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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, 9 May 1995

1. Deputy National Security Advisor Berger chaired the meeting to review diplomatic efforts to get Serbian President Milosevic to recognize Bosnia, as well as options for improving the situation around Sarajevo and containing the conflict in Croatia. In addition to the DDI, attendees included William Wise (OVP), Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Tarnoff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frasure, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Slocombe, Gordon Adams (OMB), Ambassador Albright, Ambassador Inderfurth, and JCS Vice Chairman Owens.

2. Tarnoff and Frasure led off the meeting by revealing a new two-track approach aimed at securing Serbian recognition of Bosnia. The package would include a more generous offer of sanctions relief for Milosevic--including suspension of non-strategic trade sanctions and close to all financial sanctions--in exchange for recognition of Bosnia's current borders, agreement to continue to press the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan, and agreement to sustain the embargo against the Bosnian Serbs. The second track--which Frasure had presented informally to Milosevic, and to which the Serbian President reportedly had responded positively--would involve greater OSCE involvement in the crisis; specifically, Serbia would get its OSCE seat back, the OSCE would take control of the current ICFY monitoring mission along the Serbian-Bosnian border (including deployment of several hundred more monitors), and Belgrade would permit the return of an OSCE monitoring mission to Kosovo.

- In the subsequent discussion, considerable concern was raised about offering Milosevic additional sanctions relief. Skeptics viewed it as giving up a key instrument of leverage while getting little in return. Proponents believed the new move was necessary to end US isolation in the Contact Group and as the last hope of gaining Serbian recognition of Bosnia and the Bosnian Government's agreement to extend the cessation of hostilities agreement.
- State was tasked to put its proposal on paper for consideration by the Principals.

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3. On Croatia, the Deputies expressed considerable frustration that Zagreb was continuing to take military actions in the zones of separation that risked provoking a Serb response and escalation of the conflict. The DDI reported the latest intelligence suggesting that the Croats had made only limited withdrawals and that skirmishing continued in Sectors East and South. Ambassador Albright reported that the UN was claiming that the Croats had made no withdrawals, and that frustration with the Croats was increasing in the Security Council, several members of which have troops in Croatia. The Deputies agreed that the situation in Croatia remained volatile, and that the US should urge Croatian President Tudjman to exercise restraint.

4. The Deputies also expressed frustration about the deteriorating situation around Sarajevo and anger at UNPROFOR's failure to respond with airstrikes to recent Serb attacks on the city. The Deputies briefly reviewed a JCS paper on military options to reopen Sarajevo airport and ensure passage of humanitarian supplies; they noted that JCS failed to endorse any of its options, but suggested that the paper be passed to the Principals. The DDI reported that the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo was not yet as dire as the UN was saying, suggesting that there was some additional time to contemplate action. The DDI also intervened to note that, despite its ineffectiveness in certain situations, withdrawal of UNPROFOR would set in motion a series of steps that would worsen the situation in Bosnia. The Deputies agreed that State should develop a strategy for working with the French to secure more robust UNPROFOR execution of its mandate.

5. The Deputies had an inconclusive discussion of SACEUR's request to issue an Action Request for the enabling and main forces in OPLAN 40104 to be forwarded to NATO. While they agreed that the request went beyond existing Principals' authorization, there was considerable confusion about the meaning and implications of particular steps aimed at implementing OPLAN 40104. JCS was tasked to prepare a paper clarifying these issues for the Principals.

6. The meeting did not result in any specific tasking for the Intelligence Community.

A. Norman Schindler
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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