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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 6, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMB

Gordon Adams

Keith Bickel

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA

John Gannon

Norman Schindler

STATE

Strobe Talbott

John Kornblum

JCS

Daniel Christman

Douglas Lute

DEFENSE

John White

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

John Feeley

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

David Scheffer

Summary of ConclusionsRussian Participation in IFOR

1. Deputies discussed options for Russian involvement in the peace implementation force (IFOR), in preparation for Secretary of Defense Perry's October 8 meeting with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev in Geneva. They reaffirmed that our first priority is to ensure the integrity of military operations, i.e., NATO-led operation, unity of command and no dual key. The Deputies agreed upon the following principles:

- Participation in IFOR means acceptance of NATO operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON);

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- All other options regarding relations with IFOR will be characterized as "cooperation with" IFOR;
- Under all options, Russia should not have a separate zone in the Theater of Operations, e.g., we should oppose Russian deployments exclusively in Bosnian Serb areas;
- The option of Russian units operating in support of IFOR under Russian national command is only acceptable if Russian forces are limited to non-core functional tasks;
- The option of Russian units in support of IFOR under a UN chain of command and reporting to the UN Senior Implementation Coordinator is acceptable if Russian forces are limited to non-core functional tasks and if safeguards exist against any backdoor UN interference in IFOR military decisions (no dual key);
- Only the NAC makes decisions for and provides political guidance to the IFOR;
- The Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group or any other NATO fora established to include non-allied participants will only consult, advise and/or inform the NAC but not make decisions with or for the NAC;
- NATO meetings at 16-plus-Russia are desirable as an additional confidence-building measure but only to consult, advise and/or inform the NAC; and
- Russia will not have any veto over relations with or participation in IFOR by other non-Allies. ~~(S)~~

2. The Deputies agreed in principle that other non-allied participants could cooperate with IFOR under the above principles, but caution should be exercised. ~~(S)~~

#### IFOR Role During Elections

3. Deputies were skeptical that IFOR should assume direct responsibility for providing security during elections in Bosnia. They expressed general agreement with the conclusion in the JCS paper that IFOR would help create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks: deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions; enforcing the zones of separation and negotiated boundaries; and enforcing the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period. They deferred a formal decision, however, pending discussions with the U.S. negotiating team. ~~(S)~~

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UN Role in Civilian Aspects of Implementation

4. On the appointment of a senior official to coordinate the civilian aspects of peace implementation, the Deputies agreed that we continue to prefer that the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) be appointed as part of the peace settlement, with enhanced international authority conferred by the UN Security Council. Deputies agreed that we may ultimately need to accommodate the position of our Allies and the Russians that the SICOR be appointed by the UNSC or the UN Secretary General but deferred a decision on this question. ~~(S)~~

Military Stabilization Plan

5. Following up on the October 4 Principals Committee meeting, Deputies endorsed both the State-developed arms control package and the OSD military assistance package. Deputies reaffirmed that the military assistance package would be subject to modification following a visit by an assessment team. They agreed that JCS should draft a charter for the assessment team immediately and be prepared to send the team in the next two weeks, assuming that the cease-fire has taken effect (Action: JCS). Deputies also agreed to the JCS suggestion that, in order to improve the effectiveness of the assistance package, we consider increasing efforts to strengthen the Federation's joint command. (Action: State/JCS) ~~(S)~~

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