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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: November 16, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:45 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Strobe Talbott
Robert Gallucci (video)
John Kornblum (video)

DOD
Secretary Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Alice Rivlin
David Morrison

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Michael Byron
Wes Clark (video)

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

Eastern Slavonia

1. Principals noted that Croatian officials in Dayton, in discussions on implementation of the Eastern Slavonia agreement, had urged the United States to help draft the UNSCR authorizing a new peacekeeping force, assume the civilian leadership role in the transitional administration, and help develop a "Friends of Eastern Slavonia" initiative similar to the "Friends of the Federation." Principals agreed that work should be accelerated to determine the requirements for an effective military

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on 11/16/15 (x4)

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implementation force, given the agreement's provisions on demilitarization, and to draft a UNSCR that describes the mandate for the force and outlines the guidelines for transition.
(Action: State/USUN/OSD) ~~(C)~~

Military Stabilization

2. Principals welcomed the reports from Dayton of progress regarding inclusion of arms control measures in the peace agreement. They recognized the requirement to provide the Federation some degree of equip & train and reaffirmed their decision of early October to have the United States coordinate a modest multilateral program. They agreed, however, that in view of the potential risks to U.S. personnel in IFOR of a high-profile U.S. role in equip & train, our role should be largely behind the scenes, with actual weapons provided by other countries. While the United States would not sign a formal memorandum of understanding with the Bosnian government, Principals agreed that the United States would assure the Bosnian government that the United States would ensure that coalition of willing states would provide weapons sufficient to develop a self-defense capability. ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed that in this low-profile equip & train effort, the United States would use contractors. They agreed that U.S. negotiators would seek the agreement of all parties to an understanding on the need for military stabilization as a way to ensure transparency, but that this agreement would not be a precondition for an equip & train effort. ~~(S)~~

Sanctions/Phasing of Lift and Equip & Train

4. Principals reaffirmed that economic sanctions would be suspended upon a full peace agreement and lifted upon implementation. Principals agreed that the suspension could take place upon initialing rather than signature of the peace agreement. ~~(S)~~

5. Principals agreed to the following regarding phasing of lift/equip & train:

- The arms embargo would be juridically terminated at the time the peace agreement entered into force.
- No arms shipments would be permitted for the first 90 days (the period during which IFOR would be deploying and the parties would be carrying out their withdrawals to the agreed lines on the map).

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- After 90 days, shipments of small arms and non-lethal equipment (e.g. communications) would be permitted, but larger equipment would remain excluded for another three months.
- After six months, there would be no further restrictions on arms shipments except for any ceilings agreed upon in the arms control negotiations. (There would be no conditionality: if arms control talks failed, full lift would take effect in any case.) ~~(S)~~

International Police Task Force

6. Principals endorsed the establishment of an International Police Task Force to support the civilian aspects of implementation. They reaffirmed their October 25 decision that IFOR's mission will not include police functions, but IFOR would be authorized to intervene in the event of gross violations of human rights or attacks on international civilian agencies in proximity to the force's areas of operation. ~~(C)~~

7. Principals also reaffirmed their October 27 decision that the IFOR commander at the Corps level should have the authority to act, on the basis of his own judgment, against reported "over the horizon" gross violations of human rights and/or attacks on international civilian agencies, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian needs or attacks, and where NATO forces have the means and opportunity to stop violence to life and persons and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission. ~~(S)~~

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