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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 15, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia

Response to Fall of Srebrenica: Principals agreed we should not be seen as saying "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible without falling into the trap of either having to put forces in on the ground or be blamed for the failure of UNPROFOR. The immediate decision is to send General Shali to London to meet on Sunday with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. Shali will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift to Gorazde), designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint:

- the need to ensure the mission makes sense and that the Bosnian government will mount an active defense where UNPROFOR makes its stand;
- the need for preemptive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to support an UNPROFOR stand either at Gorazde or Sarajevo;
- the need to eliminate the dual key in enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde (and Sarajevo) to bolster the more robust posture on the ground;
- the need for UNPROFOR to act as though under Chapter VII provisions throughout Bosnia to reduce the likelihood of additional hostages being taken in response to tough UNPROFOR action in Gorazde;
- the fact that it will take 10-14 days for a U.S. helicopter lift package to be in place and ready to assist with French redeployments;
- the need for UNPROFOR troops assisting in the defense of Gorazde to be effectively integrated with and supported by Bosnian government forces who would bear the primary responsibility for active defense of the enclave;

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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- ensuring a clear line of NATO command and control exists for any U.S. lift and/or logistical support;
- a commitment from the French that if we assist in redeployment of their forces to provide a more robust UNPROFOR posture, they will not turn around and withdraw from UNPROFOR anyway; and
- a clear signal any U.S. assistance is a one-time deal that implies neither any commitment of U.S. ground forces nor willingness to engage in a similar operation again.

Shali will return with the answers to these questions before a decision on providing helicopter lift to Gorazde is made.

Principals agreed that if UNPROFOR is to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We would not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London this weekend that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia.

It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF.

Principals determined that the risk of the Serbs taking more hostages would dramatically increase if UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves, and therefore, it would be necessary for the UNMO missions to be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory.

Dole Resolution on Lift: All of us agreed that, as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Bob Dole, we should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. would unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to your veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;

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- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Senator Nunn that, even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to your veto as long as it still mandated unilateral lift. However, in the event that a veto is overridden, his assistance in gaining the amendments we seek could be instrumental in saving the lives of UNPROFOR troops and the NATO soldiers, including U.S., helping to extract UNPROFOR should the lift bill trigger withdrawal -- as the French have assured us it will.

Negotiations with Milosevic: Finally, we received word of a new agreement EU mediator Carl Bildt is close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. The deal would go too far in restricting our ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months, thus giving the Russians, British and French the ability to block.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations.

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