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4 May 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and Croatia, 4 May 1995

1. Today's Deputies' Committee meeting will address next steps in preventing escalation of the conflict in Croatia and how to deal with current discord in the Contact Group over how much sanctions relief to offer Milosevic in exchange for his recognition of Bosnia. We have yet to receive the written agenda.

-- You will not be required to take the lead on any issue, but will almost certainly be called on to provide a summary of the situation on the ground. We will provide you with talking points at today's pre-brief. [REDACTED]

2. The situation in Croatia remains uncertain as of 0730 EDT. The UN claims that a cessation of hostilities has been accepted by both sides, but that it has not been signed. The UN has been dealing with with RSK "Prime Minister" Mikelic--who is close to Milosevic--and is the most moderate of Krajina Serb leaders. We have no idea how hardline "President" Martic feels about a cessation of hostilities. Tudjman went on national television yesterday and said that Croatia would respond to further attacks on Zagreb "most resolutely." We just received word from the the DATT in Zagreb that [REDACTED] reports five new rocket attacks. Sirens are on in Zagreb, but the DATT has not heard any impacts. Also, there are press reports that the Belgrade-Zagreb highway has been closed by Croatian police because of continued fighting in Sector West.

-- If reports of another attack on Zagreb are true, it will be difficult to prevent an escalation of hostilities. See the CROATIA TAB for the assessment we circulated around the community yesterday after the announcement of the cease-fire. [REDACTED]

3. The NSC has prepared a paper on diplomatic strategy for the Croatian crisis (see the MEETING PAPER TAB). The main element of the strategy is to press all parties to halt military operations and exercise restraint (I know what you're thinking!). The NSC proposes that we consult with NATO and the UN about the possibility of threatening to use NATO airstrikes against Krajina Serb targets in the event of

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future attacks on Zagreb or bombing missions out of Udbina Airfield. [REDACTED]

4. There is discord within the Contact Group over how much sanctions relief to offer Milosevic (see SANCTIONS TAB). The European members favor giving Belgrade significantly more sanctions relief than the US in exchange for Belgrade's recognition of Bosnia. Compared to the US plan, the European approach provides substantially more aid to the Serbian economy and lessens the international community's leverage on Serbia to cooperate on other issues. [REDACTED]

5. The Principals remain concerned about the deteriorating situation around Sarajevo. At their meeting last Friday, they tasked us with preparing a paper describing deteriorating conditions around the city (see SARAJEVO AIRPORT TAB). The Principals are considering a threat to attack Bosnian Serb targets if the Serbs fire on incoming aircraft. [REDACTED]

6. Senior policymakers also are concerned about the humanitarian situation in Bihać. There are some reports that the situation is once again becoming desperate with mass starvation on the horizon, and the UN is requesting resumption of airdrops. Needless to say, JCS is not thrilled about the prospect of flying missions into an area with a heavy concentration of Bosnian and Krajina Serb air defense assets.

-- We assess that the situation still is not at the point where airdrops are necessary, and that airdrops would not be sufficient to deal with the problem if real shortages emerge. [REDACTED]

7. I will accompany you to the meeting and serve as notetaker. [REDACTED]

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A. Norman Schindler

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