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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30-5:55 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

JCS:
Adm. William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

State:
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure
Amb. Peter Galbraith

UN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzal

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the January 10 Contact Group meeting in Paris and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations, while recognizing the political sensitivity

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of the U.S. going beyond the role of facilitator and adopting a formal position on specific issues. (S)

2. Deputies requested two papers for a follow-on meeting during the week of January 16 (papers should be completed by COB January 17):

A) Review and analysis of the sides' positions on the key negotiating issues (Action: CIA).

B) Diplomatic strategy for the period from now until April 30, including possible options for promoting a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down (Action: State). (S)

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

3. Deputies considered options for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31, and the position that should be conveyed to the Croatian envoys following the meeting. They agreed that we should seek to reverse the Croatian decision, stress our concern about the risks of a new war in the Krajina and the dangers the decision posed for the safety of UNPROFOR troops, and make clear to Tudjman he will be on his own if he chooses the military option. (S)

4. Deputies agreed that, as an initial response, we would we would urge the Croatians to delay a public announcement of their decision (scheduled for the following day) pending further consultations. If this were not accepted by the Croatians, Deputies agreed that we would urge them to leave the door open to a less-than-complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions: (S)

-- monitoring the March 29, 1994 ceasefire and separation of forces agreement;

-- headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

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- implementation of the Zagreb-4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;
- humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
- maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

5. As part of this proposal, Deputies agreed that we would offer to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at the political reintegration of the UN Protected Areas based on the revised Zagreb-4 plan, and to undertake a special diplomatic mission to key Western capitals to develop a coordinated Croatia strategy. (S)

6. Deputies decided that we should not threaten to withdraw the President's commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement, or threaten other punitive steps, at this time. (S)

7. Deputies agreed to review the situation at their next meeting, including the Congressional dimension, in light of the Croatian response to the U.S. position set forth above. A paper laying out a diplomatic strategy, including an inventory of possible punitive steps in the U.S. bilateral relationship with Croatia, was subsequently tasked by the Interagency Working Group and should be completed by COB January 17 (Action: State). In addition, the Joint Staff should review the operational implications of a continued UNPROFOR presence in Croatia in support of Bosnia operations in the context of renewed fighting in the Krajina (Action: JCS). (S)

UNPROFOR Strengthening and UNPROFOR Funding

8. Deputies noted the tension between ongoing efforts to strengthen/expand UNPROFOR and the need to reduce our aggregate UN peacekeeping costs. They agreed to address this issue at their next meeting. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts on UNPROFOR strengthening should continue. (S)

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