

NOTE FOR: TONY LAKE

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Dayton SITREP #9; November 14, 1995, 1:10am.

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Have attached PLS
REC'd MEMO.
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(D)

Hectic pace on all fronts. Tudjman hosted dinner last night for his two amigos (Izy, Sloba) at officers club. Remain amazed at their ability to turn on charm socially while spouting venom in negotiations. Izy inability to bring his delegation to united position threatens Dayton success.

Map talks began in earnest Monday. Shuttling hourly between parties. Brcko emerging as territorial issue most likely to spiral Dayton into failure. Bosnians clearly prepared to return to war. No real signs of progress, but sides have begun to negotiate seriously through U.S. delegation.

o After lengthy discussions with both sides, U.S. prepared summary map option and presented to both sides. Not formal U.S. proposal, but has become basis for negotiations.

o Bosnians continue to press for Brcko, Dobojo, or elements thereof, and for swaths of land in northwest for railroad ownership and swaths of land below Gorazde for constructing power plants. Serbs continue to reject.


o Sarajevo remains unresolved, but consensus appears to be forming around special district.

o Economic card introduced in preliminary fashion and had positive impact on Harris.

o Expect process to continue overnight and into Tuesday. Secretary Christopher stops in Dayton Tuesday enroute Japan. Will press throughout day for breakthrough on map or closure on constitution. Will tell parties he will return Friday to initial or closedown talks.

Civilian and police annexes were given to parties Monday night. Carl Bildt will brief parties Tuesday.

Drew and Kruzal/Frasure family visit Sunday appeared to go very well. Met with all Presidents and other members of delegations. Sandy Drew said it was a good day. You might give her a call to follow-up.



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

November 14, 1995

To: The Secretary

From: EUR - Richard C. Holbrooke


Subject: Your Long Day in Dayton, November 14

There is a certain underlying feeling among most people that success here is highly likely because of the momentum we had going into Dayton and the effort and commitment the USG has put into these talks. As you know, I do not share this view--and not because I am "low-balling" expectations.

If this were a normal negotiation or if we had reached our present situation a week ago, I would be quite satisfied. My concern over the situation here is based on the amount of time we have lost on such issues as sanctions arguments, the time spent on Federation-building (although it was productive and unavoidable, it consumed eight days), and, above all, the immense difficulty of engaging the Bosnian Government in a serious negotiation.

So, on Day 14, we are about where we should have been on Day 8 or 9. Much has been accomplished here, as outlined in the accompanying and longer memo we have just sent. But the issues that remain include most of the core issues except elections, where we have made remarkable progress. Most disturbingly, we have had a series of emotional map discussions in which the Bosnians constantly changed their mind. While the Bosnians are the sort of friends that try one's patience, Milosevic has often lied outright about factual data or changed his position after we thought we had locked something in. As for Tudjman, he is fast becoming the King of Dayton (well, only after Strobe moved to Cleveland, of course).

Paradoxically, Haris does not share my concerns. Very late this evening (or morning), just before sending you this memo, I took my second long walk of the day with Haris. The first, around noon, had been very emotional, gloomy, and threatening. I had told him that you would consider closing these negotiations down if we couldn't make progress, and that if the breakdown were attributable to Sarajevo, there would be serious



consequences, which I outlined. He responded angrily that I should never threaten a Bosnian in such a manner; it would only stiffen their spines. After an hour of this sort of thing, I told him that we would no longer negotiate from either their map, or Milosevic's, or the Contact Group map; rather, we would simply put forward our own thoughts. (We had always planned to do this if we couldn't get maps from the two sides; the delays were caused by G B-H refusal to talk to us about the map until after the Federation agreements were completed.)

An American map went to Milosevic immediately thereafter, preceded only by a meeting with Tudjman, who usually holds the aces in this game. We then negotiated back and forth throughout the day and until well after midnight, leading to my second walk with Haris. By this time, our entire delegation was fed up with the Bosnians, led by Mad Dog, who has been moving forward on the parallel track of constitutional issues. Yet Haris told me that today has been the best day of Dayton so far, that peace was within sight, and so on. I thought he must be on some controlled substance, since it seemed to me that the tortoise of our progress was being outrun by the hare of the calendar. But he was serious, and perhaps he is right. It is true that we made gains today even in the territorial field, with Milosevic giving up a few key areas of the map. But those were ones that were in Federation hands anyway, and he had always intended to relinquish them.

Beyond that, however, we hit the wall on many key issues. The Bosnians were still fighting with the Croats over many issues, and Tudjman was skillfully playing one side off against the other while slicing off pieces of land for his people. Izzy was in a terrible mood today, and refused to see either Milosevic or Tudjman, while Tudjman refused to see Milosevic. That is why they call these proximity talks, of course, but it did constitute retrogression.

Given the distance we still have to travel to get to initialling of anything, we have to recast your trip. Initially conceived of a possible closer trip, it now becomes a last warning to get serious stopover on your way to Japan, with the clear message that when you return we must have either closure or close-down.

That, pure and simple, is the message of your trip. I am convinced that you can jump-start this conference by a combination of pressure, rhetoric, and your direct involvement during the day on some issues where you can break a jogjam. These will include the status of Sarajevo, some territorial tradeoffs, and perhaps election-refugee issues. We will have to concentrate on the big issues, while also picking off some small ones on which you can establish your ability to move the process forward.

All the parties want peace, but they still don't know how to get it. They look forward to your helping them stop killing each other--and so do we.

