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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 24, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth  
Rick Saunders

STATE

Strobe Talbott  
Peter Tarnoff  
Jim Steinberg

DEFENSE

John White  
Walter Slocombe

USUN

Madeleine Albright  
David Scheffer

CIA

George Tenet  
Dennis Blair

JCS

William Owens  
Wesley Clark

SPECIAL ENVOY

Robert Frasure

NSC

Alexander Vershbow  
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies agreed to begin meeting on the Bosnia crisis via SVTS on a daily basis until further notice. (S)
2. USUN reported on Boutros-Ghali's refusal to meet with U.S., UK and French Ambassadors to discuss implementation of the London Conference decisions until he was presented with a "non-paper" on the concept being considered by NATO. A joint UK/French/USUN draft was discussed, and Deputies tasked a working group chaired by OSD to revise the non-paper and provide a cleared version for use in New York that evening, drawing on the President's phone

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call with French President Chirac (who wanted to ensure a role for General Janvier, UNPF Theater Commander, and the UN SYG in the decision cycle for initiating any Bosnia-wide phase in an air campaign) and conversations between the CJCS and the National Security Advisor on the best way to respond to the French concerns. The revision was completed and cleared for use in New York. (S)

3. Deputies discussed briefly the problems of expanding the London Conference decisions to include Safe Areas beyond Gorazde. They agreed that USNATO should seek NAC language setting the stage for a transition from a strictly Gorazde-centered policy to one that applied to other Safe Areas but that it would not be practical to insist on expanding the London ultimatum of extensive air strikes to additional Safe Areas in the July 25 NAC decision. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies noted that the Croatian government had notified Ambassador Galbraith of its intention to launch an attack into the Bihac sector during the early morning of July 25. They agreed that, given the deteriorating military situation in Bihac and the inability immediately to apply the London agreement to Bihac, it would be inappropriate to attempt to dissuade the Croats from their plans. However, it also was agreed that the Croats should be warned against taking this opportunity to launch an attack against Knin, with the accompanying risk of a multi-front campaign and possibly drawing Serbian Government forces into the conflict. (Action: State) (S)

5. Following a read-out on the President's call to Chirac, Deputies noted that several key elements of what had apparently been agreed in London now seemed to be coming undone. They agreed that a major effort involving multiple phone calls by Principals to their UK and French counterparts should be undertaken to restore the London consensus. This effort would key off the work being done to reach U.S./UK/French agreement on the non-paper for Boutros-Ghali. (Action: All) (S)

6. Deputies reviewed the results of the interagency working group tasked on July 22 to develop alternatives to the Dole resolution calling for unilateral lift of the arms embargo on Bosnia and a legislative strategy to preclude the President having to cast an unsustainable veto of the Dole legislation. They endorsed the conclusion of the group that a series of amendments should be sought that would: (1) change the triggering mechanism to ensure that the Bosnian government could not unilaterally start the clock on a requirement for the U.S. to lift the embargo; (2) endorse the efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR through the RRF and the London Conference; and (3) change the requirement from unilateral lift to multilateral lift. They

agreed that a Presidential veto should be recommended if the requirement for unilateral lift remained. They agreed that key Principals would brief a bipartisan Congressional group on July 25 regarding the desired amendments and the implications of the London Conference. (Action: NSC/All) ~~(S)~~

7. Deputies reviewed progress toward satisfying tasking from the July 22 DC regarding the need for new diplomatic initiatives and critical decisions associated with possible transition to a post-UNPROFOR environment in Bosnia. They considered the need to look at multiple diplomatic options and tracks given the fluid nature of the current environment and the need to move thinking beyond the current "Milosevic track." OVP agreed to work with State in producing a new drafts for further consideration by Deputies and Principals. (Action: OVP/State). ~~(S)~~