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6 OCT 1995

DC Meeting

OPTIONS FOR RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH IFOR

RELEASED IN FULL

Principles which apply to options I and II only:

Peace agreement would establish basic structure of military and civilian implementation.

UNSC would endorse agreement and grant authority to NATO, UN agencies and other international institutions to implement it.

Units will be deployed and redeployed within theater based upon tasks which are assigned to them and not on the basis of permanently assigned zones of operation.

A senior implementation coordinator, with UN authorization, would coordinate implementation on the civilian side.

OPTION I: RUSSIAN UNITS UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND WITH OPERATIONAL CONTROL ("OPCON") OR TACTICAL CONTROL ("TACON") DELEGATED TO IFOR.

Russia retains national command authority over its units.

Units may not be reorganized, resubordinated or disciplined without national concurrence.

Russian units under OPCON or TACON of one of the <u>units</u> of IFOR, for instance, the French division. The IFOR division commander could assign tasks and provide direction to the Russian units, as spelled out in <u>agreed</u> definitions of operational and tactical control.

Russian unit performs either combat or support function, depending on the types of forces assigned.

Russia has liaison officers at every level of NATO command, beginning with a 3-star at SACEUR HQ, with additional liaison officers at level of IFOR Cdr (AFSOUTH), Land component Cdr (ARRC), and Division commander.

Russia included in Bosnia Military Coordination Cell in Brussels (along with representatives of other significant troop contributing countries) to advise/consult/inform on deliberations of NAC, MC and other NATO bodies.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

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Russia also included in consultations at NATO HQ via periodic 16+1 meetings, but would have no veto over NAC. decisions.

Russia pays costs of its units.

Terms of Reference to be developed between NATO and Russia will spell out additional details of the relationship.

OPTION II: RUSSIAN UNITS PERFORM FUNCTIONALLY SEPARATE NON-COMBAT TASKS UNDER FULL NATIONAL COMMAND, WITH ONLY LIAISON LINKS TO NATO-LED IFOR.

Russian units under full national command and control.

Russian units perform functions that are important to overall effort, such as strategic lift or engineer tasks, but not so linked to operations of IFOR as to require unity of command.

Russian units could coordinate with but would not be subordinate to NATO.

Liaison at all levels of NATO chain of command.

Russian units liaise and coordinate with IFOR to avoid conflict/overlap, but no NATO officer has directive authority over Russian forces.

Russia participates in Brussels-based Bosnia Military Coordination Cell as well as 16+1 consultations.

Russia pays own costs.

OPTION III: PROCEEDING WITHOUT RUSSIA

Russia does not participate in military implementation at all, in neither a combat nor support role.

If neither Option 1 or 2 is agreed to, we face a good chance for Russian obstructionism in the UNSC re a resolution granting authority for peace implementation and IFOR.

IFOR proceeds with a NATO-only mandate, possibly agreed to by the parties in the terms of settlement.

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Allies modulate their IFOR participation (i.e., restrained use of force) according to the noise coming out of Moscow.

Other Russian actions are possible, but perhaps less likely:

Russians openly take sides with the "FRY" and Bosnian Serbs and offer weapons and economic assistance, in violation of embargo/sanctions.

Russian cooperation with the United States and with the Europeans deteriorates.

Russians decline to participate in non-IFOR implementation.

Obstructionism at OSCE encroaches effort to devise $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CBM}}$ regime.

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POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON BOSNIA

U.S.: Proximity talks to begin on October 31, lasting for approximately two weeks. To be attended by representatives of Contact Group countries, Carl Bildt and three Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic as heads of respective delegations. Goal: Reach and initial peace deal on constitutional and territorial issues.

Paris: International conference to be held late November/early December, to be attended by Foreign Ministers. Goal: Sign peace agreements.

London: International conference on implementation issues to be held early December, probably to be attented at Political Director level. Goal: Reach and announce agreements on the range of implementation issues, particularly reconstruction and humanitarian issues.

Moscow: Yet to be defined meeting on implementation issues.

The British have suggested inclusion of arms control issues.

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