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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****SUBJECT:** 13 November Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia [ ]

1. Sandy Berger chaired the meeting that was attended by representatives of OSD, JCS, State, and NSC. The DDCI, Mr. George Tenet, represented the Agency. The discussion centered on the military annex for an agreement, implementation of an agreement on Eastern Slavonia, and equip and train. [ ]

**MILITARY ANNEX**

2. Most of the discussion was a line-by-line analysis of the military annex offered as a counter-proposal by the Bosnian government. The Deputies went through the document with a principle of accepting whatever Bosnian changes they could that would not involve mission creep. At least one Deputy questioned whether this was appropriate because it would go against language on which we had already received Allied agreement. There was always concern about the possible implications of various Bosnian suggestions once an agreement was implemented. [I'll spare you the line-by-line discussion.] [ ]

3. The Russians had also proposed revisions to the military annex, which were thought to run directly opposite the Bosnian proposal. State was tasked with analyzing the Russian proposal and report back to the Deputies if any of the Russian proposals have merit. In that regard, Secretary Christopher was to meet with Russian Contact Group member Ivanov to remind him that if the Russians create problems in Dayton on the negotiations, the US might return to the implementation scenario where a special side unit of Russian and American troops is sets up to clear mines and other non-IFOR activities rather than the more recent Perry-Grachev agreement. [ ]

**EASTERN SLAVONIA**

4. The Deputies agreed that they were not yet ready to decide whether US forces should participate in an implementation force. CIA was tasked with a paper on the type of environment an implementation force in Eastern Slavonia would face. OSD and JCS will do a paper on military options for implementation, and State will do one on the civilian aspects. [ ]

**EQUIP AND TRAIN**

5. The Deputies agreed that an assessment team could travel to Sarajevo as long as it did not imply any formal commitment to the Bosnians on arm and train. The team would go there

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[REDACTED]

purely for a fact finding mission. They rejected a suggestion by one that the team travel to Bosnian Serb areas as well. Some Deputies argued that the situation has changed and that those who have gone down to Congress are being killed over the issue of sending a neutral US implementation force at the same time it supports lift and time. Hence, the Principals need to reconsider their earlier decision on arm and train either in a meeting or through a series of phone calls. One person mentioned the necessity to avoid any press leaks that the Administration is reconsidering equip and train because this could destabilize the Dayton talks. [REDACTED]

6. The assessment team could leave as early as this week. They would spend about two weeks in country, provide a preliminary report a week later, and a formal briefing a week later. Some noted that this time schedule was too protracted to permit a quick decision on equip and train. [REDACTED]

### **OTHER ISSUES**

7. Deputies were charged to consider possible phased lifting of the arms embargo. Under this approach proposed by some Allies, the Bosnians would be armed in phases. For example, they would receive light weapons and communications equipment at three months and heavy weapons only after six months. One person commented that this need not be a problem because of the US insistence the Iranians be kicked out before anything happens. It could take at least that long to get rid of them. [REDACTED]

8. The Deputies rejected a Bosnian suggestion that the US seek an international police force for Bosnia, consisting of volunteers from the US, Canada, and others. There was also a brief discussion of how the High Representative would lash up to the military commanders. In Dayton, the negotiators had found an appropriate way to finesse the language. [REDACTED]

Ray Converse  
Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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