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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: December 5, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Anthony Lake

OMBGordon Adams
Phil DuSaultOVP

Rick Saunders

CIAJohn Deutch
George TenetSTATEStrobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Richard HolbrookeJCSGen. John Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark
John WalshDEFENSEWalter Slocombe
James PardewWhite HouseSandy Berger
Nancy SoderbergUSUNAmb. Madeleine Albright (via
secure video)
David SchefferNSCAlexander Vershbow
John FeeleySummary of ConclusionsCongressional Strategy

1. Principals reviewed the draft text of the Dole-McCain resolution for support of U.S. armed forces participating in IFOR. They agreed that while we should try to eliminate language in the preamble that characterizes the Dayton agreement as "ratification" of ethnic cleansing, our priority should be to improve the operative paragraphs. They agreed we should seek to scale back efforts to commit the United States to "lead" rather

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1/5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 12/05/05

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than "coordinate" international efforts to equip and train Bosnian forces. (C)

2. Principals agreed that the Administration could accept requirements to report to the Congress within 30 days on U.S. and international efforts to equip and train the Bosnians and to report regularly on IFOR's mission, rules of engagement, costs and exit strategy. (C)

Eliminating Mujahedin and Iranian Threats

3. Principals agreed we must press the Bosnians more firmly on the need not only to remove foreign military and paramilitary forces as required by the Dayton agreement but also to break their military links and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran. Principals agreed to send a strong message through Ambassador Holbrooke to President Izetbegovic along these lines, stressing the risks that Iran and Tehran-backed terrorist groups pose to our troops and to our larger interests. Specific intelligence information would be prepared to reinforce the U.S. demarche. They also agreed to tell the Bosnian government that U.S. readiness to help the Bosnians -- both militarily and economically -- will be jeopardized if the Bosnians do not break the Iranian connection (Action: State/NSC/CIA). (S)

Security for Serbs in Sarajevo

4. Principals agreed to encourage the Bosnians to take immediate, concrete steps to reassure the Serb population of Sarajevo that their security will be protected when they come under Federation control. They agreed to recommend to the Bosnian government to delay the deployment of Federation military forces to former Serb areas; to phase in gradually the introduction of Muslim police and establish a multiethnic police force under international supervision; to form a transitional city government with multiethnic representation; and to establish a local human rights commission. Principals also agreed that the United States will try to accelerate the deployment to Sarajevo of international police advisors and human rights monitors before their deployment country-wide (Action: State). (C)

Ensuring Bosnian Serb Acceptance of the Agreement

5. Principals agreed to press Milosevic to do more between now and Paris to rein in recalcitrant elements among the Bosnian Serbs, although we should not make any one action a deal-breaker. They agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should warn Milosevic that if we were not convinced that the Bosnian Serbs were committed to complying with the agreement, we would have no choice but to reimpose sanctions. Principals also agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should stress that the best solution would be to remove

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Mladic and Karadzic from their positions before the Paris signing of the agreement, since they are, in any case, barred from holding elective or appointive office under the new constitution (Action: State/NSC). ~~(S)~~

UN

6. Principals agreed that the UNSCR authorizing IFOR must be enacted no later than the day after Paris, so that there will be no delay in deployment of the main force. If necessary, we should insist that the IFOR and civilian elements of the UK draft UNSCR be separated into two resolutions to avoid such a delay (Action: USUN). ~~(C)~~

Eastern Slavonia

7. Regarding Eastern Slavonia, Principals agreed that since we will not contribute U.S. forces to the peacekeeping force, a retired U.S. military officer should be nominated for appointment as head of the civilian administration (Action: JCS). They agreed that we would prefer that the operation be under Chapter VII but that we should defer to the UN and troop contributors on this point. Principals agreed that the U.S. military would be prepared to provide some logistics support on a reimbursable basis. Given the need for additional NATO countries to reinforce the existing Belgian and Russian battalions, which would form the core of a UN peacekeeping force, Principals agreed to continue diplomatic efforts with Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands (Action: State/NSC/JCS). ~~(C)~~

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