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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, 22 November 1995,
The White House

ATTENDEES: President William Clinton
Vice President Al Gore
Secretary of State Warren Christopher
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake
Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke
Assistant to the Vice President for National
Security Affairs Leon Fuerth
USUN
Deputy Secretary of Defense John White
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff John
Shalikashvili
Deputy Director for Intelligence/CIA,
John Gannon

1. The President raised four questions:

a. Can Milosevic deliver the Bosnian Serb leadership? How do we intend to measure success (he turned to the DCI, SECSTATE and Defense)?

(1) C/JCS said the US would demand statements from Bosnian Serb-leaders (when designated by Milosevic) supporting the peace plan (with the military annex) and guaranteeing safety of IFOR including US forces.

b. What commitment have we made to arm and train Bosnian Government forces (which some in US Congress, he said, see as sacrificing our objectivity and impartiality)?

(1) DCI stressed some arm-and-train effort is needed in exchange for serious Bosnian effort to send Iranians home.

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(2) Sandy Berger argued that our arm-and-train initiative is essential to "build down" military forces of all parties. []

(3) The President accepted this, stressing that we should present arm-and-train as part of a comprehensive arms-reduction package. []

c. What is the Iranian threat to US forces and what is our response? []

(1) The DCI summarized what we know about Iranian activities in Bosnia []

(2) The DCI stated that the Bosnian Government now lacked the resources to control the activities or guarantee the withdrawal of Iranians. []

(3) Dick Holbrooke agreed that there is a serious problem now, but argued that the threat will decline quickly as we make solid progress with the three parties to the conflict. []

(4) All agreed that the US needs to develop more initiatives to get the Iranians out of Bosnia. []

d. When will the agreement be signed in Paris? []

(1) Date in December as yet unspecified. []

(2) C/JCS described the military and political level approvals needed at NATO early this week. []

(3) Dick Holbrooke cited several preliminary steps to be taken to get Milosevic to deliver, to brief the Allies and the US Congress, and to pin down the Sarejevo provisions. []

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2. Other Issues: [redacted]

-- **The President** said he wanted briefers from the Pentagon to present their information on the Hill truthfully in the week ahead. But he was concerned about reports that some from the military side were letting critical personal opinion creep into their briefs. He asked all to be appropriately disciplined. [redacted]

-- **CIA will draft a "carnage" assessment of the war in Bosnia: total deaths, injuries, displacement, infrastructural and environmental damage, etc. (BTF, due OOB 25 November).** [redacted]

-- **Dick Holbrooke to call Chargé Larry Butler in Belgrade, directing him to meet Milosevic's incoming plane. Butler will tell Milosevic to contact Russians and urge them to back down on opposition to immediate lifting of arms embargo. The UN resolution today (22 November) would first lift arms embargo and then suspend economic sanctions against Serbia. (Yeltsin had sent letter to President Clinton suggesting deferral of arms lift until Russian-sponsored summit. USUN said Russians are hung up on proposed resolution's arms limitation and resumption clauses. SECSTATE called Kozyrev during meeting to make US point.** [redacted]

-- **Holbrooke said Milosevic, for all his warts, had carried day in Dayton; Tadjman could be trusted to "carry out his portion"; and Izetbegovic would take the prize for the most unreasonable and uncooperative at the table-- and maybe the least trustworthy for the next months ahead.** [redacted]

[redacted]
John C. Gannon
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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