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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 4, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OMB:
John Burnim

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Norm Schindler

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
BG John Walsh

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzal

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don Kerrick

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss a strategy for dealing with the Contact Group deadlock on what degree of sanctions relief to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia, and the accompanying strategy for Ambassador Frasure to pursue in the next Contact Group meeting and in a follow-on private meeting with Milosevic. Deputies agreed that we should continue to pursue a strategy, in close coordination with the Bosnian Government, that supports the Bosnian Government's goal of gaining genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders in return for limited sanctions relief and a closure of the border with Bosnian Serb territory. ~~(S)~~

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2

2. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure should continue to stand on the existing USG position in upcoming Contact Group discussions. In the follow-on meeting with Milosevic, Ambassador Frasure should emphasize that the U.S. will not support any efforts to lift sanctions until the Contact Group plan is accepted by the Pale Serbs, and that while we might consider a longer sanctions suspension period (e.g., 180 days), any extension of suspended sanctions would require a positive UNSC vote. He should also inform Milosevic that the U.S. is not prepared to support release of frozen financial assets. Deputies agreed that, if it becomes clear in the meeting with Milosevic that an element of lift is necessary to complete an otherwise acceptable deal, the U.S. should consider (but not offer at that meeting) lifting sanctions against certain media and information-related activities. Deputies asked that Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Frasure confer on the appropriate financial sanctions language for presentation to the Contact Group. (Action: OVP/State) (S)

3. Deputies discussed the renewed fighting in Croatia and a strategy to prevent escalation. They agreed that the U.S. should press President Tudjman and the Krajina Serbs to halt military operations and exercise restraint. They agreed to press the Croatians at all levels to adopt an accommodating position that could include the demilitarization of the recaptured areas, the return of Serb civilians to their homes and the reestablishment of UNCRO authority in Sector West and other areas of conflict. If Croatia is willing to take these steps, the U.S. would support the presence of Croatian civilian police in Sector West and the removal of all RSK military forces. (Action: State) (S)

4. Deputies discussed the steps to be taken to ensure the Croatians are aware of the U.S. view of their military actions. They agreed to support a UNSC resolution condemning incursions by all sides in Sectors South and East and calling for the restoration of UNCRO authority in all areas. Deputies directed that the Croatians be immediately informed of our deep concerns and endorsed a Vice Presidential meeting with President Tudjman in London as a useful forum for registering U.S. concerns about Tudjman's military actions. (Action: State/OVP) (S)

5. Deputies also discussed the importance of warning the Krajina Serbs of the consequences of attacks on U.S. personnel in Zagreb. They agreed that we should be prepared to bypass the dual-key system if a NATO response were not approved by the UN. They directed military options be developed for retaliatory action, both unilateral and through NATO. (Action: JCS) (S)

6. Deputies discussed briefing the Congress on OPLAN 40104 and directed that the talking points be cleared before the briefings are scheduled. (Action: JCS draft talking points; NSC/State schedule briefings) (S)

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