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Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee DATE: August 28, 1995 LOCATION: White House Situation Room TIME: 2:00 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR Sandy Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth Richard Saunders

STATE

Strobe Talbott John Kornblum Ralph Johnson

TREASURY

Jeffrey Shafer Stephen Altheim

DEFENSE

John White Walter Slocombe Ted Warner

USUN David Scheffer James O'Brien

Summary of Conclusions

Implementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement

Deputies met to advance the integrated political/military 1. plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement. They agreed to finalize a draft memo to Principals by Wednesday, August 30, summarizing their main conclusions and recommendations

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OMB Gordon Adams Mark Sandy

Dennis Blair Norman Schindler

Thomas Dine Dalena Wright

Michael Byrum John Walsh

NSC.

Alexander Vershbow Steven Simon Sue Bremner Stephen Flanagan

AID

JCS

CIA

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on: (A) issues affecting the ongoing negotiations, and (B) issues relating to implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement (Action: NSC). (S)

2. <u>Peace Implementation Force</u>: Deputies expressed satisfaction with the latest draft of the DoD concept paper on "Implementing a Peace Settlement." In reviewing the NSC paper on "Additional Tasks for the PIF," they agreed that the PIF should only play a limited role, as essential to the conduct of its core mission, in such areas as civil works, population movements, and relief support. They also agreed that some of the possible additional functions, such as border demarcation/monitoring and arms control implementation, should be conducted by civilian authorities. State offered to address the integration of requisite political and military functions in its paper on the political counterpart to the PIF Joint Commission. They also agreed that the IWG should review the DoD paper on Gorazde at the August 29 SVTS (Action: State/NSC). -(S)-

DENY FLIGHT, Air Cover, and the PIF: Deputies discussed the З. problems of creating a stable military balance during and after the implementation of the settlement given the fact that the Bosnian Government has no aircraft or air defenses to counter the Bosnian Serb's Air Force and links to the integrated air defense network of the former Yugoslavia. JCS and OSD noted that giving the Bosnian government aircraft or even a limited air defense capability would be very costly. State argued that if NATO air strikes were the equalizer in the pre-PIF era, they should remain so during implementation of a settlement and, if necessary, for a period of time after the PIF's departure. Deputies agreed these issues should be highlighted in the memorandum to Principals and that they would discuss this issue further in the context of their review of a State paper on timelines for implementation of a settlement. As a first step, JCS will draft a paper on continuation of air support beyond the PIF (Action: JCS). 181

Economic Reconstruction Plan: Deputies agreed that 4. discussion with the parties, other donors, or the Congress of specific dollar figures for the reconstruction plan at this point is both premature and possibly counterproductive. They agreed that Principals should endorse a general statement on the scope of the plan and a range of U.S. contributions to it. They agreed the plan should include: a humanitarian element, which would decline over a two-year period; provisions for reconstruction of infrastructure, with a major role for the IFIs; and support for market reforms and restructuring to ensure that the old socialist economic legacy is overcome. They also agreed that the U.S. should serve as a catalyst in this effort, with the EU taking the lead and with major contributions from Japan and the Islamic states -- including those in Southeast Asia. They agreed that the State paper on reconstruction should be refined to clarify

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the scope of the plan. State was also tasked with a gameplan for consultations with the EU, Japan, Islamic states, and the IFIs to be presented to Principals. Treasury agreed to do a paper examining various debt issues, including arrearages (Action: State/Treasury). (S)

5. <u>Sanctions Relief</u>: Deputies reviewed the OVP papers on sanctions relief under the U.S. diplomatic initiative. They agreed to defer the question of whether the offer of suspension is open-ended or time-limited. They also discussed the mechanism for reimposition and the linkage to Croatia, noting the timesequencing problem if achievement of a settlement on Eastern Slavonia takes longer than the 10-12 months envisioned for sanctions suspension. They agreed that the issues of sanctions relief for Pale and how long to hold Milosevic accountable for the Pale Serb actions should be open to review as the negotiations evolve (No new action). <u>(S)</u>

6. <u>Arm and Train</u>: Deputies discussed the DoD paper briefly and agreed that training could be conducted in Bosnia by non-PIF personnel. They also agreed that the IWG should review the following questions during its August 29 SVTS: provision of close air support/no-fly enforcement during the implementation period; how to exclude participation by Iran in the coalition; legal matters; funding; involvement of allies/others; whether/how this program could be conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo; and Croatia's involvement (Action: IWG). <u>(S)</u>-

7. <u>Outstanding Papers</u>: Deputies agreed to review at a later date State papers on arms control, implementation timelines, and a political analogue to the Joint Commission; DoD papers on cost estimates for the U.S. contribution to the PIF and how to make the PIF work as a NATO force; and OMB's paper on financing options for the PIF. (5)

