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17 August 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Associate Director of Central
Intelligence for Military Support

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, 18 August 1995

1. Friday's Deputies' Committee meeting will examine issues related to deployment of a force to implement a peace settlement in Bosnia, arming and training Bosnian Government forces, the humanitarian situation, and the ongoing Holbrooke diplomatic mission.

- You will not be required to take the lead on any issue.
- You may be called on to brief the status of Croatian offensive operations in Bosnia and the likelihood of Serbian intervention. We will discuss these issues and provide talking points for you at the pre-brief.

2. I would suggest, if the opportunity arises, that you attempt to make the following points:

- We are growing more concerned about direct Serbian intervention in the conflict. Zagreb seems to realize that an attempt to recover Sector East would prompt Serbian intervention, and the Croats appear to have put off such a move for the time being. Available intelligence suggests, however, that the Croats are planning to continue offensive operations in Bosnia. The Yugoslav Army and Navy continue to increase their readiness. The risk is growing that they will feel

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SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
18 August 1995

compelled to respond to significant Croatian advances inside Bosnia. (See the CROATIA TAB)

- If the discussion turns to Kosovo--there is concern downtown that Belgrade's efforts to resettle Krajina Serb refugees there will heighten ethnic tensions--you may want to warn that indications of international concern could actually lead the local Albanians to stir up trouble in an effort to gain even more attention. The REFUGEES TAB includes a background paper we prepared for Tuesday's Principals' Committee meeting assessing the likelihood that Serbian refugee resettlement efforts will fuel ethnic tensions.

3. The MEETING PAPER TAB includes an OSD paper addressing specific issues related to an implementation force in Bosnia. The so-called Peace Implementation Force (PIF)--to which US ground forces would be committed--would aim to deter cease-fire violations, defend itself, and monitor and enforce compliance with the agreement. SACEUR would execute the mission and has been asked by General Shali to estimate how many forces would be needed. The force would be deployed as soon as the warring parties accept the peace plan. OSD proposes that the PIF's mission end once the peace plan is implemented and the federation has substantially improved its self-defense capability relative to the Bosnian Serbs.

- The Bosnian Government, in our view, may want a mission of longer duration as a condition for acceptance of an agreement along the lines of the Lake-Holbrooke plan.

4. The MILITARY BALANCE TAB includes an assessment of the extent to which recent developments may have improved the Bosnian Government's ability to defend against Serb attacks in the event of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. Although there are some differences among our analysts, we generally

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SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
18 August 1995


conclude that the Bosnian position would be strengthened if the Croats remain willing to take an aggressive posture against the Serbs in Bosnia, something which would tie down Serb forces.

- We continue to believe that the Muslims largely are able to defend the core area of the federation against Serb attacks, provided the Yugoslav Army does not send substantial forces to assist the Bosnian Serbs. JCS is more pessimistic about Muslim capabilities.
- The Muslims would face a desperate situation if forced to confront both Serb and Croatian forces, a scenario which cannot be completely ruled out given Tudjman's recent statements to Holbrooke (see next paragraph).


5. Deputies will receive a briefing on Holbrooke's discussions this week with the Croats, Bosnians, and Serbian President Milosevic.


- Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey refused to give a formal response to the Lake-Holbrooke initiative, but the Bosnians clearly are cool toward key details of the plan, including the territorial division (e.g. the Serbs get Gorazde) and constitutional provisions.
- Tudjman's response clearly appalled Holbrooke and Ambassador Galbraith (see the NODIS message behind the TUDJMAN TAB). A confident Tudjman openly revealed his desire to carve-up Bosnia and warned of the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism. Galbraith has recommended that the US respond sharply to Tudjman's statements, reminding him of our support for the Croat-Muslim federation.

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SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
18 August 1995

6. Other items in this briefing book include a paper we were tasked to prepare by the Bosnia IWG on possible confidence-building measures around Dubrovnik (see the DUBROVNIK TAB) and one tasked by Holbrooke this week on Milosevic's view of a negotiated settlement (see NEGOTIATIONS TAB). 



A. Norman Schindler

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