train

Two principal US policy goals in Bosnia relate directly to the concept of equip and train:

- Achieve a stable military balance in the region.
- Eliminate radical fundamentalist influence in Bosnia.

To achieve these goals, an internationally supported program is required to put in place a Federation military force capable of deterring ground attacks and defending Federation territory should deterrence fail. This capability must be in place to the extent possible over the coming year.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/28/95 2

**Leadership of the Equip and Train Program.**

US leadership of the international equip and train effort is required to achieve the policy goals described above. Without US leadership, equipping and training will be fragmented, less effective, perhaps destabilizing, and subject to the actions of nations seeking to undermine US goals. The Bosnians may increase their reliance on supporters who are unacceptable to the US and alarming to Zagreb and Belgrade. Additionally, without US leadership, the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia are likely to continue to develop separate armies independent of the Federation.

US Leadership of the equip and train effort entails three requirements:

- a strong diplomatic effort to identify and coordinate the international donors;
- indirect and limited US-Bosnian military cooperation (orientation visits, access to some US equipment, an IMET program); these, consistent with the international effort;
- a US contractor to manage the execution of the equip and train program.

US leadership along these lines will increase our ability to control the origin, type and extent of assistance provided to the Federation. By extension, this will increase our ability to reassure our NATO allies, Zagreb and Belgrade, and make the case that a limited equip and train program for the Federation is consistent with the Dayton Accords and IFOR impartiality. In addition, this kind of US leadership will increase the effectiveness of the equip and train effort in providing a sufficient defense capability for the Federation.

**Objectives of the Equip and Train Program.**

- Enhance military stability and prevent an arms race in the Former Yugoslavia.
- Promote unity in the Federation.
- Create an effective Federation civilian structure capable of command management of the Federation military.
- In one year, equip and train a Federation military force capable of deterring ground attacks on Federation territory by Srpska and successfully defending Federation territory from a revived Bosnian Serb Army, with no more than modest material support from Belgrade, should deterrence fail.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C05962614

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/28/95 3

-Minimize the possibility of destabilizing influence from foreign forces.

-Over the long term, promote an integrated military structure in B-H which is oriented toward Europe and NATO and is a stabilizing force in the region.

-Protect IFOR's position of even-handedness among the parties in B-H by isolating the equip and train program from IFOR and its US military component.

**US Equip and Train Concept.**

A US Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans will direct a Task Force in the State Department to develop and implement the US program to lead the international effort to equip and train the Federation. The task force organization is attached. The US program will be governed by these principles:

-The US will lead the international effort to equip and train Federation forces. This effort will include European and Asian, as well as potential Middle Eastern donors.

-The program will provide sufficient deterrence and defense capability for the Federation.

-The threat to the Federation is defined as renewed shelling of Federation population centers and/or attack by a revived Bosnian Serb Army with no more than modest material support from Belgrade. A capability for a sustained offensive or for defense against regional powers would exceed the concept.

-Emphasis will be given to obtaining as much defensive and deterrence capability in the first twelve months as is consistent with US goals, although a long term program is required.

-The Institute for Defense Analyses assessment of Federation forces, with the approval of the Federation leadership, will form the basis of defining the equip and train requirement.

-No US troops will directly participate in equipping and training the Bosnians. However, IMET and orientations in the US and other indirect activities are authorized; these, to be consistent with the international effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/28/95 4

-Most equip and train funding will be provided from non-US sources. As appropriate, donors will also be asked to contribute equipment and required training to be applied against the requirement established by the US and the Federation. The US will lead the effort to establish donors from the international community. The US will create an international coordinating body of donors.

-All funding of the equip and train program in Bosnia will be done through the Federation structure, initially working through the Federation Presidency and extending as far as possible down through a joint military command structure.

--The effort to promote military integration in the Federation will commence at the outset of the equip and train program with the provision of non-lethal equipment. Planning and management of the full program, however, will require augmentation by US contractors since current Federation structures are inadequate.

-- A US integrator, subordinate to the Military Stabilization Task Force, will monitor the activities of the US contractors and serve as the task force representative in Sarajevo.

-US companies, under contract to the Federation, will assist the Federation in developing its equip and train requirements and plans.

-US equipment will be available for purchase.

-Equip and train will be overt. Belgrade and Zagreb will be kept informed of planning and execution, as will our NATO allies.

-The program will be consistent with Annex 1B of the Peace Agreement and arms control agreements which result from it.

#### Next Steps

- Interagency approval of the equip and train concept.
- Special Representative and task force members visit to B-H immediately after approval to discuss IDA assessment and US concept with Presidents Zubak, Izetbegovic and others. The visit will also be used to secure the signed letter holding up Bosnian participation in IMET. (The letter pledges the Bosnians not to pass training or equipment on to third parties.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/28/95 5

- The Federation encouraged to contact US contractors to assist in the management of equip and train.
- Visit by the Special Representative to Belgrade and Zagreb to establish transparency.
- Development of a congressional and public affairs strategy.

#### What About the BSA?

The condition of two or three separate military forces in Bosnia is incompatible with the long-term goal of a peaceful, unitary state in Bosnia. Accordingly, the Special Representative also will begin to explore ways in which, after indicted war criminals are removed and after conditions are met, the BSA and Federation armed forces can begin a peaceful evolution that will prevent a reoccurrence of hostilities.

EUR/TMS x72797

12/28/95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


**STAFFING: US TASK FORCE ON MILITARY STABILIZATION.**

**James W. Pardew Jr. US Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Former Yugoslavia and Director of the Task Force (DoD)**

-Dr. Mark Sawoski. Executive Assistant (DoD)


-Secretary (State)

**Amb. Darryl N. Johnson. Deputy Director for International Coordination (State)**



**Dr. Christopher Lamb Deputy Director for Military Development in Bosnia. (DoD)**

-Equipment Officer (DOD--DSAA)




-Political/Military Staff Officer (State)

-LTG (ret) Rick Brown. Consultant support -- IDA

**TOTALS:**

DOD--4

State--3



**9 total full-time personnel**




C05962614

DEC-22-1995 13:02

3.03


# Current Military Structure and C<sup>2</sup> Relationships

President Zubak (?)  
Vice President Ganic  
MOD Prlic



command —————→  
coordination - - - - -

# Proposed Military Structure and C<sup>2</sup> Relationships




operational control —————→

coordination - - - - -

planning & mgt . . . . .

# Equip and Train Structure



E & T Implementation: \_\_\_\_\_

Requirements: - - - - -