

5 October 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 6 October 1995

1. Friday's Deputies' Committee meeting will focus on the role of the IFOR in monitoring Bosnian elections, Sunday's expected Perry-Grachev talks in Geneva, the UN role in civilian aspects of peace implementation, and progress in developing a "military stabilization package (its less euphemistic title until Wednesday's Principals' Meeting was "equip and train"). None of the anticipated meeting papers have arrived. [redacted]

- You will not be required to take the lead on any issue. The Task Force will provide you with any unique intelligence on the diplomatic process prior to the meeting, as well as an update on the fighting and reactions to the cease-fire. [redacted]

2. The Bosnia-wide cease-fire announced today is set to go into effect next Tuesday, provided that utilities to Sarajevo have been restored by then. The AGREEMENT TAB includes the full text. Conventional wisdom and past practice would suggest that the cease-fire will not hold (see the CEASE-FIRE TAB).

- The Bosnian Government signed the agreement only under great pressure from Holbrooke.
- Fighting continued today in western Bosnia, with the Serbs making some gains and the Croats reintroducing a limited number of forces, probably to limit the Serb advance. Fighting also continued south of Sarajevo, with the Muslims making gains. [redacted]

3. On the military stabilization package, Walt Slocombe has been tasked with developing a joint DOD-CIA assessment of the amount of weapons and training that the federation would need. [redacted] several meetings yesterday and today to develop the assessment, a draft of which probably will be available tomorrow. At the Principals' Meeting on Wednesday, the DCI attempted--with only limited success--to get the participants to recognize considerations of the Croat-Muslim relationship as a key aspect in these deliberations. The current discussion is still at a very general level and appears to conclude that a limited stabilization program probably would be sufficient to allow the federation to defend itself. If an appropriate opportunity arises, I would recommend that you make the following points:

- A limited stabilization program probably would be sufficient to ensure the federation's ability to defend itself against the Serbs if the Croat-Muslim alliance holds.

[redacted]
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- The Muslims would require a much larger package if there were a need to defend themselves against both the Croats and Serbs--a very real possibility in our view.
- The Croatians are not likely to cooperate in any arm and train effort that appears designed to bolster the Muslims for this contingency. [REDACTED]

4. In the discussion of elections in Bosnia, you may want to raise the need for a Bosnian census and voter registration procedures. The ELECTIONS TAB includes a paper concluding that it will be impossible to establish the size of the electorate, voter rules, or voting districts without an accurate census, thereby opening the way for electoral fraud or intentional disenfranchisement of selected portions of the electorate. Moreover, if refugees are not permitted to vote, Bosnian Serbs almost certainly would be the plurality voting group in national elections. [REDACTED]

5. I will accompany you to the meeting and serve as note-taker. [REDACTED]

A. Norman Schindler

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