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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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December 19, 1995

## MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International  
Development


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON  
Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the United Nations

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Eastern  
Slavonia (C)

Attached at Tab A is the Agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Eastern Slavonia scheduled for Wednesday, December 20, 1995, from 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. The Discussion Paper is attached at Tab B. Attendance is limited to principals plus one. (C)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

## Attachments

Tab A Agenda  
Tab B Discussion Paper

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 20, 1995  
LOCATION: White House Situation Room  
TIME: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

EASTERN SLAVONIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....NSC
- II. Intelligence Update.....CIA
- III. Mandate and Size of Force.....USUN
- IV. Conditionality.....State
- V. Recruitment.....State
- VI. U.S. Support.....OSD/State
- VII. Summary.....NSC

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**Discussion Paper**  
**The UN Operation in Eastern Slavonia**

With the publication of the UN Secretary-General's report on Eastern Slavonia and the USG's limited success in recruiting contributions to the operation from allied nations, it is time to take stock. The following issues need to be decided: the mandate and size of the operation; whether to condition approval of a new operation on Serb-Croat normalization of relations; our goals for recruiting troop contributors; and the nature of U.S. support to the operation.

1. **Mandate and Size:** The UNSYG report favors a robust, Chapter VII mandate for a division-size force (9,300 combat plus 2,000 support troops) for the operation in Eastern Slavonia. The report argues that the force must be able to "actively facilitate" the collection and destruction of weapons, deter attack and reassure the Serbs after following demilitarization. The report further rejects the assumption that the agreement is self-executing, noting that the past record of the parties leaves little room for optimism.

Up till now, the USG has favored a more modest operation. Our concept envisages the deployment of 4,000-5,000 troops composed of forces from a limited number of countries and led by a NATO member. Although a Chapter VII mandate may be necessary to allow the Transitional Administrator (TA) to "govern" the region, our concept strictly limits the role of the International Force (IF) to supervising/facilitating demilitarization and protection of the international presence. In addition, we would want an explicit statement that a Chapter VII mandate would not imply that the IF would either enforce compliance with the agreement or deter a Croat attack.

**Issues:** Should we continue to insist on a modest-size force, with a mandate limited to supervising demilitarization and protecting the international presence?  
-- Are there circumstances under which we would accept the UNSYG's recommendation for a division-size force, with robust ROE and an expansive mandate?

2. **Conditionality:** Our concept for the operation assumes that the parties to the agreement are committed to its peaceful implementation. We have asked both parties to take steps to reassure the UN and others that this is the case. They have done so by beginning to demobilize their forces. At the same time, in Paris Milosevic and Tudjman failed to agree on the normalization

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of relations, which would have been a major step toward reassuring the UN of their commitment to the agreement.

**Issues:** Should we condition approval of a new UN operation on Serbia and Croatia normalizing relations?

-- Would conditionality give Zagreb an excuse to resolve the matter militarily? Are we willing to take that risk?

3. **Recruitment:** In the past two weeks, the USG has approached a number of allies asking that troops be contributed to the Eastern Slavonia mission. To date, Russian, Belgian and Slovak battalions (about 2,000 troops) have been committed, although Belgium has indicated that it would reassess its contribution if no other NATO country joined. In addition, we have approached the Canadians, Danes, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedes and New Zealanders without success, although high-level intervention might change this (for the Norwegians and Canadians). Demarches are outstanding for Spain, Poland, Australia, Ireland and Argentina -- only one of which is a NATO country.

Our best bet is to ask either the Nordics or the Canadians to contribute a battalion. In the case of the Canadians, this might involve moving their 1,000 troops committed to IFOR (against the opposition of the UK), foregoing a possible contribution to a post-UNMIH international presence in Haiti, or both. For the Nordics, it might require moving part of the force committed to the U.S. AOR in IFOR (against Joulwan and DOD's opposition).

**Issues:** Is the contribution from another NATO key to Belgium remaining in Croatia and taking the lead?

-- Are we willing to ask for a change in IFOR's composition to get contributions for Eastern Slavonia?

-- Would reducing the Nordic or eliminating the Canadian IFOR contribution be least disruptive?

-- What is the sequence of our approach to allies? At what level should the approaches be made?

4. **U.S. Support:** Our recruitment efforts gain in credibility if the USG makes significant contributions of its own, so does the credibility of the mission as a whole. We have nominated an American as TA and pledged logistics and transportation support on a reimbursable basis so long as U.S. forces did not have to operate in the area.

U.S. support may be important in two additional areas. First, key allies have asked what we would be prepared to do if the operation broke down because of non-compliance. The Belgians, having been caught off guard once in Rwanda, insist on clarity. Though IFOR operates only a few miles away, we have not indicated formally what we would be prepared to do, even though the IFOR

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mission statement includes a commitment to securing the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces in Croatia. Second, the success of the TA will depend on a knowledgeable and effective staff. Getting these people into the field quickly will prove to be difficult for the UN. The USG may have to offer assistance.

**Issues:** Will we be prepared to assist in the emergency withdrawal of UN forces in Eastern Slavonia if necessary?  
-- Will U.S. agencies commit U.S. personnel to the TA on a non-reimbursable basis until the UN finds suitable persons to replace them?

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