

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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Summary of Conclusions for  
 Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 25, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 12:30-1:35 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
 Bosnia and Croatia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Richard Saunders

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Robert Frasure

DOD:

Joseph Nye

John Klekas

OMB:

Gordon Adams

John Burnim

UN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Norman Schindler

JCS:

LTG Wesley Clark

BG John Walsh

White House:

Nancy Soderberg

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

Donald L. Kerrick

Susan Rice

Summary of ConclusionsBosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the ongoing Contact Group efforts in Bosnia and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed to defer discussion of the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations until next week. Deputies requested that, when the Contact Group is engaged, a daily one-page SITREP on Contact Group activities [redacted] and reports from Ambassador Thomas be circulated for Deputies. (Action: State/CIA)

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Declassify on: OADR

UNPROFOR Augmentation

2. Deputies considered options for moving forward with augmenting UNPROFOR and agreed to:

- A) Continue efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia, including support for the additional 6500 troops requested by the UN.
- B) Urge the United Nations to conduct a serious review of UNPROFOR operations aimed at economizing wherever possible.
- C) Press for a redefinition of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, along the lines proposed by the U.S., which could produce eventual offsets to planned plus-ups in Bosnia. (Action: USUN should begin to encourage the UN Secretariat to focus on a modified mandate)

3. Deputies briefly discussed UNPROFOR funding, noting that the Peacekeeping Deputies would meet on that subject and requested that a plan be prepared for dealing with Congress on funding UNPROFOR. (Action: State) Deputies also requested the preparation of talking points highlighting the value of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the logic of strengthening it. (Action: JCS)

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

4. Deputies discussed a strategy to respond to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. They endorsed the three-pronged approach outlined in the State Croatia strategy paper: seek to maintain the essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiating process between Serbs and Croats on a political settlement; and prepare to respond to the worst-case scenario of renewed hostilities. State will flesh out its paper with results of next week's Zagreb-4 diplomatic efforts and a concept for securing Croatian agreement to a redefined UNPROFOR mandate. (Action: State)

Pol/Mil Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia

5. Deputies reviewed the ongoing planning at the UN and NATO regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. Deputies requested the following work for a follow-up meeting during the week of January 30:

- A) An independent intelligence assessment of the threat to UNPROFOR forces withdrawing from Croatia. (Action: JCS/CIA) (Due within 48 hours)

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- B) An options paper, built on the threat assessment, that includes options ranging from full NATO involvement similar to what is envisaged in Bosnia to more limited options involving air and logistical support. The paper should include the pros/cons of extending to Croatia the President's decision-in-principle to provide U.S. ground forces and an in-depth review of associated prepositioning issues. (Action: JCS, with input from State) (Due Monday, January 30).

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

6. Deputies discussed the upcoming Silajdzic visit, endorsed the approach outlined in the State paper and agreed to ensure he departs with a better understanding of the tepid support for unilateral lift, together with renewed assurances of our support so that Bosnia can confidently engage in negotiations.

7. Deputies decided to defer publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed until after the Silajdzic visit.

8. Deputies agreed to provide the unclassified version of LTG Clark's Congressional remarks on lift to Congress before the Silajdzic visit.

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