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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 14, 1995  
 LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS  
 TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting  
 on Bosnia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair  
 Anthony Lake

OMB  
 Alice Rivlin

OVP  
 Leon Fuerth  
 Rick Saunders

Chief of Staff  
 Leon Panetta

State  
 Secretary Christopher  
 Peter Tarnoff  
 Richard Holbrooke

CIA  
 John Deutch  
 Dennis Blair

DOD  
 Secretary Perry  
 Jan Lodol

JCS  
 General Shalikashvili  
 Wesley Clark  
 Howell Estes

USUN  
 Ambassador Madeleine Albright  
 (via secure video)  
 Rick Inderfurth (via secure  
 video)

White House  
 Sandy Berger  
 Nancy Soderberg

NSC  
 Alexander Vershbow  
 Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on July 14 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

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Response to French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde:

2. Principals agreed that we should not say "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible. The immediate decision is to send General Shalikashvili to London to meet on Sunday, July 16, with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. He will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift for French reinforcements) designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint. He will return with answers before a decision is made on whether or not to provide U.S. helicopter lift. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make, with our support. We will not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia. (Action: JCS/OSD) ~~(S)~~

4. It was agreed that Sarajevo is important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy as is Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

5. Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would increase as UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves and that therefore we should urge that the UNMO missions be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~

Dole Resolution on Lift:

6. Principals agreed that as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Senator Dole, the administration should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be

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subject to Presidential veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to veto as long as it still requires unilateral lift. (Action: NSC/OSD)

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Negotiations with Milosevic:

7. Principals received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt was close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. They agreed that the deal would go too far in restricting U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

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