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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Two Deputies' Committee Meetings, 16 Oct., 1130-1230, in SVTS, and 17 Oct., 1630-1730, White House Situation Room

1. PURPOSE OF MEETING. These two Deputies' Committee meetings are still focusing on unresolved issues of what to do after a peace settlement is reached; unfortunately we don't see ourselves there yet. This briefing book will be used for both meetings; we will give you the latest intelligence on Monday before that meeting and freshen up the book with the latest intelligence for the second meeting.

Monday meeting-- Once again, the Deputies will consider the issue of Russian participation in a peace implementation force. Also, the meeting will deal with the strategy for arranging proposed conferences in London and Moscow.

Tuesday meeting-- This meeting will look at issues of economic reconstruction and getting the Allies to ante up for this effort. JCS and OSD have been offered a bye on this meeting, but Treasury will probably participate.

SYNOPSIS OF MEETING PAPERS

A Multilateral Framework for Bosnian Peace Implementation-- This State paper identifies US requirements: complete autonomy for NATO as the organizer of IFOR, an indirect link to the UN without civilian oversight, a means for integrating non-NATO participants, especially Russia, and a credible civilian implementation structure that does not get embroiled in the politics of the UN or EU. The preferred solution is a coalition of forces using the Desert Storm model.

Options for Russian Relationship with IFOR-- This OSD paper identifies three options for the Russian relations with IFOR: a. Russian units are under national command with operational control or tactical control delegated to IFOR. b. Russian units perform functionally separate and non-combat tasks under full national command with only liaison links to NATO-led IFOR. c. Failing the above two, it is quite possible that we would have to go it without the Russians.

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2. **YOUR ROLE.** You do not have any formal responsibilities for either meeting, but it seems inconceivable that you won't be asked to provide an intelligence update, especially a report on the status of the cease-fire. You could go on record once again warning that it is still too early to break out the champagne.

SECTOR EAST

- You might want to remind the Deputies that Croatian patience on Sector East is wearing thin and that the military solution is increasingly likely. Intelligence reporting shows both sides expect war over this issue after the election.
- The Croats sense they have the leverage and may prefer war over peace because it allows them to cleanse Sector East of Serbs. They'll be wary of any Serb efforts to delay resolution of Sector East until after a Bosnia settlement and will not need much of a pretext to move. Meanwhile, intelligence indicates that the Krajina Serbs plan to employ a delaying strategy until they are militarily prepared.
- Although Milosevic has judged it is not in his interest to have the VJ intervene, this judgment could change as the result of an attack on Sector East. If his calculation changes, the VJ--despite shortcomings--has the resources to intervene with sizable forces and sustain them in combat.
- Should such fighting break out after the IFOR arrives in Bosnia to monitor a peace agreement, this could endanger US troops, especially if the Yugoslav Army intervened in response.

CEASE-FIRE

- As of noon today (Friday), the cease-fire has not taken hold yet in western Bosnia. The situation is not clear, but hopefully will be more so by Monday. The Croatians tell us they have stopped their attacks, but that the Bosnian Muslims think the US has given them a green light.
- If the US proves unable to deliver the Bosnians to a cease-fire, it could undermine the peace process as currently envisioned. Ally support for the current US initiative could weaken and the Russians could become hysterical if the Serbs lose significant ground in Bosnia.

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**EVEN IF THE CEASE-FIRE HOLDS**

- Our analysis suggests that the key--and most difficult--issues continue to be kicked down the road in negotiations, so even a successful cease-fire doesn't mean we are at the end.
- For example, a settlement will require elections 6 to 12 months after arrival of IFOR. Setting up the election mechanism will be difficult; the Muslims will seek a structure preventing a de facto partition, such like letting ethnically-cleansed people vote in their home districts by absentee ballot; the Serbs will try the opposite to allow a de facto partition.
- Those in the US dealing with the issue of elections are trying to apply the Haiti model to Bosnia. There are lots of differences between those two cases. For one thing, without a census, the opportunities for election fraud or at least allegations of fraud will be rampant and make West Virginia look like a clean election.

3. PREPARING FOR THE MEETING. In preparation for the Monday meeting, you should examine the Russian Views tab, Elections, and Sector East. For the Tuesday meeting the Economic Assistance tab should be skimmed.


Ray Converse
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