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21 August 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Associate Director of Central
Intelligence for Military Support

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Principals' and Deputies' Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia, 22 August 1995

1. According to Don Kerrick (NSC), Tuesday's Principals' meeting will be devoted to a read-out from Assistant Secretary Holbrooke on his efforts to sell the US peace initiative to the warring factions and what measures should be taken to reconstitute a US Bosnia team in the aftermath of last Saturday's accident. The subsequent Deputies' meeting will resume the discussion from last Friday on policy issues associated with an implementation force.

- You will not be required to do an intelligence update. Indeed, the situation on the ground has been pretty quiet.
- Before the meetings, we will provide you with a summary of key intelligence on reactions to the US initiative. See the REACTIONS TAB for a matrix summarizing various positions.
- During today's Bosnia IWG, Kerrick indicated the Deputies would welcome your assessment of the prospects for violence during implementation of a settlement. The ENFORCEMENT TAB includes a new assessment of which aspects of implementing a territorial deal are most likely to be contentious.

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2. We seem to be in a holding pattern on the ground in Croatia and Bosnia. We have seen no intelligence, however, that the Croatians have abandoned plans to launch offensives against the Bosnian Serbs in western Bosnia and the Dubrovnik area. Tensions remain high in the Dubrovnik area and the whole world is aware of the Croatian build-up there, but Zagreb has yet to make its move north toward Trebinje. There is some evidence that the Croatian offensive toward Drvar in western Bosnia has stalled. The Bosnian V Corps initiated an offensive out of the southeastern part of the Bihac pocket over the weekend, but we have not received confirmation of any territorial gains. Tension has been particularly high in the area around Sector East, as the Krajina Serbs have shelled Osijek on several occasions, most recently Sunday night. Intelligence suggests the Croatians realize an attack to regain Sector East would bring Serbian intervention, but there are indications Croatian officials fear a local flare-up could spin out of control. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Army has given no indication of any steps to back off of its recent heightened level of readiness.

- Bottom line: Although the military situation remains relatively static, serious trouble could occur on short notice. We will hopefully get some warning

3. In terms of staffing a new Bosnia team, it will be very difficult in the near-term to replace the area expertise and creativity of Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel, and Nelson Drew--all of whom were regular BTF contacts. A contact at State speculated today that Holbrooke may decide to carry on talks in the region over the next few weeks largely by himself, accompanied by Chris Hill, who has served as Bob Frasure's key action officer on Bosnia. Holbrooke has stated publicly that he wants to return to the Balkans with a new team as early as next week.

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4. We still have not received the revised OSD/JCS paper on implementation of a peace agreement; the MEETING PAPERS TAB includes the version for Friday's meeting. In terms of the likely threat to such a force, we would recommend you make the following points:


- All the warring parties in Bosnia may attempt to block implementation of a plan re-drawing frontiers because of concerns over civilians, political goals, or a desire to maintain leverage over opponents.
- The extent of opposition will be a direct function of the high-level support of the leadership of the warring parties and their willingness to impose their authority on subordinates.
- Command and control has improved to the point in all three armies that local commanders--except in very rare circumstances--can only undertake blockage actions with the tacit approval of the leadership.


The paper in the ENFORCEMENT TAB includes a breakdown by region of the likely reactions to the warring parties to a requirement to abandon territory they control. The tab also includes a paper requested by Admiral Blair following Friday's Deputies' meeting on the pros and cons of only stationing an implementation force on federation territory.

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5. US policy positions on the extent, conditions, and timing of sanctions relief--as well as the reimposition mechanism if the Serbs violate an agreement--also are scheduled to be discussed at the Deputies' meeting. The SANCTIONS TAB includes additional background on this issue. Finally, the FEDERATION ARMY TAB includes the assessment of Croat-Muslim military cooperation we prepared at Admiral Blair's request following Friday's meeting. 



A. Norman Schindler

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