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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

19 December 1995



Sarajevo: Serbs More Likely to Flee Than Fight



The Dayton Peace Agreement's provisions for transferring the Serb-controlled suburbs of Sarajevo to Federation control will present IFOR with its first major test. Immediately after Dayton, Bosnian Serb leaders began demanding changes to the provisions on Sarajevo and have used bellicose rhetoric, public demonstrations and a referendum to press for a delay, or greater autonomy. If these efforts fail, most Sarajevo Serbs probably would leave rather than submit to control by Muslim authorities, but it is not clear yet whether they would adopt a "scorched" earth retreat. Meanwhile, Bosnian Government leaders have consistently argued that no special protections are needed for the Serbs and that the Agreement must be implemented on schedule.



The First Tough Test Case

Implementing the Dayton peace plan's provisions for Sarajevo will be the first and certainly one of the most difficult challenges for the international community and IFOR. It will test the unity of NATO and is likely to help shape attitudes of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs on implementation of the rest of the plan. It will also have profound implications for the estimated 60,000 to 80,000 ethnic Serbs who live in areas of Sarajevo slated to return to Federation control.

Bosnian Serbs: Angry but Rudderless

The Bosnian Serb leadership, including its representatives in Dayton, were caught by surprise by the Dayton Agreement's provisions for Sarajevo.

•	th	is latest setback has deepened
	the disarray in the leadership which wa	as characterized as numb and
	unable to make any plans for concrete	action.

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The Treaty's Provisions for Sarajevo

The first test of the parties' intentions will be evident in whether and how they comply with the provisions for the withdrawal of their military forces from the Zone of Separation and later from all of the territory that is slated to be transferred to the Federation.

According to Article Four of Annex 1-A, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs must transfer and vacate "selected positions" (to be determined by the French commander of Sarajevo) along the Agreed Cease-Fire Line (ACFL) within seven days of the Transfer of Authority from the UN to NATO (20 December) on instructions from the IFOR Commander.

- Within 30 days the parties must complete withdrawal from the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation--one or 2 kilometers on either sides of the ACFL. The IFOR commander may determine the exact width of the ZOS. No one in the ZOS may possess weapons except as authorized by the IFOR commander.
- According to Article IV Section 3(a), the Serbs are required to withdrawal all of their forces from the rest of the Sarajevo suburbs to be transferred to the Bosnian Government within 45 days. The Bosnian Government is not allowed to occupy these territories until after 90 days, or at the discretion of the IFOR commander.
- IFOR is authorized to use "necessary force" to ensure compliance to these provisions.
 - Except for an occasional belligerent statement, neither Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic nor Bosnian Serb Army commander Mladic has taken a strong lead on this issue and Karadzic has become increasingly quiet in recent days, according to press reports. A more strident and powerful lead has been taken by Assembly Chairman Krajisnik, who probably will be a better barometer of Bosnian Serb thinking.
 - The Bosnian Serb Assembly on 17 December grudgingly said the government could negotiate an agreement for stationing IFOR troops on its territory that protects the people, property and sovereignty of the Serb Republic. The Assembly, however, disputed the transfer of Serb-controlled suburbs of Sarajevo to the Federation.

This memorandı	ım was prepared by		Office of European Analysis	
and	Office of Transna	tional Security and	rechnology Issues. Comments and	
queries are welc	ome and may be direc	ted to Chief, DCI In	teragency Balkan Task Force, at	
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Pressing to R	einterpret the Da	yton Agreen	ient		. • •
immediately a demonstration	eaders began dem fter the Agreemen s, and the 12 Dece ation supported th	t was initialed mber referen	d; subsequent	bellicose rh	netoric, public
	· 1	Europeans L	istening		
measures have forces are char	security guarantees been echoed by s ged with implemented High Represe	ome French pointing the agr	political and neements in Sa	nilitary lead rajevo, as w	ers, whose vell as the
December, to the Bosi	uty, Michael Stein, tried to reassure the hian Serbs that the ement, while he re	ooth sides, ac re might be s	cording to pro ome changes	ess reports. in impleme	He suggested ntation of the
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following the	Serb leaders have signing of the peac Buha claimed that	ce agreement	in Paris, Bosi	nian Serb re	
•	Koljevic said he l be provided by th who wanted to le international guar	e internation ave. Those v	al community who wished to	and the FR	Y for those
•	Foreign Minister been "officially re period" would be as "at least a few	ecognized" an postponed at	nd that it was t least "6-9 m	certain that onths" and r	the "handover night be as long
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	the international community would contribute "e those remaining in Sarajevo, he proposed a "Most the city would be divided into autonomous muni an international police force.	star model" in which
probably we	ic statements, which may misrepresent informal convere designed to reassure a jittery population and to be that they can pressure the international community and at concessions have already been made.	uy time. The leaders
•		·
special protagreement	overnment leaders, on the other hand, have consistent tections are needed for the Serbs and that the provision must be fulfilled. It is likely to reject any deal that pur integration or gives the Serbs significant autonomy	ons of the peace potentially extends the
•	President Izetbegovic has indicated publicly that participated in the siege of the city would be procriminals.	- .
•	Federation Vice President Ganic told Embassy o guarantees would "bring down the Dayton Accord	
•	In discussions with US Embassy officers, Prime demonstrated little concern about the fears of the opposed negotiations about Sarajevo fearing that to reopen issues the Bosnian Government considerations.	e Sarajevo Serbs and t the Serbs only hope
But Allo	owing IFOR In	
assuming f schedule. ' will focus o	forts by Pale authorities to prevent or at least delay the full sovereignty, they probably will allow IFOR into the They probably assume that IFOR (and the French conton its military tasks of separating forces and will not a facilitating the actual transfer of political authority	Serb Sarajevo on ntingent in Sarajevo) become actively
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rajevo, most Serbs bmit to direct, or
ded on by alarmist ing under
every territorial ntees are not likely enge by the
recent days have revisit the accord leaveplanning for orting.
a plan had been as a last resort.
ricials on 15 auye and other UN eighborhoods to from northern e US Embassy. s on 18 December s constructing a rajevo Serbs.

