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1 February 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
2 February 1995

1. Tomorrow's Deputies' Committee meeting agenda looks similar to last week's, focusing on next steps on the diplomatic front, increasing UNPROFOR strength in Bosnia by 6,500, the situation in Croatia, and planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. You will not be required to do an intelligence update or take the lead on any agenda item.

-- Leon Fuerth indicated [redacted] on Tuesday that he may ask to play a CIA-produced video on the Posavina Corridor at the meeting, and request that you introduce it and explain what intelligence "Image Perspective Transformation" can provide. We will play the 4-1/2 minute video at tomorrow's pre-brief; the IPT TAB includes points you can make if called on.

-- You may also be asked to comment on the status of the cease-fire and how long it will hold, since this is an important consideration in determining when we may need to be ready to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal. The MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TAB includes a paper the BTF circulated this week. [redacted]

2. The most significant developments since last week's meeting--none of them good--have been diplomatic.

-- The Contact Group last Friday gave up on efforts to re-start peace negotiations between the Bosnian Government and Serbs.

-- As we have reported this week [redacted] the other Contact Group members are beginning to wonder whether the Contact Group has run its course and a new negotiating process should be tried. French Foreign Minister Juppe this week proposed a "summit of the protagonists" followed by another international conference.

-- Meanwhile, Ambassador Galbraith joined Russian, EU, and UN representatives this week in an effort to present the "Z-4" plan for a negotiated settlement to the Croatia conflict to Tudjman, Milosevic, and Krajina Serb leaders. Tudjman reacted coolly, Milosevic refused to receive the delegation, and

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the Krajina Serbs said they would not consider the plan until Croatia reverses its position on forcing UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Our colleagues in the Bosnia IWG suggest that the "Z-4" plan now is dead.

As a result of these developments, Deputies will need to consider how to advance prospects for negotiations in Bosnia without yielding to pressures by some Contact Group members for negotiating structures that the US would find distasteful, such as appointment of a single European negotiator (Delors has been mentioned as a possibility) or convening a ministerial before the groundwork for success has been established.

- The Deputies will discuss State's recommendation that we try to get Milosevic to recognize Croatia and Bosnia as an easy fix for both problems. Everyone recognizes that Milosevic would need something big in return--significant sanctions relief or reoccupation of the "Yugoslav" seat at the UN.
- The BTF still doubts that Milosevic will recognize Croatia and/or Bosnia, although Tudjman seems to think he is moving in that direction. You may want to warn the Deputies, however, that Milosevic might do things to make it "appear" that Serbia is recognizing Croatia and/or Bosnia. For example, "FRY" authorities could indicate a readiness to move toward recognition--as they have in the past--and then Milosevic could use this as an excuse to oust them at an appropriate time. []

3. JCS will have the lead in the discussion of options for assisting an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. The JCS paper--see TAB C behind the MEETING PAPERS TAB--recommends an agreement in principle to use US ground forces, but these would only be deployed if events on the ground require it (as opposed to deployment from the outset to assist the entire withdrawal). JCS still seems to think that they have as much as several months before efforts to evacuate UNPROFOR would need to begin.

- [] Akashi might begin the withdrawal as early as mid-February.
- The Intelligence Community threat assessment--see page 1 of the paper at TAB D--was dropped from the final paper to save space. The threat may be greater than is conveyed in the final draft. []

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4. This briefing book also includes the following background materials:

- The NEGOTIATIONS TAB includes a paper looking at the dynamics of possible negotiations in Bosnia that assesses the relative weight the parties place on individual issues.
- The CROATIA TAB includes a new BTF assessment of the Krajina Serb military forces. The Croatians have an advantage over the Krajina Serbs, but the Bosnian and Serbian Serbs are likely to come to their support.
- The ARMS TRANSFER TAB includes a summary of the latest intelligence on arms transfers to the Bosnian Muslims.
- The INTER-SERBIAN SANCTIONS TAB includes our latest monthly assessment, which was completed this week. Belgrade has not relaxed its recently-heightened enforcement efforts, but some cooperation problems exist and intelligence reporting suggests the Yugoslav Army continues to support the Bosnian Serb Army.

5. I will accompany you to the meeting and serve as note-taker.

A. Norman Schindler

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