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...While Preparing to Evacuate,

If the Bosnian Serb leadership fails to obtain a "better deal" for Sar excluding the elderly--probably would leave the city rather than suleven indirect, control by Muslim authorities.

even indirect,	control by Muslim authorities.
•	Ethnic Serbs, reacting to three years of war and goaded on by alarmist statements from Pale, appear genuinely afraid of living under
,	"Muslim" control.
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•	Population movements have accompanied virtually every territorial shift in the conflict and international security guarantees are not likely to outweigh the deep-seated distrust and fear of revenge by the
	Muslims.
urged Serbs to and to obtain	Bosnian Serb Assembly and its speaker Krajisnik in recent days have be remain in Sarajevo-to lend legitimacy to efforts to revisit the accord maximum compensation if they indeed are forced to leaveplanning for its is underway, according to press and diplomatic reporting.
•	Krajisnik on 14 December told Pale television that a plan had been drawn up for the rapid evacuation of Serb Sarajevo as a last resort.
•	Vice President Koljevic and other Bosnian Serb officials on 15 December told UNPROFOR Chief of Mission Pedauye and other UN officials they would attempt to move whole Serb neighborhoods to Srebrenica, where more than 4,000 displaced Serbs from northern Bosnia have recently been resettled, according to the US Embassy. President Karadzic and other Bosnian Serb officials on 18 December met with urban planners sent by Belgrade to discuss constructing a new townpossibly near Paleto accommodate Sarajevo Serbs.
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Indeed, a lim	ited evacuation has occurred already. Press reports sugg	est at least some
Serbs began	leaving by 30 November;	
Committee o	f the Serb-Controlled Mu	
		ople have moved
	oods out of the city but have returned to their homes until	
_	aborhoods is resolved, according to press reports. Local ported numerous Sarajevo Serbs attempting to locate hou	
Bijeljina.		
	Evacuation of economic assets appears to be limited b	ut cianificant
J	Hundreds of trucks carrying industrial and military go	-
	automobile, aircraft engine, and other factories in Serb	
	since early December, according to press reports. Sor evacuation, particularly of military equipment, may inc	
	Serb preparations to comply with the Dayton Agreeme	,
•	The outflow of people and economic assets could quic	kly become a
•	flood, however, if the Bosnian Serbs become convince	
	be forced to relinquish control permanently.	
Scorched Ea	arth Policy?	to to the second
	evacuate, they will try to remove as many portable econo	•
_	sible. Whether they go beyond this to a "scorched earth pe destruction of the housing, utility, and transportation in	•
	The occasional hostile rhetoric, at a minimum, is an effort	
	of the transfer of territory, but there almost certainly wo	
•	theer hatred, would try to prohibit Federation gains in Se ave already been burnt in the city and the Bosnian Gover	•
have receive	d reports that the Serbs are preparing to destroy major pa	rts of the
	e. A move to destroy their parts of the city would almost sure on IFOR to intervene and could lead Federation aut	
•	teps to reassert sovereignty before serious destruction ca	
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	Such efforts could potentially bring IFOR onto a collist the Bosnian Government and, in a worst case scenario	
	breakdown of the cease-fire before IFOR could take u	•
	the ZOS.	
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•	they perceive a date-either thr international co for assistance i	os are less likely to cond a possibility that they we rough negotiation or the community pressures the n building housing and a elsewhere in the Repu	rill regain the ter rough military a em against doing I providing jobs	rritory at a later ctionor if the g so, in exchange
ther Scena	rios Less Likely		-	
neasures to parajevo. Th	prevent IFOR from	s scenario, the Bosnian m implementing any as attacks on IFOR troop g about the collapse of	spect of the Day and governme	ton accord in ent positions,
•	this is a widesp	efending ethnic Serbs i	entary leader K ot believe the Bo n Sarajevo and	rajisnik, osnian Serb Army
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